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conversations with Mike Hindery, when he was Vice Dean for administration 
and finance in the School of  Medicine, and Anja Paardekooper, who served as 
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researchers. With respect to PhD and postdoctoral training, we received valu-
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Introduction
This book seeks to explain organization and funding of  biomedical research in a large academic health center, the University of  California, San 
Francisco (UCSF). Readers of  this book will learn rudiments of  the finances 
of  large academic health centers like UCSF, follow dollars in one center to 
understand where research money comes from and where it goes, and see how 
that center tries to cope with difficult challenges in the 21st century; finally, 
the book will weigh pros and cons of  those coping strategies and suggest 
changes that may make some of  them more effective. Most of  this book’s 
core audience, we suspect, will work at academic health centers, as researchers, 
physicians, teachers, leaders, administrators, students, and trainees. 
Why Research? Why this book?
Why should a single US academic health center merit a book focused on its 
research funding? The question merits three short answers. First, for half  a 
century, excellent research has been considered an absolute requirement for aca-
demic biomedical enterprises that seek to lead. We feel that research should 
play that essential role for the next half  century and beyond, despite the many 
challenges this book will describe. 
Second, the nation’s academic health centers are complex and anomalous 
institutional chimeras. Few schools of  any other academic discipline mix stu-
dents, teachers, and researchers with a business enterprise that earns hundreds 
of  millions of  dollars every year. These health centers make crucial contribu-
tions to society and the world, but their inner workings are often mysteri-
ous to their own employees, including many researchers, teachers, and health 
care professionals who know little about their colleagues’ work, goals, and 
concerns. Our bland terms for their main missions—research, education, and 
patient care—are much too tame to capture the internal energy, synergies, and 
conflicts that emit so much heat, along with dazzling flashes of  light. In short, 
it is time for these medical centers to start understanding themselves.
Third, these large academic centers face a scary challenge: can they devise 
a long-term, sustainable model for funding biomedical research? The pres-
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ent model for delivery of  clinical care works reasonably well, despite myriad 
glitches and problems. But in each of  these centers clinical care and research 
exist in an uneasy tension, both competing with and depending upon one 
another. For such institutions—and their research—to survive, economic suc-
cess of  the clinical enterprise is an absolute necessity. In addition to dollars, 
the clinicians’ focus on disease and its treatment pose critical questions, old 
and new, for researchers to tackle. In the opposite direction, researchers’ dis-
coveries—from the role of  infectious microbes and development of  antibiot-
ics many decades ago to more recent organ transplantation, stem cells, and 
effective therapies for heart disease and cancer—are dramatically transform-
ing clinical care. A once modest capacity for comforting patients and palliating 
symptoms has become a powerful engine for treating and preventing disease, 
creating an industry responsible for a large fraction of  the nation’s Gross Do-
mestic Product. Every effective intervention in the clinic depends on past 
scientific discoveries, many of  which originated in academic health centers. 
In the meantime, however, it is not clear that surplus clinical income of  
an academic medical center can suffice to support the research mission. At 
present that mission depends on an unstable, cobbled-together mélange of  
funding from federal sources and philanthropy, plus supplements from the 
clinical enterprise. Can these institutions devise ways to stabilize and sustain 
that support over the long term? 
For these three reasons, academic health centers very much merit our 
attention. But why, then, focus on this academic health center, UCSF? The 
institution does qualify as large and successful, and this book’s authors both 
spent most of  their careers at UCSF, and know it fairly well. More important, 
UCSF’s finances are accessible to public scrutiny, because UCSF is a public 
institution. Accordingly, in 2013 UCSF’s then Chancellor, Susan Desmond-
Hellman, gave the authors permission to look into the university’s books and 
encouraged UCSF officials to share their knowledge with us. Chancellor Sam 
Hawgood, her successor, did the same. For the authors this stroke of  good 
luck was crucial, because (we suspect), no private university’s health center 
would welcome such scrutiny. Consequently, this book’s deficiencies are our 
own, and cannot be blamed on a secretive, uncooperative institution. 
Scope and themes
The book, we hope, will challenge and intrigue its readers. Their principal 
challenge is the overwhelming size and complexity of  the institution we de-
scribe. Indeed, writing this book repeatedly forced the authors to recognize 
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and repair their own ignorance, despite the fact that both had spent their ca-
reers at this institution—one as a researcher and sometime department chair, 
the other as a financial analyst and Vice Chancellor of  Finance. Similarly, 
chapters that bristle with complex graphs, tables, and arcana of  institutional 
finance may daunt readers, even those familiar with a similar institution and 
already aware of  their own ignorance. Such readers should first focus their 
attention on issues that affect their ability to do their jobs, skimming gory but 
less directly relevant complexities, to which they may return if  and when the 
need arises. 
As compensation for complexity’s rigors, readers will find themselves 
grappling with dramatic human questions. Like the individuals whose striv-
ing lives make them work, large institutions are always driven by hope, and 
hope is often dashed by cold reality. Both ordinary lives and institutions run 
in cycles: when promise and hope fail, individuals and institutions wrestle with 
complication, compromise, wins, and losses. Fortunately, they usually return 
with renewed eagerness to tackle yet another cycle. 
Like other US biomedical research centers, UCSF promises to discover 
new knowledge of  biology, explain causes of  disease, and improve its treat-
ment. To redeem its promises, the institution confronts harsh reality in a 
crowded marketplace, where it weighs value and opportunity against assets, 
cost, and risk, and where many dollars will be gained or lost. Together, such 
market decisions—made by nearly 30,000 individuals, all engaged in their own 
promise-reality cycles—guide all UCSF’s components, including its academic 
campus, teaching hospitals, schools, departments, laboratories, researchers, 
health care providers, staff, students, and faculty. 
For academic biomedical researchers—including almost 2,000 faculty 
members at UCSF—the principal, and by far the most relentless promise-
reality cycle oscillates between two poles. At one pole, the beckoning promise 
of  biomedical science and a cornucopia of  recent discoveries strongly sustain 
their hopes for new discoveries and miraculous disease treatments. The cor-
nucopia’s promise is real. At every level—molecules, genes, cells, the brain, the 
gut, the heart, the immune system, primary tumors, metastases, whole organ-
isms, all the way to doctors and patients—hard work and modern technology 
can answer questions that could not even be asked ten years ago. Some of  
the answers, we know, will lead to profoundly useful discoveries. But the op-
posite pole is scary: increasingly, harsh reality discourages, delays, or prevents 
discovery, because dollars—grants, salaries, the cost of  a critical scientific 
instrument—cannot be found or are already spent. A host of  financial and 
administrative rationales, motivations, conventions, traditions, and policies—
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nationally, in the government and the economy, as well as in the institution 
itself—intervene between an idea’s promise and its realization by experiment, 
as this book will show. 
Individual humans and large institutions resemble one another in a sec-
ond way: both are driven by inherited values, learned habits, knowledge, skills, 
and procedures, all modified by past experience. A person’s memory, learned 
skills, and character correspond, in institutions, nations, and businesses, to 
something economists call “cultural capital”. Unlike revenues, expenses, costs, 
loans, assets, liabilities, risks, margins, losses, capital expenditures, and ordi-
nary economic capital, cultural capital is hard to quantify, but can generate 
immense power—as Aztecs learned from Cortez, and climate scientists find 
when they try to persuade us to reduce our reliance on fossil fuels. 
Every quantifiable variable at UCSF—and every dollar from any source 
that goes to this or that destination—depends directly on the state of  at least 
one fierce (but often quiet) struggle waged between distinct human “cultures.” 
These cultures may belong to different institutions—another university, a com-
peting deliverer of  patient care, a government agency, or the US Congress—
or, within UCSF, to specific missions, including research, teaching, patient 
care, and their many sub-varieties. Each such culture—readers will encounter 
at least one on almost every page of  this book—has its own leaders, follow-
ers, bedrock tenets, traditions, convictions, unifying drives and sub-divisions, 
virtues and faults. Over time each culture competes against or synergizes with 
others, changes in myriad ways, may subdivide itself, and (eventually) dies. 
How to use this book
Science inevitably produces change. That is how the triumphs of  20th-century 
biomedical research unleashed external forces that push the biomedical sci-
ence culture toward further changes today. External pressures do not always 
point in the right direction, however. Can the biomedical research culture 
grasp its own destiny by deliberately choosing which paths to take? Or will it 
avoid such choices until external change steers it in directions it cannot toler-
ate? The answers depend on how well the research culture understands its 
environment and its own workings. A few senior scientists urged one of  the 
authors not to write this book, because it might discourage young people from 
embarking on research careers and demoralize striving young scientists. Their 
sotto voce argument: only the old guard can be trusted to handle sordid money 
questions. The argument is wrong, for closely related reasons:
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1. Young scientists and would-be scientists must learn about money, 
because their futures critically depend on it, and because they will soon 
be in charge. 
2. The immense promise of  21st-century research can be realized only if  
institutions and researchers learn how to spend their money, and when 
not to spend it. 
3. No scientist, leader of  science, or reader can afford to ignore the 
powerful leverage furnished by understanding any complex 
mechanism—how bases pair in a double helix, how AIDS viruses 
replicate, or how large institutions finance research. 
 
Because scientists who understand science funding can do better science, this 
book can be useful in three different ways. First, it serves as a primer and 
guide for students, professors, staff, administrators, and academic leaders who 
need to navigate the maze of  revenues, expenses, governance, and academic 
cultures that controls biomedical research within large US research universi-
ties. The primer focuses on one such university, but will prove a useful guide 
to parallel complexities in many, because underlying themes vary little, even 
when details differ. Second, some facts and inferences in this book will furnish 
genuine surprises for readers who explore mysteries of  indirect cost recovery, 
faculty researcher salaries paid from sponsored projects, endowments, capital 
investments, or different research cultures. The surprises will educate naïve 
beginners, while veterans who venture beyond their own well-tended gardens 
will discover flora and fauna in many a neighboring wilderness. 
In addition to serving as a guide through complexity and a vehicle for 
education and surprise, we hope this book’s inferences and interpretations, 
hard questions and tentative answers will persuade readers to think hard about 
how to sustain the fragile ecosystem of  academic biomedical research for the 
next 10, 20, or 50 years. While the book’s quantitative facts are as accurate as 
we could make them, our inferences or interpretations deal with ever-shifting 
human attitudes and behaviors, where categorical black and white judgments 
can be right, wrong, or sometimes both at once. We urge readers to tackle our 
questions, interpretations, and proposed remedies head-on, instead of  dis-
missing them outright as simply wrong, or perhaps right but irrelevant to their 
own particular situation. Some of  this book’s questions may be poorly framed, 
its interpretations mistaken, and its proposals inadequate. But close examina-
tion will reveal the extreme fragility of  academic biomedical research, and—
we believe—the root cause of  that fragility: that curiosity-driven research can 
never thrive under conditions that require it to produce profit or even to sup-
6 Follow the Money
port itself, over the short term; instead, its real long-term value—medical, so-
cial, or economic—absolutely requires it to fail more often than it succeeds. In 
a “business model” society driven by short-term rewards, research’s long-term 
rewards require long-term investments. Readers who confront this paradox 
head on can ask better questions, provide more correct interpretations, and—
if  we are lucky—craft corrective actions that work. 
Finally, the rest of  this book is organized in 10 chapters, which begin 
by sketching UCSF as a research university, and then proceed through its 
complex human and financial components. Chapter 1 first presents the 
financial “big picture” of  UCSF as it was in Fiscal Year 2014 (FY2014), as well 
as its remarkable expansion and increases in revenue over the past 30 years, 
and then sketches changes within and outside the university that pose major 
challenges. Chapters 2-6 explore: revenue streams; investments, endowments, 
and research facilities; indirect costs of  research (i.e., dollars not paid by grants 
to investigators); how decisions are made to distribute research money, hire 
faculty, and start new projects; and how patient care revenues, research grants, 
and university coffers support faculty salaries and benefits. Interpretations 
and inferences abound in chapters 7-9, which focus on the organization 
and funding of  research and graduate education in basic science and clinical 
departments, as well as the fertile and sometimes conflicted relations between 
clinical and “basic” research. In chapters 1-9, the primary aim is to describe, 
analyze, diagnose, and identify major issues—that is, not to prescribe remedies 
but to provide information that may enable readers to devise their own 
remedies. The final chapter summarizes UCSF’s present successes, many 
challenges it faces, and dangerous threats to sustaining its research mission. 
Then it proposes changes that may allow UCSF and other research universities 
to handle both their successes and their challenges more effectively. 
Chapter 1
Today’s enterprise reflects decades of change
The University of  California, San Francisco (UCSF) comprises a health care system and four Schools—Dentistry, Nursing, Pharmacy, and 
Medicine. In multiple hospitals and two main academic campuses, it pursues 
three missions: education, research, and treatment of  disease. In fiscal year 
2014 (FY2014), UCSF employed 22,928 people, and earned revenues of  $4.45 
billion (B) per year (1). It taught 5,632 students and trainees (that is, graduate 
professional students, graduate PhD and MS students, postdocs, and residents; 
1). Its hospitals admitted 29,230 patients and managed 963,692 outpatient 
visits (2). In the same fiscal year, it received $992 million (M) in federal, state 
and private grants or contracts designated to support research (3). Together, 
these research dollars accounted for 22% of  UCSF’s total revenues, and a 
much larger proportion (48%) of  those of  its academic core, or Campus, 
as distinguished from (and not including) its clinical enterprise. In size and 
quality, UCSF’s clinical care and research both rank consistently among the 
top US academic medical centers. 
As the 21st century unfolds, UCSF takes pride in its accomplishments 
and delight in its future prospects. Still, dark clouds loom, all related to prob-
lems UCSF shares with other leading US academic biomedical centers. First, 
UCSF’s size and multifarious missions make it so complex that many fac-
ulty—and even some officials and financial gurus—do not understand how it 
works. Many faculty and employees remain confused about where UCSF gets 
its money and how it is spent. UCSF’s diverse missions complement and rein-
force, but also compete against and hinder one another. Not knowing where 
the dollars flow makes it harder for proponents of  each separate mission to 
assess their roles and contributions in relation to those of  their competitors. 
Second, unpredictable economic, social, and political changes threaten 
the fiscal integrity of  UCSF and other biomedical research institutions: the 
US economy is still recovering from a major recession; federal and state 
governments become less and less willing to increase or even stably maintain 
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financial support for clinical care, research, and education; costs of  faculty 
and employee salaries, health benefits, and pensions continue to rise; as 
patient populations age and need complex new therapies, costs of  clinical care 
dramatically increase; modes of  payment for clinical care appear increasingly 
volatile and unstable; driven by opportunities for improving human welfare, 
biomedical research expands and becomes even more expensive. 
Finally, in addition to external threats, UCSF—again, like many other 
academic medical centers—faces crucial internal dilemmas created by its own 
success. These affect all UCSF’s missions, but none more profoundly than its 
research. UCSF’s research mission, the primary focus of  this and subsequent 
chapters, requires the institution to grapple with internal dilemmas that involve 
governance, long-standing programs, salaries, other financial commitments, 
choices among competing scientific questions, and different goals for the rate 
and direction of  the institution’s growth and the quality of  its research. Fail-
ure to understand how the institutional “machine” works can delay or distort 
crucial decisions and recognition of  hidden problems, some of  which may 
require UCSF to revise or even discard inherited habits and practices. 
The potential dangers of  misunderstanding prompted this book’s focus 
on financing research at UCSF. We shall “follow the money” as it flows into 
UCSF’s biomedical research, within the larger context of  an institution that 
also pursues critical missions in education and patient care. In following re-
search dollars, we shall often treat other missions as detail-free “black boxes,” 
except in cases where either mission impinges directly on research—e.g., in 
teaching PhD student researchers or in using patient care revenues to support 
research. 
To set the stage for describing specific aspects of  UCSF’s research fi-
nances, this first chapter presents the current “big picture” snapshot of  UCSF 
and sketches dramatic changes over three decades that created major challeng-
es. Remarkably, these challenges prevented neither continuing expansion of  
UCSF’s revenues nor the growing strength of  its missions, including research. 
Such success, in the face of  profound change, attests to the extraordinary in-
genuity, ability, and motivation of  UCSF’s people, who constitute the bulk of  
its collective “cultural capital,” as we indicated in the Introduction. It is also 
worth emphasizing that UCSF is one of  many US research institutions that 
face the same difficult challenges and profound changes in the 21st century, as 
indicated in broad overviews of  the finances of  such institutions (4,5). 
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Governance 
As a center for health science education, research, and clinical care, UCSF is 
one of  the ten campuses of  the University of  California (UC). Fig. 1-1a shows 
UCSF’s formal governance, including executives who make high-level execu-
tive decisions. At the top is the Chancellor (Sam Hawgood, appointed by UC’s 
President in July 2014). As chief  administrative officer, the Chancellor pre-
sides over both UCSF’s Campus, or academic core, and its clinical enterprise, 
which was termed the Medical Center (MC) until July 2014, when it became 
UCSF Health. The Chancellor appoints the Chief  Executive Officer (CEO) 
Fig. 1-1 a & b. UCSF’s governance structure. See main text for explanation of  the governance 
of  UCSF (panel a) and UCSF Health (panel b). Abbreviations: Administration; CEO, chief  
executive officer; LC, Leadership Council; SOM, School of  Medicine.
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of  UCSF Health, deans of  the Schools of  Dentistry, Nursing, Pharmacy, and 
Medicine, and vice chancellors in charge of  various administrative activities 
within the Chancellor’s office. Deans administer education and research in 
their Schools through the chairpersons of  academic departments. 
The Office of  UCSF Health (Fig. 1-1b) comprises the Chancellor and 
two of  his appointees: Mark Laret, President and CEO of  the UCSF Health 
System, and the Dean of  the School of  Medicine, Talmadge King, is also vice 
chair of  UCSF Health. (The Chancellor appointed King, formerly chair of  the 
medical school’s Department of  Medicine, to the deanship in May, 2015.) The 
Office of  UCSF Health administers the clinical enterprise through a “board” 
or Leadership Council (health system executives and chairs of  clinical depart-
ments in the School of  Medicine), plus other committees (not in the Figure) 
composed of  clinical department chairs and faculty members. 
Governance charts tend to mask troublesome devils-behind-the-details, 
many of  which we’ll meet in later chapters. Here we sketch three of  the most 
important: 
1. UCSF’s missions overlap and compete for space, money, and faculty time and 
effort. 
2. Who is in charge? Governance charts formally depict which administrator 
reports to which superior official, but not the real distribution of  power, 
which at UCSF is especially strong at the levels of  clinical specialties in 
UCSF Health and of  Campus departments, relative to deans of  Schools 
and the Chancellor’s office. 
3. Size differences among entities within administrative units. The clinical enterprise 
brings in 54% of  UCSF’s total income (Fig. 1-2a; 1), including 
professional fees that pay many faculty; the School of  Medicine accounts 
for 86% of  Campus expenditures attributable to Schools (6); within the 
School of  Medicine, the Department of  Medicine earns and spends 
more than 20% of  all revenues—more, indeed, than the combined 
revenues and expenses of  24 of  the School’s 43 departments (6); 
several of  that Department’s subspecialty divisions are bigger and more 
complex than many academic departments.
All major academic health centers face similar hidden devils, with variations 
that reflect separate evolutionary paths and environments. As such enterprises 
grow, inevitable internal tensions among diverse goals, levels of  power, and 
different-sized functional units can threaten to make old challenges worse and 
to slow or inhibit nimble responses to unpredictable new challenges from the 
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Fig. 1-2. Revenues in FY2014. Panels present revenue streams of: (a) all of  UCSF, including 
the clinical enterprise; (b) the Campus only, excluding the clinical enterprise. Data derived 
from reference 1 and 3. The table lists each revenue stream with a number (from 1-10) that 
corresponds to numbers of  the pie slices in panel a or the nine slices in panel b, in clockwise 
order (except that number 10, the extremely thin tuition and fees slice, is not numbered in 
the pie diagram of  panel a). Close inspection reveals that three revenue categories here differ 
from those depicted in the temporal trends shown in Figs. 4 and 5 (see also, Fig. 4 legend). 
The most striking is the Professional Fees category ($449M) (7), which is marked with an 
asterisk (1*) and cross-hatched in panel a. These funds are formally part of  the Clinical Enter-
prise, and are simply included in that larger category in the graphs of  trends from FY1984 to 
FY2014. In FY2014 and previous years UCSF always included professional fees as revenue of  
the clinical enterprise, because they were largely collected by the teaching hospitals. After col-
lection, these funds are transferred to the Campus, which distributes them to academic clinical 
departments that pay salaries to faculty engaged in patient care. Two other changes resulted 
in appearance of  new categories (shown in panels a and b) that are not separately depicted 
in Figs. 1-4 and 1-5: private gifts (no. 8 in Fig. 2-2a) are included in the private gifts, contracts 
and grants category of  Figs. 1-4 and 1-5; investment income (no. 9 in Fig. 1-2) was included in 
the “auxiliary and other” category of  Figs. 1-4 and 1-5.
Fig. 1-2a
Fig. 1-2b
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outside. These chapters focus on challenges that affect UCSF’s research and 
how UCSF responds to them. 
Revenues and expenditures
To help keep our bearings as we explore the complex maze of  UCSF’s re-
search finances, we begin with low-resolution snapshots of  the institution’s 
financial landscape in FY2014 (1). Significant proportions of  UCSF’s total 
$4.452B in revenues in that year (Fig. 1-2a) include federal, state and private 
contracts and grants (together, 27%, primarily for research), professional fees 
(10%) (7), and patient care revenues of  UCSF’s clinical enterprise (44%). No 
other revenue category brings in more than 5% of  the total.
Relative sizes of  academic revenues stand out more prominently if  we 
depict them as proportions of  the academic Campus by itself  (that is, the 
“academic” 46% that remains after excluding the clinical enterprise; Fig. 1-2b). 
The largest slices of  this $2.062B Campus pie are: federal contracts and grants 
(32% of  Campus revenues); private contracts and grants (12%); state and local 
contracts and grants (11%); a grab-bag category vaguely termed “educational 
activities” (11%), which represents a miscellany of  sales and services related to 
clinical care, along with a few genuinely educational activities; and educational 
appropriations from the state of  California (10%). Four remaining categories 
(private gifts, auxiliary and other, investment income, and student tuition and 
fees) together account for ~24% of  Campus revenues. 
In FY2014 the largest expenditures (Fig. 1-3) of  both the Campus (67%) 
and the clinical enterprise (61%) went to employee salaries and benefits, such 
as the employer’s share of  pension funds, health insurance, etc. Expenses of  
the clinical enterprise for materials, supplies, and utilities (33%) proportion-
ately exceed those of  the Campus (25%). 
This low-resolution view reveals two important sets of  facts: (i) the clini-
cal enterprise accounts for a large proportion of  UCSF’s revenues, and allows 
clinical faculty to earn professional fees that pay substantial proportions of  
their salaries; (ii) most Campus revenues depend on federal and private con-
tracts and grants for research, plus professional fees brought in by faculty 
clinicians, with smaller amounts from the state (for teaching) or from auxiliary 
sales and services. In subsequent essays we shall see how these facts influence 
UCSF’s priorities and research goals.
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Growth over three decades 
To capture trends and striking changes in UCSF’s finances over the past three 
decades, we plot UCSF’s revenues from FY1984 through FY2013 (8). The 
resulting graphs present these revenues in various accounting categories—that 
is, the Campus plus the clinical enterprise (here termed Teaching Hospitals) 
(Fig. 1-4) or Campus revenues only (Fig. 1-5, excluding Teaching Hospitals). 
Both figures present the categories on three different scales: nominal US dol-
lars (panels 1-4a or 1-5a); 1984 dollars, thus correcting subsequent values for 
inflation (panels 1-4b or 1-5b) (9); or as a percentage of  the whole UCSF or 
Campus budget for that year (panels 1-4c or 1-5c). (Two small points, related 
to accounting changes: (i) revenue categories in FY2013 and previous years 
differ slightly from those of  FY2014, as described in the legends of  Figs. 1-2 
Fig. 1-3a
Fig. 1-3b
Fig. 1-3. Expenses in FY2014. Panels present expenditures of: (a) the clinical enterprise; (b) 
the Campus only, excluding the clinical enterprise. Data derived from reference 1. As in Fig. 
1-2, in each panel each numbered expense category (in the table) corresponds to a pie slice 
(numbered in clockwise order). 
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and 1-4; (ii) boxes at the center of  all panels of  Figs. 1-4 and 1-5 obscure data 
from FY1998-2000, because transient changes in accounting practices during 
those years, related to the temporary merger of  UCSF’s MC with Stanford 
Health Services, produced distracting aberrations that are not relevant to our 
conclusions and inferences. 
Fig. 1-4 shouts one message, loud and clear: revenue growth of  UCSF’s 
medical teaching hospitals dwarfs changes in all other categories. Over three 
decades the teaching hospitals (dark blue, in each panel) grew 17.7-fold from 
$135M to $2.39B, in nominal US $ (Fig. 1-4a). Even corrected for inflation 
(Fig. 1-4b), over this 30 years Teaching Hospital revenue grew to 5.9-fold its 
size in FY1984, while combined (and inflation-corrected) Campus revenue 
barely doubled (2.1-fold). Overall, in 1984 dollars, UCSF’s revenues increased 
to 3.4-fold its size 30 years earlier. In 1984 dollars, of  the $1.073B increase 
in all revenues, the clinical enterprise accounted for $681M, or 64%. Conse-
quently, by FY2014 the Teaching Hospitals accounted for 54% of  UCSF’s to-
tal revenues, or ~1.8-fold its percentage in FY1984; conversely, the academic 
Campus’s share decreased from 70% to 46% (Fig. 1-4c). 
Data in Fig. 1-4 support two inferences. First, the clinical enterprise’s re-
markable growth reflects its high standards for delivering clinical care and skills 
and hard work of  staff  and leadership in a tough competitive environment. 
Indeed, the inflation-corrected 5.9-fold change in Teaching Hospital revenues 
over three decades (Fig. 1-4b) exceeds the approximate quintupling (10) of  
overall US healthcare spending (also inflation-corrected) during the same pe-
riod. Second, it is likely that the growing financial predominance of  clinical 
Fig. 1-4a
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Fig. 1-4b
Fig. 1-4c
Fig. 1-4. Trends of  UCSF’s revenue streams, including both the Campus and the clinical 
enterprise, over three decades, from FY1984 to FY 2014 (8). Panels present separate revenue 
streams: (a) in nominal dollars; (b) in inflation-corrected 1984 dollars (9); (c) as percentages of  
UCSF’s total revenues for each fiscal year. Revenue categories are identical in all 3 panels, ar-
ranged in order (top to bottom of  each graph): student tuition and fees (TF); state educational 
appropriation (SEA); federal contracts and grants (Fed); private C&G  and gifts (PRV); Local 
and state C&G (LOC); Auxiliary and other (AUX); educational activities (EA); Teaching Hos-
pitals (TH, aka the clinical enterprise). Vertical boxes, marked Merger/De-merger, obscure 
misleading, bumpy data from years in which the clinical enterprises of  UCSF and Stanford 
University transiently merged, then de-merged (see main text); in this regard, note that dollars 
assigned to the EA category are conspicuously lower after than before the merger/demerger, 
a change that largely reflects transfer of  professional fees from EA to the teaching hospital, 
and thus contribute to (but do not fully account for) the large and persistently increasing 
apparent growth of  the clinical enterprise. Note that the detailed breakdown of  revenue cat-
egories differs slightly from those in Fig. 1-2, as explained in the Fig. 1-2 legend.
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care, in comparison to academic research and teaching, has exerted significant 
effects on UCSF’s values, governance, and development, and must have also 
garnered greater attention and effort from institutional leaders. More directly 
relevant to our main concern with research, growth in clinical care revenues 
requires more faculty physicians, many of  whom also become researchers in 
clinical departments—and seek more grant money, laboratory space and facili-
ties, students, postdocs, and technicians. 
Fig. 1-4c depicts the various revenue categories as percentages of  total 
UCSF revenues over the years: strikingly, the proportionately large relative 
growth of  UCSF’s clinical enterprise was accompanied by an equally impres-
sive proportional dwindling of  state appropriations to UCSF for education. 
As we shall see, the opposite changes in these two revenue categories, state 
funds and clinical enterprise revenues, pose important challenges for UCSF in 
the 21st century.
Trends in Campus revenues over the past three decades (Fig. 1-5) high-
light both the decrease in state support for education and impressive increases 
in research support. A quick glance at Campus revenue trends in nominal US 
dollars (Fig. 1-5a) may suggest that revenue categories increased in roughly 
the same proportion, but that impression is wrong. For instance, correcting 
revenues in these categories for inflation (Fig. 1-5b) shows clearly that state 
educational appropriations decreased by ~30% from FY1984 to FY2014, while 
overall Campus revenues increased 2.3-fold. Now, as in the past, those state 
funds primarily support faculty salaries, and more especially those of  research-
ers who cannot earn professional fees for patient care. In contrast, revenue 
categories primarily related to research increased markedly: by FY 2014, fed-
Fig. 1-5a
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Fig. 1-5. Trends of  the revenue streams of  UCSF’s Campus, excluding the clinical enterprise, 
over three decades, from FY1984 to FY 2014 (8). Panels present separate revenue streams: 
(a) in nominal dollars; (b) in inflation-corrected 1984 dollars (9); (c) as percentages of  UCSF’s 
total revenues for each fiscal year. Abbreviations of  revenue sources are as specified in the 
legend of  Fig. 1-4. For vertical boxes, marked Merger-Demerger, see legend to Fig. 1-4. The 
revenue categories shown differ from those in Fig. 1-2, as explained in the Fig. 1-2 legend.
Fig. 1-5b
Fig. 1-5c
eral contracts brought in 2.4-fold greater revenues than in FY1984; for private 
gifts, grants & contracts the increase was much larger, to 6.2-fold. By FY2014, 
these two categories, which predominantly pay for research, together account-
ed for 24% of  total UCSF revenues (Fig. 1-4a) and 52% of  Campus revenues 
(Fig. 1-5a). Corrected for inflation, FY2014 revenues from local and state con-
tracts, which relate primarily to clinical services, increased 4.6-fold over three 
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decades, and the Auxiliary and other category (which includes largely self-
supporting services like parking and housing) grew 9.1-fold. Student tuition 
and fees (from matriculated professional and graduate students) grew 2.9-fold, 
but still account for a tiny fraction of  UCSF’s revenues. 
Finally, considering these revenue categories as percentages of  all 
Campus revenues (Fig. 1-5c) draws the starkest picture. In the early 1980s, 
as an academic Campus UCSF derived about one third of  its revenues in the 
form of  tax-derived dollars from the state of  California, predominantly in 
the form of  salaries for its faculty (that is, state educational appropriations). 
By 2014 the faculty had grown much larger, but tax-supported faculty salary 
support from the university had decreased 3-fold, to barely 10% of  Campus 
revenues. Where did UCSF’s faculty find salary money to replace the missing 
state appropriations? By and large, clinicians derived ever-greater proportions 
of  their salary from delivery of  health care services. Lacking that option, 
most PhD researchers had to garner more salary from research-targeted 
contracts, grants, and gifts to them and the Campus. For decades, federal plus 
private support for research have constituted a substantial fraction of  UCSF’s 
Campus revenues: that fraction grew from ~39% in the early 1980s to ~52% in 
FY2014. Although UCSF remains a leading target for federal research support 
(~31% vs. 32% of  Campus revenues in FY1984 vs. FY2014), the private 
sector (predominantly industry) accounted for 21% of  Campus revenues in 
FY2014, vs. 7% in FY1984.  
In summary, the low-resolution picture of  financial trends in Figs. 4 and 
5 reveals key features of  UCSF’s past and present, and suggests auguries for 
its future.
1. In the early 1980s, the institution’s effort, apportioned almost equally be-
tween medical care delivery and biomedical research, was held together 
by generous support for its Campus by taxpayers, through the University 
of  California. 
2. Subsequent rapid growth of  its clinical activities, in combination with cur-
tailed taxpayer contributions to academic missions, converted UCSF into 
a predominantly clinical enterprise with a substantial research component 
and a faculty whose salaries depend increasingly on clinical work and/or 
grant dollars.
3. Increasing predominance of  the health-care mission bolsters the research 
mission by attracting clinically competent faculty who also engage in re-
search. At the same time, their clinically oriented research competes for 
institutional attention and resources against more basic research.
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4. At present the clinical enterprise’s prosperity and momentum help to sup-
port all of  UCSF, but health care’s large share of  US GDP (almost double 
that of  many other developed countries; 11) may not always be sustained. 
Should UCSF diversify its part of  the health-care juggernaut and curb its 
headlong growth? 
5. UCSF’s research—clinical, basic, and in between—remains vibrant and 
productive, but risks outgrowing available funding, especially from the 
federal government.
Future challenges
This chapter has sketched UCSF’s governance structure, outlined its current 
revenues and expenses, and revealed major changes in its revenue pattern over 
the past three decades. To conclude, here we summarize major financial and 
other challenges that are highlighted in subsequent chapters, under three gen-
eral headings.
Changes outside UCSF underlie many present challenges, including:
1. Ever-decreasing availability of  state funds, as taxpayers become less 
willing to continue paying for education and research. 
2. Decreases in previously generous support from the federal government 
for education, patient care, and—just as crucially—biomedical research.
3. A major economic recession, now slowly resolving, sapped political 
support for governmental investment in academic research, education, 
and patient care, and also damped private giving and support for 
collaborative research from industry.
4. The highly competitive health care industry has rapidly expanded, but 
also fears potential instabilities produced by controversy over 
government support for medical care and rising costs and complexity of  
drugs and other therapies. 
5. In the US and internationally, both basic and applied biomedical research 
are subject to rapid change and strong competition. 
Reduced available resources, imbalanced missions, and increasing costs of doing business all 
reflect effects of  external changes beyond control of  UCSF, including:
6. Loss of  state revenues forces UCSF’s missions to compete against one 
another, leading clinicians to suspect that a portion of  their professional 
fees is distributed disproportionately to support education and research, 
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and researchers and educators to worry that UCSF does not sufficiently 
value their contributions. 
7. Driven by inflation and competitive hiring by other institutions, faculty 
and staff  salaries and benefits (e.g., pensions and medical insurance) 
continue to rise, reducing funds available for programmatic and strategic 
purposes. 
8. Employee pensions since 1990 required no UCSF contributions, but 
owing to the recent economic recession in FY2012 UCSF was required 
in to support pension funds with dollars that added 8% to its total salary 
expenditures; now this extra contribution from UCSF’s coffers has risen 
to 14% of  salary expenditures (12). 
Intrinsic characteristics and practices reduce institutional flexibility and responsiveness to 
new challenges: 
9. Creaky, bottom-up traditions of  campus governance change slowly and 
tightly constrain responses to rapid changes in UCSF’s environment. 
10. Rapid expansion of  both research laboratories and clinical facilities 
imposes large debt obligations. By FY2025, planned construction and 
renovation are projected to double the cost of  servicing debts (interest), 
to ~$231M per year (13,14), making it harder to fund strategies for 
tackling new challenges while maintaining existing programs and 
facilities. 
11. External funds, federal and private, pay very large fractions of  many 
researchers’ salaries, putting hundreds of  faculty at risk if  external 
sources diminish further and impairing mutual loyalties of  UCSF and its 
research faculty to each other.
12. Despite evidence that available resources are limited, UCSF as a whole 
behaves as if  quality and quantity are synonyms, and exhibits little 
interest in plans that do not require expansion of  personnel, facilities, 
and programs. Should UCSF try more actively to shape new directions 
for its research and clinical juggernauts, or hang on and enjoy both rides 
while they last?
Our chapters will repeatedly encounter each of  these challenges. Their 
resemblance—financial (4) and otherwise—to challenges faced by other 
academic research centers should strike responsive chords in scientists, 
physicians, students, administrators, staff, and patients whose lives and hopes 
depend on the future of  academic biomedical research. 
Chapter 2
Revenue generates and constrains opportunity
Academic research institutions constantly weigh tempting opportunities against limited and constrained resources. Opportunities always cost 
money, ranging from the relatively small ($~0.5-2.0M) start-up fund for a hot-
shot young researcher, to several $M for an academic program focused on a 
new field, to more than $1B for constructing, equipping, and populating the 
first buildings of  a new campus. For UCSF, a $4.452B-per-year enterprise, 
potential resources for pursuing such opportunities fall under three headings: 
(i) Relatively reliable revenue streams from many sources; (ii) gifts and endow-
ments; (iii) physical space and facilities, produced by capital investment of  
philanthropic gifts and loans. This chapter, along with chapters 3, 4, and 5, 
will explain these financial resources, constraints and opportunities associated 
with each, and how UCSF uses its “margin” between revenue and expense. 
(“Margin,” the institutional term for what an ordinary business calls profit, 
provides financial elbow-room for achieving future aspirations.) This back-
ground information will set the stage for exploring UCSF’s research finances 
in detail. The present chapter focuses on reliable revenue streams and gifts 
and endowments. 
Revenue streams
These “streams” derive from UCSF’s ongoing operations, in amounts that 
change relatively little from year to year but can trend substantially upward or 
downward over longer periods. Concentrating primarily on FY2014 revenues, 
we describe in more detail the revenue streams introduced in chapter 1, and 
indicate whether and to what degree UCSF can use each category’s revenue to 
tackle new opportunities. 
Clinical revenues. Six-fold growth over 30 years made UCSF’s teaching 
hospitals the institution’s largest single revenue generator ($2.39B, or 54% of  
its total revenues in FY2014; 1). UCSF currently operates hospitals on three 
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separate campuses in San Francisco (Parnassus, Mt. Zion, and Mission Bay), 
plus another across the Bay, the Benioff  and Oakland Children’s Hospital. In 
addition, UCSF assists the City and County of  San Francisco in operating San 
Francisco General Medical Center and provides operational support to the Ft. 
Miley VA Medical Center in San Francisco. Each hospital serves as a training 
site for UCSF medical, nursing and pharmacy students. The hospitals also al-
low UCSF physicians to generate professional fee income ($449M; 2), collect-
ed by the clinical enterprise and transferred to the Campus. Professional fees 
still counted as Medical Center revenue for FY2014, but in reality, this revenue 
category “belongs” to both segments of  the UCSF enterprise (see below). 
Grants and contracts for research. This revenue source pumps most of  the 
blood that sustains UCSF’s research and teaching missions. In FY2014, it came 
to $992M and accounted for 55% of  Campus revenues or 26% of  total UCSF 
revenues (1). “Sponsored” research grants and contracts are formal agree-
ments with external sponsoring parties in which UCSF promises to provide 
specific outcomes that meet those parties’ needs for research to create new 
knowledge. Most sponsored research funds ($665M, which includes $152M in 
indirect costs, as described later) come from federal sources like the National 
Institutes of  Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation, plus smaller 
contributions from the Departments of  Education, Energy, and Defense. In 
addition, sponsored research agreements with non-federal funders (1, 3) come 
from two kinds of  sources. (i) philanthropic foundations (e.g., American Heart 
Association, American Cancer Society, Juvenile Diabetes Foundation) seeking 
to understand and treat human diseases ($190M); or (ii) pharmaceutical com-
panies which wish to develop or test the performance of  a new therapy in 
trials with patients suffering from a particular disorder ($22M). Total revenues 
for non-federally sponsored research in FY2014 come to $257M, including 
indirect costs of  $45M (4). In addition, the state of  California provides $66M 
to UCSF to conduct research; most of  this money comes from either the 
California Institute for Regeneration Medicine or from federal funds that flow 
through state agencies to UCSF; of  this $66M, less than $9M is for indirect 
costs (4). 
Most of  the funds in sponsored research agreements, called “direct costs,” 
pay salaries and benefits of  faculty who direct the research and postdoctoral 
scholars and technicians who conduct it in the laboratory, as well as research 
supplies, materials, and equipment; they can also support tuition and salary 
stipends for graduate students working on funded projects. Flowing through 
the UCSF Campus to researchers, these costs contribute directly to producing 
new knowledge. Direct costs cannot be used for purposes separate from the 
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specific research described in the sponsored agreement, however, not even 
to pay incurred (but “indirect”) costs that relate to and are necessary for the 
research to be performed, such as electricity, heating, lab construction or reno-
vation, administrative support, and certain other expenses. In FY2014 UCSF 
recovered $197M in indirect costs (7.9% of  Campus revenue; 4). While recov-
ery of  indirect costs is governed by an immense set of  arcane rules and proce-
dures (for more detail, see chapter 3), it provides a somewhat flexible, but still 
highly constrained, source of  funds for research opportunities (see chapter 5). 
Professional fees. This revenue source ($449M in FY2014; 2) primarily pays 
salaries of  clinical faculty, but also helps to pay for hospital operations, man-
agement, and other clinical staff. The School of  Medicine uses a small portion 
of  professional-fee income, the so-called “Dean’s tax” (~$25M in FY2014; 
5), for strategic projects and operational needs (see also chapter 8). Moreover, 
clinical departments and their divisions use small portions of  their profes-
sional fee revenue to support their own faculty members’ research and other 
activities (see chapter 9). 
Other clinical revenue and educational activities. This grab-bag of  revenues 
($236M in FY2014; 1) derives from and provides support for a variety of  
activities, including continuing education courses for health care providers, 
clinical support to some State prisons, small dental clinics in under-served 
neighborhoods, and—through the School of  Medicine—a number of  clinical 
services operated on a fee for service basis, including various clinics at San 
Francisco General Hospital, the UCSF Hemophilia Program, UCSF-Fresno 
programs, UCSF medical labs, and clinical operations of  the Langley Porter 
Psychiatric Institute, plus affiliation agreements with other agencies, health 
care organizations and private health-related  programs. Some revenues in 
this category even support a few genuinely “educational” activities (e.g., con-
tinuing education courses for clinicians and a small television channel). Little 
money in this category is available to support research, however.
Local government contracts. Local government agencies also sponsor agree-
ments with UCSF ($156M in FY2014; 4). While some of  this money (~$20M) 
represents federal funds that flow through local non-federal government 
agencies to UCSF, most ($136M) of  the total represents the contract between 
the City and County of  San Francisco and UCSF to provide faculty and staff  
and assist in operation of  San Francisco General Medical Center (4). 
State educational appropriation. According to the state’s constitution, the 
University of  California (UC) is an independent entity with a governance 
structure largely independent from the state, with one crucial exception: UC 
has always received funding supplied by the state government and obtained by 
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taxing its citizens. In 1979, the annual state education appropriation accounted 
for ~$67M, or 27% of  UCSF’s total revenues (then ~$250M; 6); in FY2014 
this appropriation ($198M; 1) accounted for only 4.4% of  UCSF’s total 
revenues, and 10% of  its Campus revenues. In 1979 dollars (7), the FY2014 
sum would come to $47M—that is, 67% of  its value 35 years earlier, when 
UCSF taught about the same number of  students as it does now. 
UCSF’s decrease in state funding is paralleled on other UC campuses: in 
17 of  the 25 years between 1990 and FY2014, state support for the entire UC 
system decreased, limiting the overall increase in those 25 years to a meager 
9% increase in nominal dollars, from ~$2.2B in 1990 to ~$2.4B in 2014 (8). In 
fact, the erosion is dramatically worse: if  the 2014 state support appropriation 
instead had kept up with inflation (7) and with mandated increases in student 
enrollments, UC would have received ~$6.7B in state support in 2014—nearly 
three times the actual dollars appropriated in 2014 (8). 
Auxiliary and other. Multiple enterprises—e.g., food service operations, 
student unions, parking operations and student and faculty housing systems—
provide everyday services to UCSF’s students, faculty, staff, and visitors. In 
FY2014, these enterprises earned revenues of  $159M (1) or 8% of  UCSF’s 
Campus revenues. Auxiliary services sustain themselves financially (as they 
are required to do), owing to UCSF’s large staff  and faculty base. (Institutions 
with much larger student bases can sometimes use auxiliary services like these 
to contribute financially to the more general operation of  the institution.) 
Within the “auxiliary” category at UCSF, patent income ($27M in FY2014; 1) 
provides limited fungible revenue ($4.6M; 9) for deans to distribute in UCSF’s 
schools (predominantly the School of  Medicine); the rest goes to faculty in-
ventors and legal and administrative costs of  patenting and licensing. 
Student tuition and fees. The small number of  students (3,094) who matricu-
late at UCSF provides revenues in the form of  formal tuition and fees: $56M, 
or about 3% of  Campus revenues in FY2014 (1). Tuition looms larger on UC 
campuses that teach more students, but at UCSF the entire amount is used to 
defray student-related costs UC forbids its schools to pay from state revenues, 
including non-educational “processing” of  students (registration, admissions, 
financial aid, student counseling, and student health offices) and costs for 
student activities like student newspapers and legal aid. The $56M does not 
suffice to pay these costs, which must be subsidized from other revenues—
leaving UCSF virtually zero tuition money to spend on actual education.  Al-
though UCSF does get a small amount of  tuition money from professional 
school fees (called the PDST) in this total, the PDST was allowed by the State 
in the mid 1990’s to replace State Educational funds that were being cut during 
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that era of  reductions.
Capital improvements. In addition to cutting education and operations, the 
state has decreased its contributions to capital improvements for UCSF even 
more dramatically (10). Until the early 1990s, the state was the predominant 
source of  construction funds at UCSF, paying entirely for two research towers 
(1966) and the Ambulatory Care Center (1968), plus substantial proportions 
of  costs for the new School of  Dentistry (1980) and Long Hospital (1993), 
all on the Parnassus site. In the late 1970s UCSF began to receive small al-
locations of  state capital funds: ~$10M annually, out of  ~$250M for the UC 
system each year. Accelerated growth in numbers of  undergraduates reduced 
UCSF’s allocations still further in the 1990s, because its student numbers re-
mained relatively low (11). From the late 1990s to now, the drought of  state 
construction funds became more severe. UCSF’s largest capital improvement, 
its Mission Bay research campus, cost ~$1.585B from 1997 to 2015 (12); of  
this cost, state capital funding contributed barely 4.8%, or $76M, including 
$21M toward the $215M construction of  Genentech Hall, and $55M for the 
$95M QB3 building (12). 
Steady reductions in capital funds and annual revenues supplied by the 
state required UCSF to become almost completely self-reliant in securing 
capital funds for constructing new teaching and research facilities (see chapter 
4), and increasingly to depend on non-state sources to support education and 
research. UCSF still embraces its public service missions, but its identity as a 
“public institution” is much diluted. 
Relative flexibility of  different revenue streams. In summary, constraints on 
spending dollars accrued through different revenue streams vary considerably. 
UCSF has no flexibility in spending income from student tuition and fees, the 
auxiliary category, or most clinical revenues. Two revenue categories afford 
flexibility, but in small doses: (i) a relatively small “Dean’s tax” (5) on profes-
sional fees for clinical care allows the Dean of  the School of  Medicine some 
opportunities for strategic spending and plugging holes in the budget (see 
above, and chapters 8 and 10, below); (ii) UCSF’s schools and departments use 
87% ($173M) of  the state educational appropriation for salaries and benefits 
of  faculty ($77M) and staff  ($96M) who play roles in education, and $23M to 
pay for utilities and maintenance costs of  teaching facilities (13). This much-
reduced state appropriation pays only 15% of  all UCSF faculty salaries (see 
chapter 6). 
Several other revenue categories do furnish more flexibility: (i) partial re-
imbursements of  certain “indirect” costs of  research ($197M in FY2014; 4), 
which the Chancellor controls (see chapters 3 and 5); (ii) ~$4.6M of  patent 
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revenues provide a modest flexibility to the schools; (iii) endowments and 
gifts and other investment income provide further flexibility, subject to strong 
constraints, as discussed below. 
Endowments and gifts
To thrive, and sometimes even to survive, academic institutions usually rely 
on the financial cushion of  philanthropy. Gifts from individuals, foundations, 
and corporations can make crucial differences in UCSF’s efforts to achieve 
world-class scientific discoveries, attract excellent faculty and students, and 
build first-class facilities for research and teaching. For many reasons, how-
ever, these gifts are no panacea. 
Definitions. Table 2-1 summarizes gifts received by UCSF in FY2014 (14). 
Gifts—a term that includes endowments—may be given for specific or gen-
eral purposes: e.g., to build a research laboratory, pursue a research program, 
support a faculty salary, stabilize institutional operating funds, etc. Gifts and 
endowments may have strings attached, but do not impose contractual re-
quirements and are awarded irrevocably; unlike sponsored agreements, gifts 
do not require the institution to provide detailed technical reports or reports 
of  expenditures (15). All endowments are gifts, but not all gifts are endow-
ments, as we shall discuss in a moment. 
*References 14, 17. 
¶As of  June 30, 2014.
§Reference 21.
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At the end of  FY2014, UCSF’s 1,162 separate endowment funds added 
up to a total principal of  ~$2B, and ranged in size over a wide range (Table 
2-1; 15, 16). An endowment is a gift intended to provide long-term or even 
permanent value to the institution, and thus is usually a substantial cash gift 
whose principal is invested in long-term financial instruments that provide 
continuing income. Most private colleges and universities have “general en-
dowments,” which provide on-going income to help them pay general operat-
ing costs and salaries of  teachers and support staff. For many years, UCSF 
neither had nor needed a general endowment, because it could rely on annual 
educational appropriations from the state. Instead, its departments, adminis-
trative units, or individual faculty solicited and received small endowments, 
given for more narrowly defined purposes—e.g., a lecture series or salaries 
(aka “chairs” and “professorships”) for specific faculty. Now, like many oth-
er public institutions, UCSF badly needs more general endowment funds to 
make up for its reduced state educational appropriation. 
Non-endowment gifts to UCSF. Gifts that are not endowments are usually 
given once and then spent for a specific item or activity. In FY2014, UCSF 
received a total of  $445M in 31,129 non-endowment gifts (Table 2-1). The 
number of  gifts is large, but most dollar amounts are relatively small: 89% 
of  these amount to a total of  ~$5M, or ~$185 per gift. A non-endowment 
gift can be used to construct a new building, renovate a laboratory, purchase 
equipment used in research or teaching, or support activities that advance an 
institutional mission or specific goal (e.g., funding an investigator’s research 
aimed at treating infectious tropical diseases). Cash gifts donated for “general 
support of  the institution” may be used for any legal purpose the institution 
chooses. 
Large gifts ($20-50M or more) come with built-in constraints, which usu-
ally require a focus on a specific target, with little latitude for broader use. 
Thus the funding plan for a major capital endeavor, like the growing campus 
at Mission Bay, may include a large gift fund target, with major donors ulti-
mately giving money to construct a specific building, but with little of  the gift 
funds going into a general funding “pot” that pays for the entire program and 
its infrastructure. Moreover, large capital gifts are generally paid to UCSF over 
a period of  10 years or more, so the institution must borrow funds to “front” 
the money during construction and bear interest costs on the unpaid balance 
while the gift is paid incrementally. This “cost of  doing business” dilutes the 
value of  a large gift by 10-20%, depending on the size of  the gift and the 
schedule of  installments. Smaller cash gifts—e.g., for research lab renovations 
or costly research equipment—are usually paid up front, and the result is more 
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immediate (within a few months to a year). In general, gifts to individual fac-
ulty contribute to UCSF’s cash and balance sheet, but are for the most part 
unavailable for broader initiatives.
Rarely, a non-endowment gift directly funds research costs of  an indi-
vidual faculty member. UCSF looks closely into such “research support” gifts, 
to ensure that the money is a genuine gift, rather than an attempt to escape 
paying indirect costs (overhead) on what is really a sponsored agreement: a 
true gift is not subject to conditions imposed by the donor, nor does its receipt 
require written reports on its outcome (15). Gifts to individual faculty contrib-
ute to UCSF’s cash and balance sheet, but are spent by those individuals and 
thus unavailable for broader initiatives.
Endowments and quasi-endowments. UCSF’s endowments are held and man-
aged by either of  two parallel entities, the UC Regents or the UCSF Founda-
*Data from references 14, 16, and 21.
¶Reference 16. UCSF Development Office and Foundation finance director told one of  the 
authors (on November 14, 2014) that there were 646 endowments in the Foundation at the 
end of  FY 2014, but provided no subsequent substantiation from the Foundation financial 
reporting data.  The finance director advised the authors on November 14, 2014, that the 35 
missing endowments (= 646 - 611) had been “received” but not “set up”. Since the FY 2014 
financial data was never formally amended or changed, we chose to stick with the data we can 
validate.
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tion (Table 2-2; 14, 16). The Regents controlled and conservatively invested 
all UC endowment funds until the mid-1980s, when UCSF and several other 
UC campuses petitioned them to allow individual campuses to raise and man-
age new gifts and endowments on their own. Agreeing, the Regents insti-
tuted controls to ensure fiduciary responsibility and management parallel to 
those of  Regental endowments. The UCSF Foundation, like its counterparts 
at other campuses, is a corporation owned by the UC Regents and subject 
to Regental policies, but funded from and managed by UCSF. Compared to 
Regents’ funds, the Foundation enjoys modestly greater flexibility and latitude 
for investment; critically, its returns from endowments can move into campus 
accounts within 30 days, vs. 3-6 months. As a bonus, the Foundation can set 
payouts from its investments at a slightly higher maximal level (5% vs. 4.75% 
for the Regents). 
Actual “net” payout rates (Table 2-2) are lower than those maximal rates, 
for three reasons. (i) Rates are set to ensure that each year’s payouts suffice 
to fund the targeted activity, while endowment principal keeps pace with in-
flation. To avoid sharp peaks and deep ravines in payouts in both flush and 
lean times (e.g., the major recession that began in 2008-9), fund managers 
apply “rate-smoothing,” which averages capital gain or loss over periods of  
3-5 years, so ravines become shallow valleys and sharp peaks become rolling 
hills. Inevitably, smoothing the recession’s effects reduced payout rates, keep-
ing them low in FY2014. (ii) Part of  each payout (presently, just over half  a 1% 
drop in the payout rate) helps to pay for administering the endowment. (iii) 
If  the beneficiary unit (a department, school, or other endowed UCSF entity) 
does not need part of  the fund’s entire payout in a given year, it can request 
reinvestment of  that part to increase the fund’s principal. 
The UCSF Foundation comes close to matching UCSF’s share of  Regental 
endowments in size and payouts (Table 2-2), and played essential roles in raising 
and managing cash gifts to pay for construction of  the new campus at Mission 
Bay. UCSF’s endowments, however, have not become maximally effective 
resources for funding flexible strategies or large new programs designed to 
accomplish academic missions of  the Campus as a whole, because most of  
UCSF’s separate endowment funds are extremely small, in both principal 
and payout (Table 2-2): in FY2014 less than half  of  all UCSF’s individual 
endowment funds produced individual payouts greater than $200,000 per 
year, a sum that can barely sustain a substantial fraction of  the salary and 
fringe benefits of  a single senior faculty member; only five funds produced 
payouts greater than $1M per year (Table 2-2). Most small endowments (and 
their payouts) are under the control of  academic departments or individual 
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faculty members, rather than a larger entity able to use its payouts to benefit a 
wider spectrum of  academic endeavor. 
In FY2014, this decentralization left small portions of  UCSF’s total en-
dowment principal under direct control of  the Chancellor ($355M; 18% of  
the total) or the Dean of  its largest School, Medicine ($315M; 16%). In fact, 
the bulk of  the ~$12M and ~$10.5M annual payouts received from those 
funds by the Chancellor and the Dean, respectively, are devoted to ongoing 
operational needs (17). No problem when the state provided generous fund-
ing, decentralization now poses critical difficulties for a public university like 
UCSF, which lacks a general endowment usable for the entire institution’s 
benefit.
For the Chancellor’s office, this difficulty has been modestly mitigated 
by a “Chancellor’s gift assessment.” As the assessment was applied through 
June 2014, the Chancellor’s office received 4% of  the endowment principal 
at the time a gift was accepted, plus 1% of  net annual payout, in addition to 
interest income earned on payout balances held by Schools, departments, or 
divisions—amounting, in FY2014, to a total of  ~$17M (18). Beginning in 
July 2014, however, the Chancellor’s “Infrastructure and Operations Fund” 
(IOF, for short) collects 4% at the time of  receipt of  each new gift or en-
dowment principal and (by 2017, after a phasing-in period) 6% at the time 
expenditures from the campus gift or endowment account are posted. (One 
exception: these rules do not affect gifts restricted to paying tuition and liv-
ing and other educational costs for students in degree programs.) The IOF’s 
percentages are in keeping with similar practice at other research institutions 
(18), and their rationale is simple: over the next decade, without such an IOF, 
available sources will not suffice to meet projected demands for “funds that 
support the basic operations of  the schools and administration, utilities, and 
infrastructure, and strategic campus wide initiatives” (18). While annual dollar 
totals of  new gifts vary greatly from year to year, the new IOF arrangement 
will provide more than double the money received in FY2014—i.e., $35-40M 
per year (18), to be used for broad strategic purposes. (For further discussion, 
see chapter 4, below.) 
One useful mechanism for strategic purposes is the “quasi-endowment” 
or a “Fund Functioning as an Endowment” (FFE). To create an FFE (which 
must be specifically approved by the Chancellor), an administrative entity at 
UCSF must identify a discretionary source of  funding to be placed in an FFE 
and invested, via the UC Treasurer, in the UC General Endowment Pool, 
where it earns income and increases market capitalization (grows in size), just 
like an ordinary endowment. An FFE’s key advantage is that its principal bal-
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ance can be withdrawn and used as required. For example, the Chancellor’s 
Instruction and Research Enrichment fund (CIRE fund), established in the 
mid-1990’s and augmented from various sources, increased its principal bal-
ance to more than $25M by 2014, by capital growth and re-investment of  
annual payout. Almost all this FFE, plus an additional $4M of  new gifts, was 
used to match a $30M gift from Michael Moritz and Harriet Heyman to es-
tablish a new Discovery Fellows Program (19), which helps to pay tuition and 
fees for graduate students. The Program’s new FFE combines funds from the 
donors and the CIRE FFE. 
The Chancellor can use a second (and even more limited) strategic mecha-
nism, unrelated to endowments. UC’s Office of  the President (UCOP) autho-
rizes the Chancellor to leverage UCSF’s balance sheet for strategic purposes: 
the Chancellor can ask the UC Treasurer to invest up to 55% of  cash available 
on UCSF’s balance sheet (ceiling set by UCOP), to earn greater interest income 
in a Total Return Investment Pool (TRIP) than the same money can otherwise 
earn in a standard Short Term Investment Pool (STIP), which is nearly risk 
free. In this way, the Chancellor earned an “extra” ~$42M in FY2014— barely 
2% of  Campus revenue, but not an insignificant sum (20). Of  this $42M, the 
Chancellor allocates ~$15M back to the School of  Medicine and ~$3M to the 
Medical Center, representing their shares of  the invested funds. The invest-
ment advantage is real: FY2014, 45% of  UCSF’s balance sheet, invested in 
TRIP, earned $42M; the remaining 55%, invested in STIP, earned only $14M; 
the Chancellor earned $31M more than the $11M that would have accrued if  
100% had been invested in STIP.
Summary, so far
We have described in broad outline UCSF’s revenue streams, endowments, 
and non-endowment gifts. These revenue sources add up to very large sums—
$4.452B per year in revenues, endowment funds of  nearly $2B, and non-
endowment gifts of  $445M per year. But most of  these sources are already 
committed to pay for essential functions, leaving little fungible revenue for 
strategic academic purposes: that is, to educate students, pay a more substan-
tial proportion of  faculty salaries, or tackle new opportunities for research in 
basic biology or to combat disease. 
A recent example is instructive. UCSF is correctly proud of  its handling 
of  one such recent opportunity, which began with the Moritz-Heyman gift 
($30M) described above. UCSF combined this generous charitable gift with 
$29M from an FFE in the Chancellor’s reserves, to produce a $59+M FFE—
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now called the UCSF Discovery Fund— that will support graduate education. 
This apparently huge sum, $59M, comes to only 1.3% of  UCSF’s $4.452B 
budget, and only 3% of  its Campus budget. Worse, the ~$2.24M yearly in-
come from $59M (at a net payout of  4% per year) comes to only 6.8% of  the 
~$33M UCSF spends in tuition, fees, and stipends for basic science graduate 
students each year (for details, see chapter 8). Imagine what UCSF could do 
with three or ten times as much flexible money each year!
Our next chapter delineates the intricate and frustrating constraints, 
mixed with real opportunities, which accompany UCSF’s strenuous efforts to 
recover dollars reimbursed for the indirect costs of  research.  
Chapter 3
Moiling for gold: The indirect cost mystery
Indirect cost recovery (ICR) seems easy to define: it is the dollars reimbursed to researchers’ host institutions by funders of  sponsored research projects, 
in order to pay the indirect costs institutions incur for research to take place. Al-
though these indirect costs are incurred when research is actually performed, 
they are distinct from the direct costs (researcher salaries, supplies, etc.) of  the 
research itself. Because indirect costs relate to facilities or administration, they 
are also called F&A costs. The F includes categories like utilities, laboratory 
maintenance and depreciation, and interest on loans to build research facili-
ties; the A covers items like applying for research grants and supervising award 
expenditures, plus other research-related portions of  university administra-
tion, ranging from the Chancellor to accounting and payroll, and more. This 
may sound straightforward, even humdrum, but dense clouds shroud ICR in 
mystery, controversy, and emotion at UCSF and most research institutions: 
1. ICR, a glittering pot of  gold, amounts to 9.5% of  UCSF Campus 
revenues (1) and looms large in the academic imagination. 
2. Access to this pot is especially valuable because its gold is relatively free 
of  traditional or statutory obligations to narrowly defined university 
purposes. Access at UCSF is primarily the prerogative of  the Chancellor, 
who uses it to guide ongoing efforts and support new projects and 
strategies, while other cash-hungry elements of  the institution yearn to 
dip into the pot for their own purposes. 
3. The glittering pot is shallow, because external funders fail to pay all 
indirect costs incurred. Nonetheless, universities eagerly seek more 
research funds from non-federal funders, although they pay smaller 
proportions of  incurred indirect costs than does the federal government. 
Delving into its own coffers for dollars equivalent to 7.5% of  Campus 
revenues, in FY2014 UCSF paid 46% of  its incurred indirect costs. 
4. Few administrators, and virtually no scientists, understand the maze of  
complex, arbitrary rules and calculations that make ICR so mysterious. 
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This chapter recounts the history of  academic ICR, outlines federal rules 
for calculating indirect costs, shows how written and unwritten rules compel 
host institutions to share payment of  actual indirect costs with federal and 
non-federal funding agencies, quantitates UCSF’s indirect cost burden, and 
sketches dilemmas ICR poses for all research universities. Readers will begin 
to understand how ICR’s complexity makes the cost recovery process resist 
change so strongly. 
Before we proceed, a caveat: details of  ICR at UCSF are not replicated at 
all academic research centers; each recovers a different proportion of  the in-
direct costs it incurs, follows subtly different rules, and controls ICR revenues 
differently. 
ICR: a pocket history
The practice of  reimbursing universities for indirect costs was established dur-
ing and after World War II, when the Office of  Naval Research realized that 
contract research for special projects by university faculty could continue only 
if  government were to pay indirect costs. In 1958 the principle of  reimburse-
ment, by then gradually adopted by other federal agencies, was formalized in 
Circular A-21, from the original Bureau of  the Budget. The new ICR guide-
lines included criteria for justifying costs; rules and documentation require-
ments for distributing costs between research, instruction and other func-
tions; and definitions of  certain costs as unallowable on government research 
contracts. The Department of  Health, Education, and Welfare, forerunner 
of  today’s Department of  Health and Human Services (DHHS), initially set 
the rate for assessing indirect costs at a flat 8% of  direct costs, but by 1966 
the federal government replaced artificial indirect cost ceilings with a general 
policy that universities should be fully reimbursed for indirect costs incurred 
in conducting federal funded research projects. Simultaneous amendments to 
A-21, however, required universities to share paying the indirect costs of  fed-
eral grants (e.g., by donating time of  faculty or staff); A-21 also imposed new 
standards for compliance and documentation (2). 
Since then Circular A-21 has been modified several dozen times, often to 
transform the initial cost sharing process into devices that trim federal reim-
bursement of  indirect costs more effectively. Such devices restrict classes of  
direct costs for which indirect costs can be calculated; impose caps on certain 
indirect costs (e.g., researcher salaries); and demand that universities “negoti-
ate” indirect cost rates with federal agencies. Together, they require most in-
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stitutions to pay substantial shares of  indirect costs from their own funds, and 
richly justify quotation marks for the verb, “negotiate.” 
From 1967 through 2011, UCSF’s parent university, UC, comprehensively 
raided ICR generated on its campuses, keeping ~80% of  their ICR revenue 
between 1967 and 1982. In FY1983, the office of  UC’s President (UCOP) 
finally began to relent, returning to UCSF 35% of  the ICR it generated, and 
higher percentages to campuses with undergraduate students. UCSF’s yearly 
“recovery” of  its indirect costs from the parent university slowly improved 
thereafter, to more than 50% in 2000; by FY2012, UCOP was returning 100% 
of  ICR generated at UCSF, as well as its other campuses (Fig. 3-1, 3) Over the 
years, UCOP consumed several hundred million dollars of  research indirect 
costs earned at UCSF. The ICR battle between UC and its research campuses 
exemplifies academia’s ceaseless lust for control of  indirect cost reimburse-
ment.
Calculating indirect costs—aka: quantifying muddles
After a restaurant meal, customers pay two bills: the restaurant’s price for each 
dish consumed, plus a gratuity for the waiter. The first cost requires a “ratio-
nal” market decision, weighing anticipation of  the meal’s quality against menu 
prices. The gratuity decision is arbitrary and uncertain, however, with respect 
Fig. 3-1. Indirect costs “earned” by UCSF or returned to UCSF (red) after UCOP removed 
a share for its own purposes. Dollars between the two lines were “retained” by UCOP. Data 
from 4.
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both to the amount to be paid and the customer’s ignorance of  where the dol-
lars may go (to the waiter, alone? shared with other waiters? or with dishwash-
ers and cooks, as well?). The reality: restaurants don’t pay waiters enough to 
keep them working, so diners are asked to pay waiters a percentage of  the bill. 
Restaurants are not universities, and diners pay for food rather than research, 
but the menu-specified price closely resembles a “direct cost,” in that buyers 
know how much to pay and what they will get in return. Gratuities share two 
key characteristics with indirect costs for research: (i) the actual amounts to 
be paid are fraught with mystery and muddlement, for both payer and payee, 
but (ii) if  the gratuity or indirect cost is not paid, the direct-cost transaction 
will not work. 
In universities the imprecision of  indirect costs reflects the fact that vir-
tually every employee (administrator, faculty member, janitor, etc.) and every 
building’s square feet, electric wires, or heating ducts contribute to multiple 
functions—i.e., teaching, research, and, at UCSF, patient care. This mixing 
makes it impossible to trace or count dollars paid for each contribution, so 
indirect costs are usually allocated as a percentage of  the direct cost, like gra-
tuities. The rules governing that percentage are vastly complex, inevitably ar-
bitrary, and often unfair, albeit to unknown degrees. 
Assessing indirect costs is a prime example of  the critical (but usually ig-
nored) Muddlement-Uncertainty Principle, or M-UP (4). In its simplest form, 
the M-UP states that irretrievably muddled mixing of  categories prevents ana-
lysts from quantifying financial facts with the degree of  accuracy desired—or 
even needed—to drive key decisions. The M-UP affects analysis of  every fi-
nancial transaction of  every academic research center and most large busi-
nesses and institutions. In its more general form, the M7-UP, the keyword 
muddlement may be replaced by Multiplicity, Mystery, and Mistakes, and (at 
least with respect to the US federal budget) by Magic, Mendacity, and even 
Malevolence. For academic ICR, muddlement alone typically suffices. 
Although UCSF receives sponsored dollars—for both direct and indirect 
costs—from several kinds of  sources, our account of  indirect cost calcula-
tions starts by focusing on federally funded research, which accounts for most 
(73%) of  UCSF’s recovered indirect costs (Table 3-1; 5). We must distinguish 
between ICR rates and the actual amount of  indirect cost incurred, including 
the part that is reimbursed and the part that is not. Careful analysis of  the 
actual amount of  incurred indirect costs serves as the starting point for the 
negotiations between the institution and federal auditors that determine ICR 
rates as a percentage of  indirect costs, relative to direct costs:
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ICR rate (%) = [total indirect costs ÷ direct costs] x 100
To establish the amount of  indirect costs (and subsequently an ICR rate), an 
academic institution must first show the federal government, in detail, how 
it defines and identifies the indirect costs it actually incurs, by a process that 
costs so much that universities can afford to tackle it only every four years 
or so. Based on existing federal allocation formulas, however, the complex 
definition-and-identification exercise (Box 3-1) probably does approximate (a 
version of) the “truth,” despite the muddled categories it dissects. 
Throughout the exercise, UCSF’s analysts are keen to ensure that the doc-
umented indirect cost pools they assess do not generate complications like the 
brouhaha triggered by Stanford University’s difficulty with federal auditors 
25 years ago (8). Stanford did not write a check from federal funds to pay for 
maintaining either a yacht or Leland Stanford’s tomb, but did fail to remove 
these costs from the indirect cost “pools” it used to calculate and then negoti-
ate the ICR rate—thereby violating a federal law that prohibits false claims for 
*Data from 5, but contracts with affiliated hospitals for medical services have been excluded; 
although these contracts reflect direct costs paid to UCSF in sponsored contracts, they neither 
represent costs of  research nor were ever proposed (by UCSF or anyone else) as subject to 
“recovery” of  indirect costs.
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Fig. 3-2. The ICR rate calculation, controlled by federal rules and allocation formulas involves 
three stages, each depicted in the vertical columns and described in the Box.
Figure 3-2 shows the process by which UCSF calculated UCSF’s indirect 
research costs for FY2010, which was the base year for its most recent ne-
gotiation with federal auditors. The calculation’s complexity reflects a brave 
attempt to combat the M-UP (Muddlement Uncertainty Principle; main text), 
even when details are stripped to a bare minimum. Proceeding from left to 
right, the Figure’s vertical columns depict three sequential stages of  the cal-
culation, each dictated by federal guidelines and (for FY2010), extensively re-
viewed by federal auditors. To make the process work, UCSF’s general ledger 
system had to be able to account for and classify all the university’s costs into 
categories that will ultimately be assigned to direct and indirect cost pools (6) 
specified and allocated by detailed federal guidelines. Those categories differ 
sharply from the usual parsing of  expenses into salary plus benefits, supplies, 
travel, etc. 
The first stage of  the process (left column) divides all UCSF’s expen-
ditures in FY2010 into straightforward categories defined by the common 
Box 3-1. Calculating incurred indirect costs of  research at 
UCSF
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accounting lexicon for all universities. These categories include both direct 
and indirect operating costs, but exclude those not allowed by federal rules, 
so reducing the year’s total expenditures ($3,179M) to $2,933M by removing 
$246M in unallowable costs—that is, expenditures that failed to qualify as 
Modified Direct Costs (MTDC; see main text). 
The next step re-sorts all expenditures from UCSF’s ledger into five feder-
ally-defined direct cost categories (white boxes in the figure’s middle column), 
plus the facilities and administrative (F&A) indirect cost category (highlighted 
box, middle column). This re-sorting followed detailed formulas specified by 
the federal government. Total dollars in the middle and left columns are iden-
tical, so no middle-column category is defined with respect to sources that 
supplied its dollars. Expenditures in the Instruction category, for example, 
included not only instruction paid for by external grants or contracts, but also 
instruction funded by UCSF, by tuition and fees, or by UC (as if  the latter were 
a kind of  “external sponsor” of  education for medical and other professional 
students). Similarly, Organized Research (OR) costs include dollars supplied 
by federal or non-federal sources, or by UCSF itself  (which pays, for instance, 
portions of  some researchers’ salaries). F&A costs in this column include fa-
cilities and administration for all UCSF missions (not just research); part, but 
by no means all, of  these F&A costs were paid from indirect costs reimbursed 
by external sponsors. 
Next comes the “F&A step-down” process, aimed at determining which 
proportions of  the total F&A indirect cost pool (in the central column) are 
associated with each of  the six “direct cost” pools listed in the right-hand 
column. This step-down analysis and calculations are also based on a series 
of  complex federally-specified allocation formulas and rules. In general, the 
facilities portion of  F&A related to a particular direct cost pool depends on 
the space occupied by that direct-cost pool’s activities (e.g., by research in a 
particular subunit, department, or division of  UCSF, in proportion to the sub-
unit’s total space); similarly, that F&A pool’s administrative component usually 
depends on the “direct-cost” expenditures of  the UCSF subunit, as a propor-
tion of  its total expenditures. In every case, federal auditors carefully reviewed 
both data and calculations. In no case is all the F&A related to a particular 
direct cost pool subject to reimbursement by any external funding agency: 
the two white boxes in the right-hand column, clearly UCSF’s responsibility, 
involve no F&A recovery from external sources; some portion of  F&A in 
each of  the column’s four highlighted boxes, however, may be recovered from 
external sources. 
The last step of  the process is to calculate the indirect cost rate UCSF will 
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reimbursement. (For a partial list of  other “unallowable” indirect costs, see 9.) 
In 1991, the resulting publicity helped to support tighter federal restrictions 
and documentation requirements, plus a 26% cap on the administrative por-
tion of  all university indirect cost rates (see below, and 10). 
Once indirect cost pools are purged of  unallowable costs and calculated, 
the university is ready to defend the ICR rate it proposes for negotiation. But 
the federal government requires that the direct costs used for that calculation 
not include all the dollars (Total Direct Costs, or TDC) in the awarded grant 
or contract. Instead, TDC must be reduced to MTDC (Modified TDC, or 
MTDC), which specifically excludes certain direct expenses—e.g., for equip-
ment, patient care, rental of  off-campus space, graduate training stipends and 
tuition, and sub-contract costs greater than $25,000. Substituting MTDC for 
TDC, the equation becomes: 
ICR rate (%) = [total indirect costs ÷ MTDC] x 100
Universities and federal agencies hotly debated the substitution of  MTDC for 
TDC before it was instituted in 1979, for good reason. Some MTDC-driven 
exclusions are logical and reasonable, and others not, but their overall effect, at 
any fixed ICR rate, will always limit the federal dollars reimbursed for indirect 
costs by institutions; that is, if  ICR rates already being applied remain con-
stant, substituting the lower MTDC figure as the divisor in the equation above 
must inevitably reduce the actual dollar amount of  ICR by universities. Over 
the 35 subsequent years, however, negotiated ICR rates and ICR amounts 
propose for each direct cost function in order to recover the corresponding 
indirect costs from external funders; rates are calculated in the four highlighted 
categories: Organized Research (OR), instruction, and Other Sponsored Ac-
tivities (OSA). The example in this figure calculates the F&A indirect cost rate, 
as a percentage, by dividing the proposed F&A amount for OR by the direct 
cost (actually, the MTDC) of  OR, and multiplying the result by 100. UCSF 
began its 2012 negotiations with DHHS auditors by justifying and proposing 
this percentage as the calculated indirect cost rate for OR. As described in the 
text, however, federal negotiators offered a much lower rate for OR. Regard-
less of  negotiation, proposed rates in other highlighted categories would not 
have recouped many dollars in the way of  indirect cost recovery, as compared 
to OR, because these categories were not associated with large amounts of  
direct costs (7). 
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have changed substantially. At UCSF, for example, the ICR rate on federal 
grants for “Organized Research” (OR) more than doubled (from 27.5% in 
1982 to 57% in 2014; 11); the dollar amount of  recovered indirect costs on all 
of  UCSF’s federal grants increased about seven-fold during almost exactly 
the same period (FY1985-FY2014; see 3, 12). Thus the old MTDC argument 
is no longer relevant. Instead, as we shall see, the pivotal decision about the 
amount of  indirect costs to be reimbursed/recovered is made when federal 
auditors and the institution negotiate a new set of  indirect cost recovery rates, 
about every four years. Each institution proposes those new ICR rates based 
on documented amounts of  both MTDC and F&A costs incurred by the insti-
tution in the year prior to expiration of  previously negotiated rates (Box 3-1). 
The real problems with recovering indirect costs arise at later steps of  the 
process, including the negotiation itself. 
Before negotiation begins, institutional proposals for ICR rates are re-
viewed by auditors appointed by the federal executive branch—DHHS for 
UCSF—that funds most of  the its grants and contracts. For 3-6 months 
DHHS auditors review hundreds of  pages documenting UCSF’s direct and 
indirect operating costs and proposal for new ICR rates. Then they visit UCSF 
for several more months, to inspect facilities, interview staff  and researchers, 
and check UCSF’s proposal against financial and other records. Finally, the 
panel “negotiates” with the Chancellor’s Department of  Budget and Finance 
to determine the actual ICR rate. (Later, we sketch the course of  a recent 
negotiation.) 
The last step in the process, actual recovery of  incurred indirect costs, 
takes place only after UCSF’s researchers pay direct research costs by spending 
awarded grant or contract dollars: applying appropriate negotiated ICR rates 
to these payouts, UCSF requests reimbursement from the federal funding 
agency several times a week; the agency usually pays each incremental indirect 
cost bill within 24 hours. (Thus ICR on federal grants is paid only when and if  
dollars are actually spent from those grants.) 
Unrecovered ICR on federal grants in FY2014 
Some researchers assume that ICR payments from funders of  direct costs 
cover all indirect costs incurred by the university in support of  research. Not 
so. Instead, in FY2014 UCSF recovered $144M in indirect costs on all its 
federally sponsored research projects; but this represented only 64% of  the 
$226M in federal indirect costs incurred in that year, so that UCSF was obliged 
to pay the remaining 36% ($82M) from its own coffers (Table 3-2; 13). 
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*Data from 13.
§Incurred indirect costs were calculated exactly as described in Box 3-1, except that the 
incurred F&A costs in each grant or contract subcategory were calculated by multiplying the 
actual FY2014 MTDC amounts in the subcategory by the percentage for total F&A UCSF 
proposed (at the start of  its negotiations with federal auditors in 2012) for that category for 
FY2014. Thus the “incurred” dollars are based on (i) actual MTDC amounts in FY2014 (5) 
and (ii) UCSF’s specification of  F&A in FY2014. (Federal auditors did negotiate for lower 
percentages, but audited and did not dispute UCSF’s numbers.) The total amount of  calcu-
lated/incurred F&A (“computed recovery”) for federal grants in FY2014 was $226M; in that 
year UCSF actually recovered $144M on federally-funded projects, so that the (unrecovered) 
deficit on federal ICR comes to $82M, as shown in the Table. 
¶Dollar values of  unrecovered indirect costs were derived as follows: 
Caps of  two kinds: (i) Administrative. The federal government (OMB) implemented a cap 
on the administrative component of  all university ICR rates of  26%.  Any amount above the 
26% cap is calculated at the start of  each rate negotiation process and can’t be recovered from 
the federal government. UCSF calculated its administrative component at 6% over the 26% 
cap. The cost of  a rate decrease of  1% in 2014 was just over $3.5M (6% X $3.5M = $21M). 
(ii) On salary level (>$185,000) of  faculty and staff. Any amount above this threshold can-
not be charged to federal contracts and grants. The UCSF Controller’s office computes this 
amount at the end of  each fiscal year based on actual salary costs ($16.5M for 2014). 
Cost sharing. This amount, $3M for 2014, computed by the UCSF Controller’s Office at fiscal 
year’s end, is based on actual cost sharing identified in the general ledger.
Negotiation. This amount is the 11.5% difference between UCSF’s Facilities rate calculation 
and the rate agreed to by federal negotiators, which amounted to $26M total because each rate 
point difference was worth just over $3.5M (see just above).
Grant type. This adds up to $15.5M of  unrecovered indirect costs, all related to multiple, 
hard-to-list/describe-in-detail variations in indirect costs federal rules allow universities to 
charge in relation to different kinds of  grants—to, in other words, the M-UP’s ineluctable 
complexity. Examples: (i) In 2014, UCSF’s portfolio of  federal agreements still included 
very many contracts and grants for projects whose indirect costs were negotiated in earlier 
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For federal contracts and grants, the difference between incurred and re-
covered indirect costs reflects four classes of  lost ICR revenue, each created by 
explicit regulations and/or traditional and effectively non-negotiable practice. 
Lost ICR (i): different ICR rates for different types of  research grant. Academic 
researchers tend to cite on-campus Organized Research (OR) rates—which 
UCSF negotiated earlier to be 57% for FY2014—as if  the OR rate applied 
to all federal grants, but this is not the case. For instance, in its contract with 
DHHS UCSF negotiated an ICR rate of  44% for instruction grants, but NIH 
refuses to honor that rate and advised the institution that to be awarded a 
training grant it must accept an 8% rate. NIH also sets special rates for dif-
ferent components of  federal grants like those that support UCSF’s Clinical 
and Translational Science Institute (CTSI); finally, UCSF negotiates an Other 
Sponsored Activity (OSA) rate (34%) for federal grants and contracts that do 
not fit into OR or instructional categories. (Some NIH institutes have begun 
to set their own ICR rates for specific types of  research, but not yet so con-
sistently that UCSF finds it worthwhile to track ICR lost in this way.) Overall, 
these special rates, among which the very low rate on training grants did the 
most damage, cost UCSF $15.5M in FY2014 (Table 3-2). While ICR based 
on the negotiated OR rate (57%) accounts for the bulk of  UCSF’s federally 
reimbursed revenues, blending OR recovery from federally funded grants with 
the lower recovery for training and a few other types of  grants dilutes UCSF’s 
overall effective federal recovery rate to ~41% (5); the loss would be higher if  
graduate training represented larger proportions of  UCSF’s NIH grants. 
Lost ICR (ii): caps on certain classes of  expenditures. The federal government 
also places ceilings or caps on specific kinds of  research expenses for which 
ICR can be charged. UCSF’s Finance office calculates that in FY2014 the 
combination of  two such caps caused the institution to lose $37.5M in unre-
covered ICR (Table 3-2): 
years when the OR rate was lower than the 57% OR rate negotiated in 2012, for grants to be 
awarded in the future. (ii) The off-campus OR rate is set at 26%; (iii) NIH mandates reim-
bursement of  universities’ indirect costs at a fixed 8% rate on instruction/training grants (well 
below most universities’ negotiated instruction rates). We elected not to lure readers into the 
M-UP jungle by trying to define and calculate incurred indirect costs for more than a dozen 
specialized grant categories. Instead, readers may rest assured that these numbers of  unrecov-
ered dollars for different grant types ($15.5M total), plus the dollars unrecovered because of  
caps, cost sharing, and negotiation, add up to the $82M difference for federal grants between 
the calculated/incurred $226M described above (see note§) and the recovered $144M actually 
recovered. 
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a. A 26% cap on administrative costs (instituted in 1991, after the famous 
indirect cost audit debacle at Stanford; 8) caused UCSF in FY2014 
to lose ~$21M; Table 3-2). That loss represents a decrease of  6 
percentage points from the administrative ICR rate (32% of  MTDC) 
UCSF calculated and proposed in 2012 to the federal auditors, who 
did not question UCSF’s figures. Touted as a way to promote more 
efficient research administration, this cap ignores the gradual increase in 
universities’ administrative burdens that results from having to comply 
with the ever-growing flood of  regulations crafted by federal funders 
(14). Such compliance costs, reflected in increasing administrative 
rate calculations, have dramatically increased, but have not yet been 
comprehensively assessed by at a national level (e.g., by the Council on 
Governmental Relations or the Association of  American Universities). 
b. A cap on maximum individual salaries that may be paid as direct costs by 
NIH-funded projects. In FY2014, universities were required to use other 
sources of  income to pay the portion of  faculty salaries above that cap 
(set at $181,500 per year, a pay grade for certain federal employees). 
Annual extra cost to UCSF: ~$16.5M (Table 3-2). 
c. The NIH-mandated 8% ICR rate on training grants, described above 
under i, represents another kind of  cap specified by federal agencies. 
(This kind of  cap did not contribute to the $37.5M in ICR lost under 
headings a and b, above.)
Lost ICR (iii): cost sharing by faculty. UCSF advises its investigators not to partici-
pate in voluntary (but unpaid) sharing of  direct costs, but some faculty mem-
bers still do so. Thus Professor X, a leader in her field, may promise to donate 
5% of  her time to Assistant Professor Y’s project, with no salary requested; 
such voluntary participation may make the proposal look stronger to review-
ers who decide whether to fund it. If  X keeps her promise, the university must 
pay 5% of  X’s salary from other sources. UCSF records the overall cost of  this 
voluntary sharing as $3M in FY2014 (Table 3-2). 
Lost ICR (iv): “negotiation.” Negotiation with DHHS auditors substantially 
decreases UCSF’s recovery of  federal ICR (Table 3-2). Various institutions 
get quite different negotiated ICR rates, sometimes because they negotiate 
with different government agencies or come to the table as a private research 
institute (with no mission other than research) rather than as an academic in-
stitution. Different histories can account for some discrepancies: for instance, 
generous state support for public universities through the 1980s kept ICR 
rates lower than for private institutions. Subsequent loss of  much of  that state 
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support gradually helped UCSF to negotiate higher ICR rates (compare the 
57% negotiated OR rate in FY2014 to the 42% OR rate in FY1994 (11); even 
so, UCSF’s OR ICR rates do not yet match those of  institutions whose ICR 
rates were much higher early on. In other cases, reasons for different negoti-
ated rates remain unexplained (15). 
UCSF last negotiated with federal auditors in 2012, when its negotiated 
OR rate was 54.5% (26% administrative; 28.5% facilities), based on rates ne-
gotiated previously. To the auditors UCSF proposed new OR rates, based on 
federally audited UCSF expenditures in the index year of  FY2010 (see Box 
3-1). The proposed OR rate was 71.3% for FY2013, dropping to 70% over 
the ensuing four years. For each year, the proposal asked for a 32% rate to 
pay its administrative component. At the very outset the 26% federal cap for 
administration automatically reduced the ICR rate for OR by 6%. 
The rest of  the negotiation revolved around the difference between the 
2011 facilities rate (28.5%) and UCSF’s proposed 40% facilities rate, or 11.5% 
higher. The proposed increase was based on a combination of  new costs for 
two recently occupied new research buildings and two additional buildings to 
be opened during the four years to be covered by the proposed new rate; the 
increased costs included interest on new bonds, building depreciation, and 
utilities, operations, and maintenance. Without arguing against the basis for 
the proposed increase, DHHS auditors simply offered a gradual 4% increase 
in the facilities rate—take it or leave it. Because the alternative would have 
been to give up NIH-funded research, UCSF accepted the offer (16). “Nego-
tiation” thus meant UCSF itself, not NIH, had to pay the unrecovered 7.5% 
from the facilities component of  its ICR rate, a loss of  ~$26M per year (Table 
3-2). In FY2015, the negotiated OR rate is 58%; UCSF is preparing for anoth-
er rate negotiation in 2016, which will presumably cover fiscal years 2017-20. 
ICR on non-federal research grants and contracts
In actual dollars, recovery of  indirect costs for federally sponsored research 
was almost three-fold higher in FY2014 than that for non-federally sponsored 
research—$144M vs. $53M, respectively (Table 3-1; Fig. 3-3). As we saw in 
chapter 1 (see Fig. 1-5), research funds from private funding sources have 
increased mightily, especially since the beginning of  the 21st century. This 
increase reflects enthusiastic and effective efforts of  clinician-researchers to 
garner more privately funded support (see chapter 9). Consequently, recov-
ered indirect cost dollars for privately funded research have also risen during 
the same period (Fig. 3-3). 
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Nonetheless, increased private research funds do pose a problem. If  we 
compare recovery in proportion to total direct costs, funders of  federal re-
search also reimburse at a higher rate than do non-federal funders: for the 
two, ratios of  the recovered indirect costs to the total direct costs in FY 2014 
were 0.28 and 0.18, respectively. The different reimbursement rates proba-
bly reflect two causes. First, the reimbursement policies of  many important 
private sponsors of  academic research (e.g., American Cancer Society or the 
American Heart Association) explicitly limit the percentage of  indirect cost 
they will pay, to assure donors that their donations will directly fund research. 
Some corporate sponsors do pay at rates comparable to federal rates, although 
privately sponsored clinical trials reimburse at a special rate of  33%, set by 
the UCSF Chancellor’s Office (levied on TDC, rather than MTDC; 17). The 
second cause is an essential corollary to the first: like most large biomedical re-
search centers, UCSF usually waives its stated policy that non-federal funders 
pay indirect costs at the federal rate. Indeed, federal rules require grantee in-
stitutions to charge indirect costs to non-federal funders at federal rates, but 
also allow them to waive such charges if  they set up a formal waiver process. 
UCSF formally waives a large proportion of  the non-federal indirect costs it 
would otherwise charge. The waivers reflect market decisions parallel to the 
institution’s acceptance of  the “negotiated” loss of  indirect costs on federally 
sponsored grants (see above). In both cases, UCSF recognizes its weak bar-
gaining position: to obtain direct costs necessary for research, it must absorb 
unavoidable deficits in unrecovered indirect costs. 
Fig. 3-3. Indirect costs recovered by UCSF over thirty years (1985-2014): total ICR; federal 
ICR; non-federal, or Private, State, and Local ICR. Data from 12).
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Because the proportion of  UCSF’s non-federal research dollars to its total 
research dollars increases every year, it may be useful to quantitate the unre-
covered indirect costs the university itself  pays to receive non-federal research 
support. To determine that number, in turn, requires an estimate of  the total 
indirect costs actually incurred when UCSF accepts grants and contracts from 
non-federal sponsors. That estimate has remained distressingly fuzzy, because 
UCSF does not request or receive most of  its indirect costs from non-federal 
funders in relation to federally-specified cost-allocation categories, nor does it 
track indirect costs specifically related to non-federally-funded research grants. 
To manage this fuzziness, we take advantage of  the fact that federal rules 
require that its allocation categories be applied to UCSF expenditures for all 
research, not only to that funded by federal sources (Box 3-1). Because re-
search funded by both federal and non-federal sponsors takes place in the 
*Data from 5.
¶Total incurred indirect costs were calculated according to the same MTDC-based procedure 
(see legend to Table 3-2) used for calculating federally funded contracts and grants (C&G). 
They were then distributed into four categories based on the relative direct costs (MTDC) 
received from four classes of  non-federal funding agency (state, local, private) and the kind of  
research (private clinical trials, private C&G); these distributed incurred costs are not shown in 
this table. 
§Unrecovered indirect costs were calculated by subtracting the actual indirect costs reim-
bursed from each funder category from the calculated incurred indirect costs (not shown, but 
see footnote above) in that category. 
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same facilities, is performed by the same researchers, and is administered by 
the same staff, it appears likely that indirect costs incurred for non-federal 
research closely resemble those for federal research. We used federal alloca-
tion categories to calculate the incurred indirect costs in FY2014 for federal-
ly-sponsored research (Table 3-2), so applying similar rules to non-federally 
sponsored research should provide an equally valid result. The key assumption 
is this: the non-federal MTDC dollar generates quantitatively the same incurred 
indirect cost at UCSF as does a federal MTDC dollar. Subsequent subtraction 
of  ledger-recorded recovered indirect costs from the calculated incurred costs 
can then tell us the amounts of  unrecovered indirect costs in each subcategory 
of  non-federal research.
Table 3-3 shows the results based on these assumptions. For non-federal 
research, in FY2014 UCSF recovered $53M of  the $129M it incurred, and 
failed to recover $76M. Most of  these unrecovered costs —$49M, or 64%—
could be attributed to privately sponsored research contracts and grants, and 
relatively little to unrecovered funds in other subcategories. 
Earlier we suggested that the M-UP makes indirect cost calculations—
even those that obey the federal government’s precisely prescribed rules—
quantitatively imprecise approximations of  reality. Extrapolating these rules 
to non-federally sponsored research must add yet more uncertainty, because 
we do not know for sure whether indirect costs of  federally- vs. non-federally-
funded research are muddled in exactly the same way. Despite the caveats, 
dollar amounts in the section below are as nearly correct as the M-UP allows. 
Overall IC recovered vs. IC incurred
Rough estimates of  UCSF’s incurred indirect costs of  research in FY2014 
(Fig. 3-4) yield three useful pieces of  information about how UCSF pays for 
its research:
1. UCSF’s overall research effort costs nearly half  the total revenues of  its Campus 
(Fig. 3-4a). The sum of  total direct costs of  sponsored research ($795M; 
Table 3-1) and the total calculated/estimated indirect costs incurred 
($361M; Tables 3-2 and 3-3) comes to $1,156M, or 47% of  UCSF’s 
Campus revenues ($2,480M; 1). 
2. From its own resources, UCSF pays nearly half  the indirect costs its research incurs 
(Fig. 3-4b). The incurred indirect costs of  all sponsored research 
($361M) vastly exceeded the $197M reimbursed by all funders, 
producing an indirect cost deficit of  $164M, or 45% of  all indirect 
  Moiling for gold: The indirect cost mystery           49
costs and a deficit burden that is 7.5% of  UCSF’s total annual Campus 
revenue.
3. For UCSF, federally funded research is a substantially better financial bargain than 
non-federally funded research. Despite 12 years of  flat-lined NIH budgets, 
UCSF received 64% of  its total sponsored research direct costs ($507M) 
from federal sources—almost double the 36% ($288M) received from 
non-federal sources (Fig. 3-4a). But funders of  the two classes of  
research failed to reimburse exactly the same amounts ($82M each; 
a fortuitous coincidence) of  Indirect costs (Fig. 3-4b). Consequently, 
UCSF was obliged to pay 61% of  incurred indirect costs of  non-federal 
research, but only 36% of  those incurred in supporting federal research. 
 
The third piece of  information indicates that non-federally funded research 
can create a distressing dilemma for UCSF, and presumably for other large 
academic biomedical research centers. As the NIH budget shrank (in infla-
tion-corrected dollars; 18) by 21% from FY2003 to FY2014 (19), UCSF and 
its sister institutions continued to scramble furiously for research funding 
from philanthropic and other non-federal sources. (Also corrected for infla-
tion, non-federally-funded research at UCSF increased 5.5-fold, vs. 2.4-fold 
for federally-funded research over the much longer period, 1984 to 2013; see 
Chapter 1, Fig. 1-5b.) But in FY2014, the lower recovery of  indirect costs on 
non-federally funded research requires UCSF to pay 29 cents on average for 
each non-federal direct cost dollar—that is, 13 cents more than it pays per 
federal direct cost dollar (20). If  the swerve toward more non-federal support 
for research continues, universities like UCSF will find themselves unable to 
bear the growing financial burden. 
Why do UCSF and its sister schools tolerate these fiscally painful burdens, 
whether they involve federal or non-federal funders? Are these schools help-
lessly trapped between faculty lusting for money to support their research and 
penny-pinching federal and non-federal sponsors powerful enough to call the 
shots? The trap metaphor captures only part of  the problem, which is really 
historical: during the latter half  of  the 20th century many leading US universi-
ties, including the University of  California, began to take on a new mission, in 
addition to educating the young—that is, production of  new knowledge (21). 
Now, after more than six decades, employees of  those universities—from 
lowly wage-workers to top leaders—take genuine pride in their institutions’ re-
search accomplishments, which attract excellent students, superb faculty, and 
millions of  dollars from alumni, philanthropists, foundations, corporations, 
and government. Because their jobs and future prospects depend directly on 
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Fig. 3-4 a & b. Dollars spent on research at UCSF (panel a) and indirect costs of  research 
(panel b) in FY2014. Sections of  the pie in panel a are associated with federal or non-federal 
grants and contracts. Outer arcs and arrows indicate proportions of  total research dollars 
according to pay source: federal, non-federal, or UCSF itself. Indirect costs in panel b are 
separated into two categories: recovered; unrecovered; the horizontal bars depict indirect 
costs of  (from bottom to top) non-federally-funded research, federally funded research, and 
all research in that year. Abbreviations: Fed, federal; non-fed, non-federal; C&G, contracts and 
grants; TDC, total direct costs; IC, indirect costs; Rec, recovered; Unrec, unrecovered. All data 
derived from Tables 3-1-3.
these accomplishments, institutional sharing of  research’s indirect costs with 
government and non-federal sponsors remains a necessary and tolerated—al-
beit poorly understood—bargain. While febrile eagerness to keep that bargain 
induces institutions to invest ever-increasing dollars into research, the substan-
tial benefits and potential dangers of  sharing the indirect costs of  research will 
continue to raise additional concerns. These dangers are surely accentuated 
by progressively decreasing willingness of  the public and state and federal 
government funders to maintain—let alone increase—past levels of  funding, 
both direct and indirect.
Indirect costs pose other difficult questions
For what purposes may universities legitimately spend ICR revenue? Research-
ers often raise this question, mostly to urge that every dime of  that revenue 
directly supports research, and more particularly, research in their own labo-
ratories. Nonetheless, no university- or sponsor-generated regulations contra-
dict the principle that the institution—at UCSF, the Chancellor’s Office—can 
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use ICR dollars for any purpose in keeping with university missions, because 
those dollars are reimbursed to the university for real costs already incurred. 
Employers reimburse employees for costs incurred in pursuing business pur-
poses: reimbursement to an employee who uses her car to travel to a business 
meeting requires documentation of  trip and meeting, but she is not required 
to spend the reimbursement check on her car, or for any other specific pur-
pose. Thus universities may use ICR dollars to support research, but are not 
required to do so. UCSF Chancellors generally follow an unwritten policy of  
using the ICR dollars to support research and education. Chapter 5 will return 
to these issues. 
Institutions jump through fiery hoops to garner whatever indirect cost re-
imbursements funders deign to provide, because they want to pursue research 
and need every dollar they can get to survive and prosper. These straightfor-
ward facts raise yet more questions. We pose them here, so readers can ponder 
the underlying issues before they re-appear in later chapters:
1. Given UCSF’s pressing need for indirect cost reimbursements, do federal 
rules for calculating those reimbursements skew institutional incentives 
in directions that make it harder to maintain the high qualify of  
biomedical research? Bruce Alberts pointed out (22) that universities are 
motivated against paying substantial proportions of  faculty researchers’ 
salaries, because faculty salaries paid from grants constitute much of  
the MTDC to which ICR rates are pegged. Indeed, if  UCSF itself  had 
paid all faculty researcher salaries charged to research grants in FY2014, 
it would not only have had to pony up an extra $114M in direct salary 
and $34M in benefits, but would also have lost an additional ~$60M 
in ICR—a total of  $208M. [These sums derive from: (i) dollars of  
direct sponsored faculty salaries (see chapter 6); (ii) benefits calculated 
as 29.7% of  that sponsored salary; (iii) 41% ICR on direct costs of  
federal grants.] Faced with the federal ICR rules on researcher salaries, 
a university leader who proposes that his institution pay a higher 
proportion of  researchers’ salaries might well be judged insane.
2. Do universities continue to build or renovate laboratories—as Alberts 
also suggested (22)—because the government allows ICR to pay the 
interest on money borrowed to do so? For UCSF, this incentive is real, 
but relatively weak (see Chapter 4). 
Finally, let us pose a question that should occur to almost any observer. How 
does a university find dollars to pay for all its unrecovered indirect costs? For 
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UCSF, the shortfall of  indirect cost reimbursement was ~$164M in FY2014 
(Fig. 3-4a), including both federally- and privately-sponsored research grants. 
Where did UCSF find the dollars to pay this money, especially in view of  pro-
gressively declining support from UC and the state of  California? The short 
answer: no one, including the authors of  this book, can provide a straightfor-
ward quantitative answer. 
The long answer: the M-UP strikes again! In essence, the dollars for every 
activity that involves research in any large academic institution are muddled ir-
retrievably with everything else the university does. So, as we described above, 
calculating total incurred indirect costs produces an estimate, for which the 
arithmetic is easy to record and check (e.g., by federal auditors), although 
its true accuracy can never be known. From the very beginning of  “indirect 
costs,” no “real” unrecovered indirect cost of  research has ever been tracked 
and used as a basis of  negotiation with any research funding source. When 
indirect costs were first paid, sophisticated data systems able to track such 
information didn’t exist, and no one imagined requesting such information. 
Instead, over ensuing decades, costs increased incrementally and became more 
complex, and institutions paid their unrecovered indirect cost dollars out of  
multiple budgets, most of  which were not even predominantly devoted to 
maintaining research. No one (federal, private, or in the institution itself) both-
ered to ask where any of  the money for indirect costs “really” came from. 
Also, it became clear that even superb documentation of  unrecovered indirect 
costs (e.g., UCSF’s $164M in FY2014) would never affect an outcome of  “ne-
gotiation” with a federal agency. Thus, incrementally, the M-UP has rendered 
unrecovered indirect costs—however large—essentially unknowable. 
Finally, we have described many ways in which the federal government 
limits its quantitative obligation to pay ICR, but that does not mean that we 
think the government should pay all the indirect costs of  research. Like other 
research universities, UCSF at present pays a substantial portion of  those indi-
rect costs (Fig. 3-3); this is as it should be,, because the institution derives great 
benefits from the research it produces, which attracts faculty, students, pa-
tients, and philanthropic donors, and furnishes the immense satisfaction that 
comes from advancing knowledge and medical care. For all academic research 
institutions, however, indirect costs pose two extremely difficult questions. 
1. How should the relative portions of  indirect costs paid by funding 
agencies vs. the institution be determined? The present system is both 
cumbersome and potentially unfair with respect to certain types of  
research and some universities. These problems reflect a long, complex 
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political history and cannot be fixed without extensive reform of  the 
present rules and regulations—a daunting task indeed! 
2. Where are universities to find the money to pay their share of  indirect 
costs? For rich private research universities, the answer is philanthropy. 
For public universities like UCSF, the answer is by no means clear. Sharp 
reductions in state support make it hard for all state universities to pay 
for their research programs. For a biomedical institution like UCSF, 
tuition can contribute very little, and philanthropy is much harder to 
obtain than for private universities with many rich alumni. UCSF can 
leverage some of  its clinical income toward research, but this resource is 
also limited. 
 
We cannot provide satisfying answers to either of  these thorny questions, but 
later chapters will make it clear that both questions have implications for the 
future of  academic research in general, and UCSF’s research, in particular. 
Chapter 4
Money is a good soldier: Buildings, equity, 
gifts, and debt
Until now our account of  UCSF’s finances has focused on revenues, with occasional nods toward expenditures. Now we begin to explore how the 
institution manages to leverage its assets to meet its aspirations. This chap-
ter sets the stage by discussing three critical topics. First we describe UCSF’s 
“real” assets—its buildings and space devoted to various missions in differ-
ent locations. Second, we outline rudiments of  how the institution forecasts 
the future and plans accordingly. Finally, we consider how UCSF leverages 
its assets by spending cash (or equity), seeking state funding (on ever-rarer 
occasions), seeking philanthropic gifts, or borrowing funds for buildings or 
projects. 
Buildings and Space
To fulfill all its missions, UCSF needs durable, well-designed physical spaces. 
Such spaces are classified under four main functional categories: teaching (also 
termed “Instructional”), research, clinical care, and support. Teaching space is 
devoted to educating professional students, graduate students, clinicians in 
training, etc.; it includes not only classrooms and lecture halls, but also fac-
ulty offices, space dedicated to educational support staff, conferences, and 
study space. The search for new knowledge takes place in research space: “wet-
bench” laboratories, research equipment rooms, dry-lab offices for computa-
tion and analysis, and related support spaces. Patients are seen and treated in 
clinical care space: hospital rooms for sick patients, emergency room facilities, 
operating rooms, treatment rooms, nursing stations, waiting rooms, and any 
type of  room that directly supports clinical care of  in-patients or out-patients. 
Support space is all the other space necessary to support performance of  those 
three primary missions, including libraries, parking garages, food service facili-
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ties, and spaces for administration, police and security, computer services, etc. 
Different spaces in any particular building may fall into one, several, or 
all four categories, and two or even three missions may take place in a single 
space or room. Teaching often takes place, for instance, in research labs, clini-
cal examining rooms, and patients’ sick-rooms, and patient-focused research 
can take place in space otherwise devoted to clinical care. While inevitably 
overlapping functions sometimes confuse, the University of  California and 
higher education throughout the US try to make sure that a particular space’s 
major function defines its primary use.
UCSF’s total space, distributed among multiple sites (Table 4-1), amounts 
to 5.7 million assignable square feet (asf)—a measure roughly equivalent to 
“usable” square feet (1). Of  these sites, two account for 62% of  the total: 
the Parnassus campus (33%) and the Mission Bay campus (29%). Of  UCSF’s 
total space, 1.43 million asf  (26%) are devoted to research (Tables 4-1 and 4-2; 
2). Of  UCSF’s total research space, 79% is located on the two largest cam-
puses—36% at Parnassus and 43% at the Mission Bay campus (Table 4-1). 
Table 4-2 compares space devoted to research (including laboratories, research 
offices, and research support facilities) vs. that devoted to other uses, UCSF-
wide. Counting all UCSF campuses, more asf  are devoted to administrative 
offices than to research (28 and 25% of  total UCSF space, respectively), but 
the asf  devoted to each of  these two uses far surpasses any other uses, includ-
ing clinical care (14%). 
*Data in this table was from reference 2.
†Other sites include: Several, including Laurel Heights, China Basin, and Mission Center.
¶Research space includes laboratories, research offices, and miscellaneous.
§Abbreviations: asf, assignable square feet (1); SFGH, San Francisco General Hospital.
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Academic biomedical researchers need space to do their research, and 
institutions badly need every dollar of  the indirect costs they recover when 
research dollars are spent. In earlier years, PIs urged their institutions to pro-
vide more laboratory space, so they could expand their research programs 
with dollars readily obtained from NIH. In contrast, now many researchers 
complain that they are constantly pushed to obtain more grant dollars by host 
institutions dependent on indirect cost recovery (ICR). This ICR is surely criti-
cal, for UCSF and most other research institutions. How do institutions main-
tain or increase the ICR flow? 
UCSF’s interest in ICR is serious, and not only because ICR is needed to 
maintain research. Indeed, the Chancellor’s UCSF Space Committee uses ICR 
as a general indicator of  the relative magnitude and intensity of  research in 
planning for new buildings or changes in the function of  existing buildings. 
In 2010, the Space Committee began to use ICR as an explicit criterion for 
judging whether research space is efficiently utilized, based on the following 
stated policy (3): “For appropriate spaces (e.g., Research) a standard expected 
level of  extramural funding (indirect costs; $/asf) will be defined for such 
space based on operational costs. . . . Failure to meet the overall expected level 
of  funding for a Unit is one criterion that could support a Space Committee 
recommendation to decrease the total asf  assigned to the Unit. [A]ll units will 
*Data in this table is from reference 2.  Reference 2 was not updated with the final space 
information for the new UCSF Hospital at Mission Bay at the time of  publication.
†Other uses are multiple; among the largest are storage, animal quarters, food faciltiies and 
service.
§Abbreviations: asf, assignable square feet, Acad, Academic; Instruc, Instructional
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be expected to demonstrate extramural Facilities and Administration (F&A) 
recovery in excess of  $90 per asf. . . . The [UCSF Space] Committee will re-
assess this figure on an annual basis. . . . [If  s]pace is deemed to not be used 
efficiently . . . , this space will be returned to the Chancellor.” In January 2016, 
the criterion will increase from $90/asf  to $120/asf  (4). In principle, then, 
every unit’s research asf  will depend quantitatively upon its faculty’s ability to 
maintain ICR on their grant awards at or above a specified level. The criterion 
applies to average ICR dollars per asf  in all academic units (schools, depart-
ments, ORUs, etc.), but does not specify that each of  the unit’s individual 
faculty laboratories must meet the criterion.
Some faculty members bridle at being assessed to furnish ICR as surro-
gate rent for the privilege of  directing a research program, but it is hard to see 
how UCSF can avoid setting some kind of  standard, because its research en-
terprise depends on ICR (and on direct costs as well) to survive in the face of  
progressive loss of  state financial support, fierce competition for researchers, 
students, and grant dollars, and ever-increasing costs constructing laboratories 
and conducting and administering research. 
Nonetheless, the ICR/asf  policy itself  appears to us as counterproduc-
tive, standing by itself. The problem is not only that unthinking state and 
federal politicians may use the notion of  ICR as surrogate rent as a red flag to 
promote anti-research and anti-academic agendas. More important, in choos-
ing ICR/asf  as the quantitative criterion for utilization of  research space, 
UCSF is adopting a dangerously blunt instrument for the delicate, crucial task 
of  assessing the value of  a research project in relation to the space it uses, for four 
reasons:
1. ICR on federal projects is determined by arcane, arbitrary rules (chapter 
3) that bear no relation to the value of  those research projects.
2. Different kinds of  research earn ICR at very different rates in relation to 
space utilized (e.g., dry-lab vs. wet-lab research, as we shall see in 
chapters 7-9).
3. Because ICR is much lower for privately than for federally funded 
research (chapter 3), projects can earn more (or less) ICR for reasons 
unrelated to research quality.
4. Because research support from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute 
(HHMI) pays no ICR whatever, any unit that houses HHMI 
investigators will report lower ICR/asf. 
Even as a benchmark for the relative density of  research in a particular 
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building or space, the quantitative criterion should surely include both direct 
and indirect costs, simply because the university clearly needs both. Also, for 
the University to decide whether an academic unit should gain or lose research 
space, it must explicitly judge the quality of  the research it conducts, because 
that quality determines the worth of  research to the university and society as a 
whole. (High UCSF officials told the authors that the ICR benchmark is only 
one of  eight criteria used for judging utilization of  research space, but we 
were not able to find the other seven criteria in the policy statement (3) that 
announces the use of  ICR dollars per asf  as the key quantitative criterion.) To 
judge quality requires answering this question: does new knowledge produced 
by this research increase our understanding of  the natural world and/or our 
ability to understand and treat disease? While large institutions naturally seek 
simple numerical answers to hard questions, the ICR/asf  criterion can pro-
duce wrong answers (see above). Correct answers can and should depend on 
judgments by the best impartial scientists the institution itself  can find in its 
faculty and assign to this task—not to those whose expertise limits them to 
measuring only asf  and ICR. Arbitrary dependence on numbers did not make 
UCSF a first-rate research institution. Instead, research quality requires careful 
value judgments—not hasty shortcuts. 
A Short History: How UCSF Pays for its Research Facilities
To prepare for more extensive discussion of  how UCSF now pays for its re-
search facilities, we begin by asking where the money came from in the 20th 
century (5). Before about 1980, the state of  California paid most of  the bills 
for UCSF’s new facilities, including hospitals; other bills—for teaching, re-
search, administrative, and support facilities—were also paid by the state, with 
minor contributions from philanthropic donors. Then and now, funds for 
housing, food service, and parking facilities were paid from debt supported by 
revenues earned from these services. Later, the state paid less than half  the bill 
for constructing Long Hospital, completed in the 1980s; by the mid-1990s, the 
state virtually stopped funding UCSF’s hospital construction and renovation. 
From then on, state support for UCSF research facilities has been virtually nil, 
owing in part to the recession of  1991-94, the “dot.com” crash of  2001-03, 
the 2008 real-estate crash, and the subsequent recession. For two decades, the 
state has funded UC teaching facilities, almost exclusively; almost no teaching 
facility dollars came to UCSF. 
To become acquainted with the different mechanisms by which UCSF 
pays for its facilities, consider capital funding of  the $1.586B Mission Bay 
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campus, building by building (Table 4-3), and money sources for each (Table 
4-4); the tables are based on a capital funding plan that began in 1997, and 
was updated in 2015 (6). Most Mission Bay construction is funded from more 
than a single source (Table 4-3), often including philanthropic gifts, campus 
reserves, and one of  several “flavors” of  debt (described more fully below). 
Note also the exception to our statement that state support for UCSF’s re-
search construction has been “virtually nil” for decades: the state of  California 
paid $76M—i.e., only 4.8% ($76M) of  all Mission Bay construction, as we saw 
earlier (7). 
Table 4-4 summarizes the four distinct mechanisms used to pay for these 
projects. Philanthropic gifts are paying 24% of  the new campus’s construction 
costs. The second mechanism, ordinary debt ($739M), pays for 47%. Principal 
and interest on this debt comes from three different sources of  campus in-
come: ICR backs most of  it ($597M), with income from housing and parking 
services paying off  the corresponding auxiliary debts. The third mechanism, 
operating or capital leases, represent a different flavor of  debt, explained later in 
this chapter; this source accounts for 14% of  the new campus’s cost. The final 
source is equity—basically cash, which UCSF obtains either from cash reserves 
(11% of  the new campus’s costs) or state funds (4.8%). The next section de-
scribes details of  these modes of  payment and rules that govern them. 
*Data in this table is from reference 6. 
†Abbreviations: Acqu., Acquisition; CVRI, Cardiovascular Research Institute; Neurosci., 
Neurosciences Building; Res., Research Building; $M, millions of  dollars.
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Leveraging Assets for the Future
UCSF is an educational institution that must also operate as a business to 
compete effectively for patients and dollars against other health care enter-
prises, and also against large, academically strong, well-funded research insti-
tutions that vie against one another to maintain—and often to increase—the 
number and quality of  their researchers, students, and sponsored research 
funds. Like any dynamic business, UCSF husbands and increases its resources 
by predicting and planning for the future. To do so, it maintains a Core Fi-
nancial Plan (CFP) and forecasting effort that combine its financial plans for 
the clinical enterprise (UCSF Health) and for the central resources controlled 
by its Schools and Chancellor’s Office. In autumn each year, the CFP assesses 
the past fiscal year and forecasts revenues and expenses for the next decade. 
Such forecasts incorporate detailed inferences and assumptions with re-
spect to operating costs and growth, extant debt payments, and new capital 
projects for new construction and maintenance or upgrading of  present facili-
ties. Based on past performance and prudent assumptions about changes in 
the economic environment, forecasts help leaders make hard decisions. Do 
we pay for X with cash reserves or by borrowing? How much philanthropy 
can project X attract? Can we backstop shortfalls in philanthropy, if  they oc-
*Data in the table is from ref. 6.
†Items in italics are subsets of  the sources for payment of  the debt ($739M) listed in the 
line above; the dollar figures are for the individual items, while the corresponding percentage 
figures refer to percentages of  total payment sources in the table.
§Abbreviations: ICR, indirect cost recovery; $M, millions of  dollars
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cur? To cover unanticipated problems with X, how many dollars should be set 
aside? (What about projects Y, Z, M, N, and P?) Incorporating best guesses 
and calculations for ongoing operations and future projects, forecasters pre-
dict bottom lines for subsequent years. If  revenues from project X exceed its 
costs, the institution gains “resources on the margin,” which businesses call 
“profit.” A non-profit enterprise, UCSF uses resources on the margin to meet 
future goals, satisfy requirements and regulations (e.g., earthquake safety), and 
fulfill compelling aspirations. 
This section now turns its attention to the different sources of  funds—
equity and public funding, philanthropic gifts, and various forms of  debt—
used by UCSF to create new space, replace old space, or renovate existing 
space to make it functional in future years. The actual decision-making process 
will be described in chapter 5.
Equity, including public funds. Equity is simply “available cash,” in the form 
of  current funds or reserves. The decision to use such money is often dic-
tated by exigent need or unforeseen circumstances, conditions that account 
for much of  the campus reserves UCSF has spent to maintain construction 
of  the Mission Bay campus, amounting so far to $181M, of  about 11% of  the 
project’s total cost (Table 4-2). 
In addition to available cash, UCSF has in the past treated public funding 
as a form of  equity, despite the fact that state funding is usually provided by 
general obligation bonds, repaid from state tax revenues. Such state funds—
sweet, but hard to get—may entail three-year delays between initial request 
and receipt of  actual funds—time devoted to internal review by UC, further 
review by a state agency, and a political process that can attach strings to each 
dollar. During the past 15 years, UCSF obtained funds via this route for two 
projects related to its education mission (8). Sometimes, small windfalls occur 
for research buildings, as with the special state bond funds that paid $55M 
of  the $95M cost of  constructing Byers Hall (aka the California Institute for 
Science and Innovation) or a seismic code replacement project that helped to 
pay $21M of  the $215M cost for Genentech Hall (Table 4-3). For 35 years, 
UCSF has attracted no federal construction grants; federal dollars for higher 
education buildings are rare. 
Philanthropy. Dollars from generous donors are almost always welcome. A 
donor may attach onerous demands or stipulations to a gift, but most gifts—
whoever the donor may be—come with two kinds of  unavoidable costs:
1. As we noted in chapter 2, donors may pledge contributions over a 
period of  years, so the university incurs a cost for paying interest charges 
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to accept the gift. Paid over 10 years, a gift of  $100M could cost the 
university over $20M in interest costs (e.g., with a bridge loan for 10 
years at 5% interest). 
2. A major fund-raising campaign can cost up to $3-5M per year for a 
campaign that requires additional fund-raisers and support staff, 
sponsors fund-raising events, and it can last for five years. Skilled fund-
raisers receive premium pay because they are engaged for short times, 
and in San Francisco living costs drive their salaries higher.
For these reasons, raising $350M for new research facilities over a five-
year period could cost a university $75M or more in operating costs plus inter-
est costs for unpaid gift pledges. UCSF’s initial donation target to build the 
Mission Bay campus was $350M, and its first phase raised $329M. We do not 
know how much it cost to raise that money. The present total, $381M (Table 
4-3), represents one of  every four dollars used to build the campus so far. 
Now a specific target is usually set for each new building. 
Debt. For major research universities, debt is an essential tool for building 
and renewing teaching and research facilities. Private universities have used 
debt and gifts for many decades, because they can repay their debts from 
several sources, including income from tuition, general endowment, and other 
investments. Unable to secure loans in such ways, public institutions arrived 
late at the banquet, because their general endowments are meager and states 
generally prohibit use of  tuition to repay debt. Fortunately, by the late 1980s, 
UCSF (and other public research universities) finally began to use ICR on fed-
eral and private contracts and grants as a pledge-able revenue, vetted by Wall 
Street bankers and debt-rating agencies, for securing (and paying) debt. UCSF 
didn’t know at that the time that this use of  ICR would prove critical for its 
survival during the ensuing 25 “lean” years, which simultaneously increased 
the need for borrowed money and made it impossible to rely on steady state 
support. 
Before 1986, UCSF issued only small amounts of  debt, for parking fa-
cilities and some student housing. In that year the institution issued its first 
ICR-backed debt, when it borrowed $55M to purchase and update the Laurel 
Heights facility in San Francisco. Thirty years later, its present debt comes 
to $2.0B, comprising $900 million for the clinical enterprise and $1.1B for 
the Campus, which included $162M for auxiliary enterprises like parking and 
housing, for which both interest and repayment of  the principal are paid from 
the income of  each separate enterprise (9). 
Now UCSF’s debt pays for a wide range of  capital programs. On the 
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Parnassus campus these include renewal and seismic upgrading of  older build-
ings, replacement of  heating, power plant, utility systems, and creation of  a 
new animal care facilities and the Dolby Regeneration Medicine building. In 
other locations, debt allowed acquisition of  facilities at Mission Center, a new 
medical education center in Fresno, and the Osher Center at Mount Zion. 
Development of  the $1.586B new research campus at Mission Bay has relied 
heavily on debt (Table 4-3), as described above. Proportionately, debt so far is 
paying 47% of  the total cost, with a capital lease (a specialized form of  debt) 
accounting for an additional 13%; gifts, campus reserves, and the state of  
California account, respectively, for 24, 11, and 4.8% of  the total (Table 4-4). 
Capital or operating leases are names for arrangements very like ordinary 
debt. In these leases, the final product is “bought” by annual payments that 
require continuing sources of  available funds—a requirement identical to that 
used in normally issued debt. For example, UCSF purchased the Sandler Neu-
roscience Research Building (Table 4-3) via a capital lease, based on “a ground 
lease-development-leaseback” scenario. In simpler terms, the institution owns 
the land, contracts with an outside party to develop a project as specified by 
the owner, and pays the developer back through a lease arrangement. In such 
a “capital lease,” the owner (UCSF) takes over the project when the develop-
ment period ends (in this case, after 30 years). (In a so-called “operating” lease, 
the institution pays over time but does not intend to own the project at the 
end.)
During the six years between FY2009 and FY2015, UCSF’s total debt 
more than doubled, rising from about $1.06B to $2.33B (Fig. 4-1; 9). Overall, 
Fig. 4-1. UCSF debt doubled between FY2009 and 2015 (9). Each column shows the institu-
tion’s debt in a particular fiscal year (abscissa); the debt is apportioned in three segments, 
shown from top to bottom: the clinical enterprise (Medical Center); auxiliary (to be paid by 
income from auxiliary functions for which the debt is incurred); academic campus (aka the 
Chancellor’s Core Financial Plan).
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the FY2014 debt was 1.95-fold that carried by UCSF in FY2009. Most of  that 
change reflected a 3.08-fold change (that is, a 208% increase) in debt incurred 
by the clinical enterprise (“Medical Center” in Figs. 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3), owing 
primarily to constructing new hospital facilities at Mission Bay. Debt carried 
by the academic campus (called the “Core Financial Plan” in these figures) 
rose less (by ~63%) over this period, again predominantly due to obligations 
incurred for Mission Bay construction. Debt on auxiliary functions like park-
ing and housing rose even less (by 24%). 
Predicting Future Debt
Because future debt obligations inevitably constrain future options and op-
portunities, large institutions carefully plan how to distribute future issuances 
of  debt. In December 2015, UCSF’s planners expected the university to incur 
new debts over the coming decade (Table 4-5), {Table 4-5 here} based on 
capital the university would borrow at specific times (9). These planning num-
bers are subject to change, of  course, but they reveal UCSF’s thinking about 
its plans for the coming 10-year time window. As we write, some items on the 
*Data in the table is from reference 9.
†The Core Financial Plan (CFP) and Auxiliaries are two separate categories of  debt: the 
CFP debt is paid by the campus (supervised by the Chancellor’s Office), from equity and 
philanthropy, while auxiliary debts are paid from revenues of  the campus’s auxiliary functions, 
such as parking, housing, etc. 
§Abbreviations: Bldg, Building; MB, Mission Bay; MSB, Medical Sciences Building (Parnassus 
campus); MU/ACC, Millberry Union/Acute Care Center (Parnassus campus); SFGH, San 
Francisco General Hospital; $M, millions of  dollars.
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Fig. 4-3. Annual debt service (payment of  principal and interest) is predicted to double 
between FY15 and FY25 (9). Here debt service is apportioned in the same categories shown 
for debt in Figs. 4-1 and 4-2. If  UCSF were to incur no further debt since 2015, debt service 
would decline after FY2025, but that fall is in fact unlikely, owing to debt that will be issued in 
future years, as explained in the main text.
Fig. 4-2. UCSF debt will increase from about $2.1B in FY2014 to $2.5B in FY2024 (9). The 
debt (correct for 2014, predicted for the two other fiscal years) is apportioned in the same 
categories described in the Fig. 4-1 legend. 
list have already been initiated. 
If  each project is financed at the amount shown in Table 4-5, by FY2026 
UCSF’s debt level will increase from the 2015 figure (~$2.33B) to ~$2.82B 
(Fig. 4-2; 9). Issuing those planned new debts means UCSF will require more 
cash in future to meet its debt obligations—i.e., to “service” that debt over the 
long term—as indicated in Fig. 4-3 (9): annual costs of  debt service are pro-
jected to more than double, from ~$102M in FY2015 to ~$231M in FY2025. 
After an additional 24 years, in FY2049, annual debt service would fall back 
down to a value close to that of  FY2015—providing that UCSF issues no 
further debt in the interim. “No further debt,” of  course, is an untenable as-
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sumption; although the prediction shows debt service costs if  UCSF incurs no 
further debt than that explicitly planned in 2015, additional debts will certainly 
be issued during the coming 34 years. For instance, by 2024 some Mission Bay 
buildings, nearly 25 years old, will need renewal and upgrades. And UCSF’s 
Long Range Development Plan (10), which looks forward to 2035, discusses 
additional needs, soon to appear on the planning horizon.
Finally, it is worth pointing out the bold optimism that underlies planning 
for future debt levels: such plans assume that medical care continues to thrive 
as a profitable business and that steady streams of  federal dollars continue to 
flow in support of  both patient care and biomedical research. For biomedical 
research, the latter assumption has not been valid for more than a decade (see 
chapter 7, below); neither it nor the other assumptions are assured over the 
longer term. Chapters 5 and 10 will return to these issues. 
Priorities and Decision Making: Faith vs. Risk
In 2010, Bruce Alberts warned that the combination of  soft-money salaries 
and ICR from the NIH to reimburse interest and depreciation on research 
buildings “enables the many advocates for expansion [of  academic research 
institutions] to effectively argue that the costs will eventually be borne in large 
part by the U.S. government” (11). As we shall see, this statement does not 
correctly describe an institution’s decision to build a specific research building. 
It does apply, however, to long-term expansion of  UCSF and other research 
institutions. As described above, UCSF uses the reliability of  its ICR income 
to show prospective lenders that their loans will be paid. Approximately 25% 
(~$45M) of  that ICR income in 2014 (12) was reimbursement for interest and 
depreciation of  research facilities built in previous decades. Thus institutional 
expansion rests squarely on faith that federal support for research will con-
tinue. Later we shall return to this faith, and the genuine risks it poses for the 
institution and its lenders.
First, however, consider short-term decisions for building a specific re-
search facility. Reliance on future ICR played little if  any role in such decisions 
at UCSF, as shown by direct observation of  the decision process from 1991 
to 2013 (13). Back when state taxes paid for most research facilities, UCSF 
could enjoy the fruits of  new construction without worrying much about ei-
ther costs or using ICR to pay them. In the early 1990s, however, UC began 
sharply to reduce its support for construction of  research facilities. As a result, 
the institution learned a new lesson: over the short term, every research facility is a 
losing proposition, because it incurs costs much higher than the ICR it earns. 
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In 1990, a new state law (14) allowed UC to finance construction of  new 
research facilities by using 100% of  net new ICR generated from support for 
research in the new buildings. At the time, and for some years thereafter, more 
than 50% of  all ICR went not to the campuses where the sponsored research 
was conducted, but was instead divided by the state of  California and UC’s 
central administration (see Fig. 3-1). For this reason UCSF and other campus-
es greeted the new “Garamendi financing mechanism” (14) with enormous 
enthusiasm, because now they would retain all the ICR earned by research in 
new laboratories built by Garamendi loans (15). 
Naturally, there was a catch: UCSF (like other UC campuses) also had to 
operate and maintain such buildings from the same new ICR revenue, or from 
any excess dollars it might scrape together. UCSF used the new mechanism to 
construct a new cancer research building at its Mt. Zion campus. The Gara-
mendi financing mechanism permitted UCSF to accumulate a financial deficit 
on operating and debt costs while the new facility filled with faculty investiga-
tors and new research grants; the accumulated deficit was then to be paid back 
from ICR in excess of  the new building’s annual operating, maintenance and 
debt payment costs. Applying the Garamendi mechanism to pay for the new 
cancer building soon produced serious problems: 
1. It quickly became clear that that years would pass before the new facility 
realized its full potential as a magnet for ICR—at least three years for 
planning and constructing the building, plus an unknown number 
of  years to find, attract, and relocate research faculty able to develop 
exciting new research programs and populate the new laboratories. 
(Otherwise, the new faculty and staff  would have to be housed in 
some kind of  holding center if  they were to enter the building when 
it opened.) How long would that be? On what basis was the new ICR 
going to be projected?
2. A net increase in research faculty, staff, and equipment inevitably creates 
a need for more administration (e.g., for payroll, grants, etc.), which 
accounted for more than 50% of  total ICR in the early 1990s. Where 
could UCSF find the money to pay administrators when the Garamendi 
mechanism required it to use 100% of  ICR generated by the new 
research for maintenance, utilities, and interest costs? 
3. What would happen if  the new research program theme fizzled and the 
building’s research generated ICR at only pennies on the dollar? Who 
would pay the bills?
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Fortunately, but also very slowly, scary risks became happy results. Five 
years after its opening, the building had been occupied by enough new inves-
tigators to generate net new research dollars, with help from its research pro-
gram being named as one of  a very few national cancer centers; it took three 
additional years for those researchers’ new grants to generate enough ICR to 
begin paying all the building’s utility, operating, and maintenance costs, as well 
as the debt payments; five more years were necessary for the ICR to pay off  the 
operating and administrative deficits generated in the previous eight years. So, 
after a delay of  13 years, ICR dollars earned by research in the building were 
finally able to pay for the ongoing costs and administrative support needed to 
build, staff, and maintain the new facility. Ultimately, 100% of  the ICR paid 
the bills, but the mechanism hardly constituted a viable business model for 
generating future revenue. The take-home message: over the near term, it is 
folly to rely on generating excess ICR income as the primary driver for con-
structing research facilities. 
As we suggested earlier, there is a bigger issue. Stated most broadly, re-
search universities are driven by hope and exciting opportunities, but repeat-
edly encounter unpredictable realities. Stated a different way, the issue involves 
not only judging short-term risks, but also not falling into the fatal trap of  
taking the longer term for granted. UCSF appears to have judged short-term 
risks pretty accurately, and has profited from a six-decade run of  extraordi-
nary luck. But can its research mission be sustained, long term? Will funding 
sources of  research universities remain viable? As we saw in earlier chapters, 
trust in government research funding is an act of  faith. State governments in 
general, and that of  California in particular, have not proved reliable partners. 
Over the past decade, flat-lined NIH budgets show that unquestioned reliance 
on the federal government is also short-sighted. The same, often, is true for 
philanthropy. Each source is exquisitely susceptible to rapid changes and un-
certainties, political, social, and economic. Will health sciences research find a 
reliable and sustainable funding model for its future? 
 We return to these questions in chapters 5 and 10.
Chapter 5
Sweet uses of adversity: Planning for change
As they try to distribute resources wisely, UCSF and other large academic research institutions repeatedly face hard decisions about how to change 
that distribution in the face of  new opportunities and challenges. To coor-
dinate agile, correct decisions, UCSF has had to develop ways to analyze its 
resources and make long-range plans. This chapter describes how, since the 
1960s, UCSF’s responses to its own success and to external dangers triggered 
successive changes in planning, decision making, and distribution of  respon-
sibility for making and coordinating those decisions. The chapter concludes 
by highlighting key aspects of  the latest (2015) version of  UCSF’s 10-year 
financial plan (1)—aspects which will, in turn, prove critical for understand-
ing our proposals for changing the future of  biomedical research at UCSF, in 
chapter 10.
Parnassus Will Not Suffice: Long-range Development Plans 
(LRDPs), 1962-1995
We begin our history with a long view, depicted in a series of  LRDPs for 
UCSF, from 1962 to 2015. The LRDP of  1962 revealed ambitious plans for 
expanding facilities and projects in and around the Parnassus campus, includ-
ing projected growth south of  the campus, on Mt. Sutro, and the Inner Sunset 
neighborhood. Opposition to expansion by neighborhood activists, however, 
led to a second LRDP (1976), which revised and curtailed expansion plans. 
Later that year, UCSF also agreed to fix the Parnassus site’s geographic bound-
aries and accept a ceiling on the site’s total square feet of  developed space.
Those limitations soon conflicted directly with the beginning of  UCSF’s 
increasing success, both as a center for human health research and also—
with the development of  DNA technology and discovery of  oncogenes—as 
a world leader in basic science research. With lightning speed (in academia six 
years is fast), yet another LRDP (1982) gained UCSF some breathing time, as 
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an agreement with neighborhood groups allowed UCSF to exceed modestly 
the space “ceiling” of  1976 and build a new library and small research build-
ings, in return for promising to demolish several old “temporary” buildings. 
The 1982 LRDP’s bottom line was a gob-smacker: unable to grow at the 
Parnassus site, UCSF would develop satellite sites in and near San Francisco. 
At first, activities not directly required for teaching, research, or patient care 
were moved away from the Parnassus campus—“de-centralized,” in LRDP 
parlance—to satellite campuses, including Laurel Heights and Mission Center, 
each with more than 300,000 square feet. Some functions were moved to af-
filiated campuses like San Francisco General Medical Center and the VA Med-
ical Center; at both sites, where UCSF participates in staffing, management, 
and operations, and also trains its students. Also, UCSF acquired an additional 
medical center campus, now called the UCSF Mt. Zion Medical Center. 
Soon these sites were over-crowded with decentralized operations and ex-
panding research and clinical programs. Although UCSF appeared remarkably 
efficient in accomplishing much in little space, decentralizing support func-
tions and distributing a few research programs to separate physical locations 
treated the symptoms, but could not fix the central problem. By 1989, a UCSF 
Faculty Futures Committee, appointed by the Chancellor, concluded that con-
tinued restriction on growth at Parnassus would require UCSF to build or 
acquire an additional major campus. 
A New Site at Mission Bay
As the institution’s best of  times alternated with its worst, both shaped hopes 
and plans for its future, and gradually fashioned a model for planning resources 
and making long-term decisions. In a key first step, yet another LRDP (1996) 
defined a second primary site should look like, what programs it should house, 
and how it should relate to existing campuses. This LRDP opened doors not 
only to a new research campus, but also to: (i) expanding the clinical mission, 
with a new hospital and medical offices, to replace seismically-deficient facili-
ties at Parnassus; (ii) accommodating more students and medical residents in 
housing owned and operated by UCSF; (iii) providing “campus life services” 
to students, faculty, staff  and the neighboring community. 
A year later, in 1997, UCSF accepted an immensely valuable gift: the Mis-
sion Bay campus on the eastern edge of  San Francisco, a few miles from 
Parnassus. (The site’s joint donors: the city of  San Francisco and the Mission 
Bay site developer, Catellus Corporation.) Since then, UCSF has spent nearly 
$1.6B on its new research campus, plus student housing, parking structures, 
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and a major recreation and conference facility as well (2). With an additional 
~$1.5B, it acquired adjacent property and has built a new Women and Chil-
dren’s hospital and an adult cancer hospital with attendant supporting clinics, 
medical office buildings and parking facilities (3). In 2014, UCSF published 
a new LRDP (4), focused on plans for its teaching, research and clinical care 
missions up to 2035. 
The Resource Planning Evolution
In the half  century since the 1962 LRDP, UCSF transformed itself  from an 
institution with a single site, a simple mission, and about 10,000 employees 
into a leading health center that produces new understanding of  biology and 
pathogenesis, new treatments for human disease, and highly skilled medical 
professionals and research scientists. Its nearly 30,000 employees and students 
are located at five major sites in San Francisco and dozens of  others in the 
Bay area and northern and central California. How did its ability to plan future 
resources and make long-range decisions change to enable this extraordinary 
growth and metamorphosis?
Early on, UCSF seemed to receive almost all its funds from the state of  
California—for employee salaries, construction of  buildings, and just about 
everything else. But this impression was wrong: in FY1979, only ~27% of  
UCSF’s revenues came from the state, with 25% from federal government, 
28% from its hospitals, 10% from its clinical practice income, and 10% from 
other sources (5). Still, state funds were the primary focus of  financial plan-
ning, for both UC and UCSF. Minutes of  UC Regents’ meetings in the fall 
of  each year, focused on the UC budget plan, were devoted almost entirely 
to state funds. The State Educational Appropriation (SEA) was less than 4% 
of  UCSF’s budget in FY2014 (chapter 1), much less than in earlier days: for 
instance, in FY1971 UCSF’s SEA was ~48% of  its total budget and SEAs at 
general UC campuses like Berkeley, Los Angeles, Davis, and San Diego were 
even higher (~64-74%; 6). 
At every administrative level, resource planning in earlier days was largely 
confined to state funds. UC left to UCSF responsibility for managing revenues 
of  UCSF’s medical center (and physician fees), and UCSF’s chancellor left 
that responsibility pretty much to the Medical Center director and the Medical 
School Dean. So UCSF’s planning model was born “decentralized,” although 
the buzzword was not much used in 1970. 
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Impact of  Indirect Cost Recovery (ICR) on 
Resource Planning
As NIH-funded research grew across the US and at several UC campuses, so 
did ICR. Beginning in the 1960s, UC campuses were required to deliver any 
ICR they earned back to the UC President’s Office, with no substantive return 
to the campuses. Finally, in FY1983, UC President David Saxon grudgingly re-
sponded to a publicity crisis stirred by several UC campuses, including UCSF 
(7), by returning part of  their ICR back to the campuses. Up until that point 
(and thereafter, as well) a portion of  the ICR had been used to “subvent” the 
SEA (readers should always view the word, “subvent,” as a hint of  possible 
deception; 8) with the rest of  the ICR held by the President to dole out for 
special purposes. (Special purposes included helping to pay costs for develop-
ing the small new campuses at Santa Cruz and Irvine, and expansion of  older 
campuses at Santa Barbara and Riverside—including in most cases construc-
tion costs the state chose not to fund from its own coffers.) The President’s 
Office made no effort to relate the amount of  ICR doled out in relation to 
who earned it. So, UCSF and UC San Diego (which at the time, like UCSF, 
had relatively few undergraduate students) had to pony up tens of  millions of  
dollars each year, receiving no evident benefit in return. 
The President’s FY1983 decision to return part of  their ICR to the cam-
puses still failed to satisfy UCSF. Instead of  returning all the ICR not needed 
to subvent state funds in proportion to where it was generated, the President’s 
Office devised a clever formula, which gave UCSF about 45 cents on its ICR 
dollar (9). While finally receiving part of  its ICR was better than a sharp stick 
in the eye, the allocation formula caused friction for 18 more years, when 
Richard Atkinson, then University President, allocated 96% of  all ICR earned 
each year to the campuses that earned it.
Nonetheless, in 1983 UCSF’s Chancellor finally did receive a small pro-
portion of  UCSF’s ICR—unrestricted dollars, substantial enough to make 
something happen. An early result: the Chancellor created a new position, 
Vice Chancellor for Resource Management and Planning (VC-RMP), with the 
goal of  making resource planning and financial management play key strategic 
roles in UCSF’s future development. (Later called Vice Chancellor—Finance, 
this position is now called Associate Vice Chancellor—Budget & Resource 
Management.) Creation of  the new position coincided—probably not for-
tuitously—with growing awareness that UCSF would not expand further at 
Parnassus, so the new VC-RMP was needed to coordinate development at 
other sites. 
  Sweet uses of  adversity: Planning for change           73
As one of  his first tasks, this VC-RMP, Tom Rolinson, initiated an effort 
to raise the ICR rate UCSF earned on federal grants from its then piddling 
rate of  27.7% to a rate closer to the ~80% rate then earned by other leading 
research universities (10). He set up a cost accounting system and hired and 
trained professional staff, so that federal auditors soon gave UCSF the maxi-
mum allowable increase at each successive rate negotiation (for details of  this 
one-sided negotiation, see chapter 3). During the next three decades the first 
allocation of  a few million dollars has grown to almost $200M per year, pro-
viding most of  the Chancellor’s Campus Core Funds (CCF; 11). To acquire 
UCSF’s first two major satellites, the Laurel Heights and Mission Center cam-
puses, the Chancellor used debt backed by ICR for the acquisitions, and ICR 
to pay for their operations. 
Despite the new VC-RMP position, no formal planning or strategy model 
was put into place for the next 10 years. During these “black box model” years, 
the VC-RMP’s staff  did initiate a comprehensive framework for organizing 
the Chancellor’s funds (largely State funds, a few endowments and the new 
ICR allocation), but referred to it simply as a “checkbook,” because it func-
tioned mainly as a mechanism for recording decisions, rather than as a tool 
for planning or making decisions. Later (1986-1990), the VC-RMP worked to 
establish firm annual budgets for at least the Chancellor’s administration and 
the CCF, with annual review of  resource needs, future plans, and pending 
regulatory requirements that might require outlays of  funds. But back doors 
into offices of  the Chancellor or the Senior Vice Chancellor frequently cir-
cumvented the budget review process. Often last to find out there were new 
bills to be paid, the VC-RMP’s office worked largely in reaction mode until the 
early 1990s. As before, the Medical Center and the Schools continued their 
own separate resource planning. 
In the same period, UCSF grew mightily, by all quantitative measures—
research dollars, clinical dollars, patient population, faculty, staff, etc. Its com-
plexity grew also, as it managed large campuses and populations at San Fran-
cisco General, the VA and Mt Zion Medical Centers, and the Laurel Heights 
and Mission Center campuses, plus research operations—basic, clinical, wet-
lab, dry-lab—at multiple sites. 
In sharp contrast, UCSF’s executive management structure hardly differed 
from that of  the 1950s. Consultations took place in a virtual black box: faced 
with a possible decision, the Chancellor requested advice from a few individu-
als, who might include a prime stakeholder. This private meeting would then 
produce a decision, often issued with little explanation and scanty records of  
details or rationale. Sometimes staff  were asked to analyze problems, but for-
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mal presentations were few. No comprehensive financial planning took place, 
but the Chancellor or his Senior Vice Chancellor made financial decisions and 
funds were allocated. This process may have reflected decades of  rising NIH 
budgets and a generous legislature, making budget plans and careful analysis 
of  long-term decisions appear superfluous. Just as likely, a management struc-
ture entrenched in the past preferred not to notice stark harbingers of  change.
A Perfect Storm
In FY1991, the state of  California was afflicted by a major recession, regarded 
at the time as the largest since the Great Depression. Between FY1991 and 
FY1995, the state reduced UCSF’s funding by $38M, or ~26% in comparison 
to FY1991 (12). Suddenly, the Schools and the Chancellor’s office(s) faced a 
scary reduction in their major funding source. The state largely funded faculty 
and staffs of  the Schools of  Dentistry, Nursing, and Pharmacy, which oth-
erwise had only small sources of  clinical and other income. The School of  
Medicine, with substantial clinical and sponsored income, still had to absorb 
this 26% reduction in state funds, and managed to do so at the time from 
other resources. But this manageable crisis served as a frightening harbinger 
of  a perfect storm that would sharply disrupt habits, customs, and practices 
inherited from prosperous earlier times and produce challenges that still per-
sist today.
The recession’s economic effects coincided with a quite separate storm 
in 1991, which originated at Stanford, when an on-site federal auditor alleged 
that Stanford was defrauding the federal government in recovering ICR for 
its research. While the actual sin turned out to be little more than sloppy cost 
accounting, a public brouhaha (see chapter 3) led the federal government to 
change a basic rule of  OMB Circular A-21, sharply reducing universities’ abil-
ity to charge certain support costs (e.g., telephones, some staff) directly to 
research grants. At the time when the new A-21 rules took effect, internal 
estimates indicated that UCSF Schools would need to find about $12 million 
annually to replace the support previously paid from direct costs (12).
In addition, in these years President Clinton was fighting budget wars with 
Congress. The resulting continuing resolutions meant that already allocated 
grants and contracts were reduced to 90% of  the dollars initially approved, 
and new grant funds were held in abeyance (sometimes for months) until each 
annual budget battle was resolved. To make the future look even less certain, 
the health care marketplace was also in an uproar, agitated in part by the Clin-
ton administration’s attempt to implement a modified form of  single-payer 
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health care, but even more by the health care industry’s forays into managed 
care. Suddenly, tertiary and quaternary care centers like UCSF appeared to 
have been transformed from institutional cash cows into cost centers. At one 
point in the 1990s, an executive of  a large Health Maintenance Organization 
(HMO) told an audience of  UCSF department chairs that UCSF’s clinical en-
terprise would rapidly shrink within the coming decade, as more competitive 
and efficient HMOs would capture its patients (13).
In today’s world, UCSF knows how to weather such crises and threats, 
but in the mid-1990s managers of  the UCSF Campus were not prepared to 
deal with a continuing state budget crisis, and new federal regulations, which 
combined to produce a revenue loss of  nearly $50M per year in 1995. Never 
exposed to such troubles, administrators had no process in place to deal with 
budget cuts, big or small. Now they began to recognize that UCSF must learn 
how to assess its resources, plan their future use, and make critical decisions—
and must, in each case, include the entire UCSF enterprise. Separate, nearly 
independent financial silos—hospitals, schools, and the chancellor’s office—
would have to learn how to work together. 
Centralized Resource Planning: the Maiden Voyage 
A new Chancellor, Joseph Martin, took the helm at UCSF in 1993, following a 
career at Harvard Medical School and four years (1989-93) as Dean of  UCSF’s 
School of  Medicine. As Chancellor, this “new broom” quickly ordered forma-
tion of  a financial plan for the CCF (Campus Core Funds) and a process for 
making decisions about resources that cut across all the institution’s silos. In 
1994 the Chancellor’s Office produced the first Chancellor’s Financial Plan 
(CFP) and announced formation of  an Executive Budget Committee (EBC). 
Today these are called the Core Financial Plan (CFP) and the Budget & Invest-
ment (B&I) Committee. 
In 1994 the CFP comprised the first comprehensive examination of  all 
resources directly managed by the Chancellor’s Office, plus a planning fore-
cast for future years, complete with assumptions and analysis. Because the 
CFP did not yet include revenues and expenses of  the Medical Center or 
the four Schools, the old decentralized model remained intact, although the 
Chancellor had always been charged with overall responsibility for all UCSF’s 
resources. The EBC’s composition constituted the first real step to change the 
decentralized model: its co-chairs were leaders in positions now termed Ex-
ecutive Vice Chancellor-Provost (EVCP) and Senior Vice Chancellor-Finance 
& Administration (SVCFA); its initial members were the CEO of  the Medical 
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Center and deans of  the four Schools; later its members also included the 
dean of  the Graduate Division and the chair of  the Academic Senate. Staffed 
by the Chancellor’s Budget and Resource Management office, the EBC had 
four main functions: 
1. To serve as a sounding board for institution-wide resource planning 
issues.
2. To coordinate intra-campus resource issues.
3. To conduct annual reviews of  the resources and initiatives of  each major 
budget “Control Point”—including the four Schools, the Medical 
Center, and the Chancellor’s office and its two major units (offices of  
the EVCP and the SVCFA).
4. To provide advice on setting priorities for the Chancellor’s central 
resources.
The CFP gradually became a successful new model for UCSF, because the 
Chancellor put on the table central resources for both enterprise-wide initia-
tives and needs of  individual Control Points. The new annual budget review 
process required each Control Point to present its budget, discuss resource 
problems and issues, new revenue strategies, and new programmatic direc-
tions—that is, challenges they had to confront, future goals, and how they 
planned to manage them. To help set funding priorities, their needs for re-
sources were on the table and evaluated in comparison with other needs. The 
perfect storm’s crises showed Control Point leaders both the limits of  each 
other’s resources and the need for enterprise-wide planning. For the first time, 
a uniform formula reallocated some ICR dollars to help Schools respond to 
the new A-21 rules, and Schools reeling from state budget cuts had a place to 
present their needs and receive support funds. The EBC provided key stake-
holders a forum to discuss institution-wide issues and balancing capital needs 
vs. operating requirements. Importantly, all resource decisions were also docu-
mented in formal allocation letters, which contained the allocation’s rationale 
and specified spending rules, reporting requirements, or milestones. From 
then on, every Chancellor’s funding decisions were documented in this way.
Paradoxically, the Medical Center’s ill-fated merger with Stanford’s Medi-
cal Center—beginning in 1996 and unwound in 2000—improved the new 
cooperative enterprise-wide model: when the Medical Center returned to the 
UCSF fold, its previous management was replaced by a new team, headed by 
CEO Mark Laret; freed from past baggage, it could build new ways of  busi-
ness planning. 
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UCSF’s new tools for managing resources and planning (the CFP) and 
an enterprise-wide consultative body (the EBC) would serve the campus well 
through good and bad times to come. Thus, just as the Campus was imple-
menting programs and finances for research at Mission Bay campus (2001-04), 
yet another financial crisis (the “dot-com bust”) led to further cuts in state 
funding. For UCSF, the unkindest cut was the state’s decision not to provide 
~$14M per year to maintain buildings and supply utilities for its newly emerg-
ing research campus (14). This loss did slow the project, but fortunately cam-
pus leaders and the EBC had advance notice, plus tools for making decisions 
based on data rather than guesses to adjust CFP dollars and realign necessary 
resources.
The Ten-Year Forecast Model
UCSF’s first enterprise-wide forecast (in 2012) can be traced to collapse of  a 
hospital in a 1994 California earthquake, long before that forecast appeared. 
By the 21st century, resulting changes in state seismic laws (SB 1953) for hos-
pitals meant that UCSF’s Mt. Zion and Moffitt Hospitals, would either have 
to be re-built from the inside out or replaced. Because it would cost less to 
build another hospital (and find another conforming use for the Mt. Zion and 
Moffitt buildings), and such a hospital could not be built at Parnassus, atten-
tion focused on Mission Bay. Realizing that separate silo-based models would 
not suffice to gain UC Regents’ approval, in 2006 planners for the Chancellor 
and the Medical Center engaged an outside firm to help build a joint UCSF 
financial model for preparing consolidated 10-year financial forecasts (15). 
By 2009 the model was built and tested, but two additional years were 
required to fully integrate the medical center and the Campus and include spe-
cific financial plans and assumptions from the four Schools—that is, to refine 
each entity’s plans to fit into the model and develop shared methods, charts 
of  accounts and classification categories, so as to forge a seamless fit between 
the financial reports of  each and the overall forecast model. The first forecast 
was published in draft in 2011. After further refinements, the comprehensive 
UCSF financial plan and 10-year forecast was first published in 2012—and 
again every year since, improving in clarity and precision with each iteration.
While this comprehensive financial planning and modeling tool was un-
der development, another financial crisis struck: the financial crash of  2008-9 
and the subsequent recession again reduced state funds for education, as the 
Governor cut almost $1B (more than 25%) from UC’s budget. For UCSF, 
this crisis reduced resources to their very limits, owing to cumulative effect of  
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many years of  state funding reductions, plus development and operation of  a 
new major campus at Mission Bay. Fortunately, however, by this time the EBC 
had dealt with resource problems for 15 years, and Control Points had learned 
how to work jointly in making hard decisions. Staff  sought redundancies and 
organizational combinations as potential opportunities to reduce costs. Con-
trol Point plans were shared, so a cut in one place didn’t produce unanticipated 
consequences elsewhere. Ultimately, one offshoot of  the EBC process, a pain-
ful exercise euphemistically dubbed Operational Excellence (OE), eliminated 
more than 400 Campus employees (16). The goal of  this exercise was not 
simply to reduce costs, but—more specifically—to respond to substantial de-
creases in state support. Overall, OE did achieve ~$50M in annual savings 
(run-rate savings, rather than one time savings; 16) and UCSF weathered the 
financial storm. Inevitably, of  course, some departments experienced losses in 
quality of  staff  services, while others enjoyed gains. Human resource activities 
and processing of  contracts and grants were re-shaped into new models, with 
results that differed in different departments, based on their previous handling 
of  both these functions: thus, in some cases costs charged to departments for 
both functions actually increased; others received better services than they 
had before OE was instituted. The OE process tried hard to mitigate deleteri-
ous effects of  workload shifts, with success in some cases but not in others. 
Unfortunately, however, some departments experienced a loss of  services or 
found themselves paying more than before, and deemed OE a futile and dam-
aging exercise. Impacts of  the cuts in state support and the OE response to 
those cuts are still being felt, as we shall see in later discussions of  inadequate 
support for faculty salaries and research administration (chapters 7-9, below). 
Current Decision-making and the 2015 Financial Plan 
and Forecast 
Luckily, UCSF’s development has been guided by a strong mix of  entrepre-
neurs, visionary thinkers, and good stewards, who consistently found ways 
to move in the right directions as conditions changed, for more than half  a 
century. In a further stroke of  good fortune, a combination of  new financial 
resources and economic threats fostered gradual development of  effective 
processes for analysis, planning, and making long-term decisions. Shaped by a 
20-year baptism of  fire, the process is still changing. 
That said, it is fair to ask pointed questions. Where, exactly, do decisions 
regarding high level, longer-term issues take place? In actual practice, who 
thinks hard about such issues and makes decisions that, for instance:
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1. Choose among alternative paths for future directions of  research at 
UCSF? 
2. Commit UCSF to expanding one major activity or contracting another?
3. Take account of  possible impacts of  politics on government funding, 
and hedge bets with respect to academic missions—research and 
teaching—as well as patient care? 
4. Determine whether and when to issue hundreds of  millions of  dollars in 
debt, to be repaid over 30-40 years, backed by a source of  funding (ICR) 
that is exquisitely sensitive to political influence? 
5. Mitigate (or, ignore) the burden of  soft-money salaries for UCSF 
research faculty.
6. Seek to improve the quality of  training for basic scientists and clinician-
scientists (rather than simply continuing to pay the growing costs of  
training)?
 
From the first part of  this chapter, one might surmise that such decisions 
are made by the Chancellor, in combination with the EBC—now called the 
B&I Committee—and by deans of  the Schools, in collaboration with their 
parallel planning experts. After all, the scope of  the B&I Committee and 
its offshoot, an informal working group of  financial officers called the B&I 
Working Group is to manage buttons and switches that control the flow of  
resources, including decisions that judge trade-offs among strategic invest-
ments, allocations for ongoing activities, and large-scale outlays for capital, 
information technology, and programs (17). Both the B&I Committee and its 
Working Group are designed to bring transparency to the budgeting process 
and allow Control Point leaders to have their say in setting priorities and man-
aging critical trade-offs. 
The truth, as always, is more complex. In reality, senior leaders largely 
decide which decisions will be examined, analyzed, and implemented by the 
B&I committee. In order to do so, they must be able to communicate freely 
their hopes and fears with respect to any new idea, long-term decision, or 
major policy change before it becomes public knowledge. But because UCSF 
is—in reality if  not in funding—a public institution, there Is a critical tension 
between the institution’s duty and need to be trusted by the public, on the 
one hand, and freedom of  communication among leaders, on the other. To 
manage that tension, UCSF’s Chancellor meets regularly for critical discus-
sions with an Executive Cabinet, composed of  a more limited set of  senior 
leaders—the Chancellor, the UCSF Health CEO, deans of  the four Schools, 
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the EVCP, the SVCFA and the UCSF Counsel. Minutes are not kept and no 
agendas are prepared. Sometimes these discussions require the presence of  at-
torneys, so the attorney-client privilege can allow free communication among 
leaders. Once a decision is agreed upon and action becomes necessary, UCSF 
makes its further discussion and implementation public, at the right time and 
at the right level—often first at the B&I/Working Group level, and then to 
the Campus and the public. Decisions are thus ultimately more open than at 
private universities, but UCSF’s gradual disclosure process shares with those 
universities one hitch, which is probably irremediable: only decisions that are 
slated for implementation are revealed; so, if  high-level leaders decide not to 
make a decision, no one else may ever know. Clearly, however, failure to make 
decisions can produce disasters—in war, governments, large institutions, and 
even our daily lives. 
UCSF’s financial outcome in FY2014 was good (see chapters 1-3), but the 
outcome in FY2015 was even better—and better than most people suspected, 
as indicated in the most recent 10-year UCSF financial plan and forecast, in 
2015 (1), and in the annual financial report summary previewed in October, 
2015 (18). Between the 2014 and 2015 forecasts, the new Mission Bay hospitals 
became operational, clarifying previous uncertainties. Other key comparisons 
reflect positive changes: 
1. Investment strategies (e.g., the TRIP program and other cash 
management changes, begun in 2008 and bearing real fruit since 2010) 
had a banner year in 2015, earning ~$60 million more than in 2014, 
based largely on a $51 million capital accumulation payout (18).
2. The medical faculty earned income on professional services agreements 
(PSA) was $32 million higher than 2014 (18).
3. UCSF Health had substantially higher revenue—a net increase of  $105 
million more than the previous forecast—and higher operating expenses 
than expected (18). This resulted in a small $14M increase in the 
Strategic Support UCSF Health could transfer to the Campus (18).
4. Unrestricted cash reserves continued to grow and are projected to 
increase by more than 50% at the end of  the 10 year forecast period (1).
 
Nonetheless, potentially daunting issues must be considered. One is the pro-
jected growth of  debt largely backed by ICR, which will increase from slightly 
more than $1B at the end of  FY2014 to more than $1.8B by 2020. Conse-
quently, annual payments from ICR will grow to more than $140M per year 
and remain near that level until FY2035. If  UCSF continues to earn ~$200M 
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per year in total ICR, about 70% of  that ICR will be consumed each year to 
pay off  debts.
UCSF‘s remarkable ability to attract awards for sponsored research (and 
associated ICR; see chapter 3) persisted over the past decade, despite a sub-
stantial overall tightening of  federal funds for research. While UCSF’s research 
grew, that of  many other academic research institutions declined. If  the feder-
al government’s largesse fails to increase or even declines (either is more likely 
than sustained long-term support; 19), will UCSF’s research growth continue 
in the face of  declining research funds at other institutions? To commit 70% 
of  potentially tenuous ICR to 30-plus years of  debt payments appears a bold 
act of  faith. 
Moreover, UCSF has devised no concrete, mid-to-long-term strategy for 
dealing with unexpected surges in revenue, like that of  2015, which is expect-
ed to repeat in 2016. The recent 10-year plan and forecast (1) pay lip service to 
developing new revenue for the campus and reducing operating costs, but, on 
the surface, they essentially toss the recent unanticipated increase in revenues 
back into the central money pool. (A high-ranking UCSF official informed us 
that some of  this surplus was indeed moved into a general endowment-like 
fund.) Instead, we suggest that UCSF adopt a clear, well-publicized, long-term 
strategy for investing “extra” revenues into a General Endowment that can 
be used to deal with future cuts in state funding support or to backstop ICR 
funds currently used for debt payments.
Before closing this chapter, consider this question: as it invests in the pro-
grams, buildings, and people necessary for its future, how can an academic re-
search institution like UCSF avoid the kind of  financial over-reach that could 
place it at the edge of  a financial cliff  without a rescue net? Institutional lead-
ers aver that part of  their job is to keep such risks under firm control. 
Nonetheless, institutional leaders frequently are subjected to intense pres-
sures from a rich donor to build a facility or house a program that is not a top 
priority of  the institution and will unavoidably incur additional hidden costs 
the donor will not pay. Let us consider a hypothetical example of  a $300M 
building, to be named for a rich donor who pays one third of  the building 
cost. Here are some of  the hidden costs the institution will have to pay: 
1. The remaining construction cost will be paid by the university, which must 
find additional donors, commit significant amounts of  its own reserves, 
or issue new debt (for which it will pay ~$12M a year to service a $200M 
loan). 
2. The annual costs of  operating and maintaining the building (including utilities, 
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custodial service, security, equipment maintenance, maintaining 
information technology systems, etc.). Such costs can amount annually 
to $25-30 per gross square foot (gsf)—or, for a 250,000 gsf  building, 
$6.2-7.5M every year. 
3. The institution will have to recruit new faculty to fulfill the program 
envisioned by the donor. Initial recruitment costs alone for faculty 
investigators of  real quality may come to $2-5M per person; a building 
that requires 30 new investigators will incur start-up costs amounting to 
$100-200M. 
For such a building, the university will pay hidden costs, amounting over the 
building’s first decade to ~$340M (including $120M for debt service, $70M 
for building maintenance, and $150M for recruiting faculty). Thus, if  the do-
nor’s gift is to produce real benefits, the institution will pay a yearly average 
extra cost of  $34M a year over the first 10 years after the building opens. This 
conservative estimate does not include additional costs, such as salary and 
benefits for investigators and costs of  hiring and paying administrative staff. 
Moreover, as described in chapter 4, indirect costs on research grants awarded 
to investigators in the building will not fully compensate for these costs during 
its first decade.
Finally, the decision to pay for such a building will mean that UCSF incurs 
significant opportunity costs: lacking the $340M it has chose to pay for the 
donor’s building, UCSF must defer or not fund other programs or buildings. 
Because such lost opportunities can prove significant for determining UCSF’s 
future, leaders must ensure that each major investment in a building or pro-
gram is the right thing to do. The process of  making decisions about distribu-
tion of  scarce resources is only as good as the rigor imposed by those charged 
with the responsibility for it. The 10-year resource plan that UCSF engages 
in each year is a detailed and thoughtful process, currently with solid financial 
planners and analysts and executive decision makers riding herd on it. Both 
authors of  this book have seen outside pressure from donors that produces 
real mischief, but in the long run the institution has usually built a first class 
facility that works for 75 years or more. Every year UCSF’s leaders face simi-
larly daunting gambles. As for the payoff, in each case, only time will really tell.
Subsequent chapters explore the funding future of  research in greater de-
tail, particularly with respect to paying research faculty salaries. Chapter 10 will 
revisit several questions raised in the present chapter. The underlying issues 
are critical for UCSF and all health science research institutions.
Chapter 6
Researchers’ salaries: Soft dollars, thorny issues
At UCSF and other large institutions, salaries inevitably become the hot-button issue for everyone, from top leaders to the lowest-paid workers. 
Salaries are usually by far the institution’s biggest expense: UCSF’s $2.773B in 
expenditures for salary and benefits together account for 65% of  total annual 
expenditures ($4.290B in FY2014; Table 6-1; chapter 1; 1). More viscerally, 
each employee wants very much to know how much he/she will earn every 
year, what benefits are covered, for how long the salary will last, whether and 
how it may increase, and where it comes from—and asks the same questions 
about colleagues. The answers strongly influence employees’ satisfaction with 
their work and the institution, their attitudes toward the institution’s missions, 
and their interactions with and loyalty toward co-workers, leaders, students, 
and patients. 
This chapter concentrates on salaries of  UCSF’s employees. Employee 
headcounts and salary dollars reflect the institution’s strengths, but also raise 
thorny issues. One of  the thorniest derives from the large proportion of  fac-
ulty salaries paid from research grants, rather than by UCSF or the clinical 
enterprise. Such “soft-money” salaries keep research afloat, but pose difficult 
conundrums for UCSF’s future.
Big picture
To understand more complex issues, we first consider salaries of  different sets 
of  UCSF employees and sketch the numerous and diverse subsets of  UCSF’s 
faculty. 
Headcounts and dollars. In FY2014 UCSF paid $2.138B in salary to a work-
force of  nearly 23,000 people (Table 6-1); Campus or clinical enterprise em-
ployees make up, respectively, 63% or 37% of  the total workforce and receive 
similar percentages of  salary payments. Of  all UCSF employees, more than 
half  (52%) are staff  represented by unions—including nurses, other patient 
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care workers, laboratory research personnel, postdoctoral scholars, and others; 
together this group received about 41% of  UCSF’s total salary bill, at mean 
annual wages of  $51,000 (Campus) and $95,000 (clinical enterprise). Staff  
not represented by unions account for 27% of  UCSF employees and receive 
26% of  total salary; this group includes senior managers and professional and 
support staff, earning mean yearly salaries of  $80,000 (Campus) or $114,000 
(clinical enterprise). Academic non-faculty employees (including academic co-
ordinators, lecturers, hospital resident physicians, postdoctoral scholars, and 
graduate students) comprise 10% of  the UCSF workforce and earn 6.1% of  
total salary paid, for a mean annual wage of  $58,000. Finally, UCSF’s academic 
faculty (11% of  workforce, 25% of  total salary) earns a mean annual wage of  
$209,000. 
In addition to $2.138B in salaries, UCSF also paid $635M (29.7% of  sal-
ary, on average, across all UCSF) in benefits, including the UC retirement 
plan, health benefits, Social Security, Medicare, and worker’s compensation. 
As discussed in chapter 2, benefit costs increased considerably over the past 
*Headcounts are as of  June 30, 2014; benefits include UC retirement plan, retiree health 
benefits, health insurance, social security/medicare, worker’s compensation, and other. Union-
represented (Rep.) staff  include those engaged in health care, research support, administra-
tion, lab work as postdocs, patient care & service, nursing, non-senate academic research. Un-
represented staff  (Non-rep.) include individuals in senior management, management services, 
professional support, and non-faculty academic employees (academic coordinators, lecturers, 
post-doctoral scholars, residents and graduate students). Data is from reference 1.
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five years, mainly owing to a gap between projected funding of  the retire-
ment system and actuarial assessment of  future retirement obligation liability. 
Consequently, UC decided to tax campuses for the funds needed to maintain 
pension support (2). 
What exactly is a faculty member? UCSF faculty members belong to several 
many-splendored species. Faced with multiple and ever-changing needs for 
faculty with widely diverse expertise and goals, the ever-fertile academic imagi-
nation has invented no fewer than five distinct “series” of  faculty for UCSF. 
[As a bonus, the University defines a kind of  shadow series, “Academic non-
faculty,” that comprises 2,391 employees (Table 6-1) who are not faculty at 
all!] The rationale for the five bona fide faculty series is to define two kinds 
of  relations between the institution and its faculty (3). First, for each series, 
the university describes the relative importance of  four categories of  quali-
fications and contributions it considers in judging whether individual faculty 
in the series should advance in academic rank (Table 6-2). These categories 
include research, teaching, professional activity and competence (as a research 
*For a summary of  expectations and privileges that apply to the clinical series at UCSF, see 
reference 3. Sources of  data on numbers and UCSF salaries of  individuals in these series 
(FY2014) are described in reference 4.
¶Professional leave may sometimes be allowed as an exception
§For faculty without tenure, all appointments must be renewed yearly, except that in residence 
associate or full Professor appointments have no end date. 
‡Abbreviations: Acad., Academic; Avg., average; Health Sci, Health Sciences; $M, millions of  
dollars; P.L.P. = “professional leave possible”; Prof., professional; $thou, thousands of  dollars
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scientist and/or, if  the faculty member is a health-care provider, as clinicians), 
and University and public service (termed “service” in Table 6-2). Second, 
relations between faculty and the University are described in terms of  the 
privileges and rules individuals in each faculty series may expect the university 
to apply to them. Some of  these rules and privileges (Table 6-2) include: mem-
bership (or not) in the UCSF Academic Senate, a representative body whose 
members advise the administration and vote on academic issues; whether the 
appointment must be full-time (100%) or may be part-time; whether series 
members can take sabbatical leave; and duration of  a faculty member’s ap-
pointment, which can range, depending on faculty series, from one year to 
“tenure,” as described below. 
Ladder-rank faculty. This is one of  three faculty series that contribute 
most substantially to UCSF’s research mission. UCSF’s 333 ladder-rank fac-
ulty members make up 13% of  all its faculty (Table 6-2; 4). They advance 
in academic rank based on equally weighted judgments of  research accom-
plishments and teaching prowess, and typically direct independent research in 
laboratories, clinical settings, or both; their research is usually funded by grant 
support from federal and/or private sources. They are also called “tenure-
track” faculty because the University contributes to their salary from its own 
coffers (and thus not only from research grants, clinical income, or contracts 
with external agencies) and because promotion to associate professor rank 
raises them to tenure (Table 6-2). 
As a term, “tenure” means different things at different institutions, and its 
meanings have changed dramatically over time, at UCSF and elsewhere. The 
tenured security of  ladder-rank UCSF faculty in the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s 
depended critically on the University’s then correct assurance that it would 
pay a substantial fraction of  their salaries. This assurance began when they 
were accorded ladder-rank status as assistant professors, continued thereafter 
if  they were awarded tenure, and terminated only with the faculty member’s 
voluntary retirement or resignation, involuntary dismissal, or death. In the 
1970s, tenure-track faculty members of  basic science departments received 
~75% of  their salary—called a “Full-Time Equivalent,” or FTE—from the 
University, which they supplemented by an additional ~25% paid from re-
search grants. In clinical departments, ladder-rank faculty members received 
the same FTE dollars as did basic science faculty members at the same rank, 
but usually maintained higher total salaries with supplements from both grants 
and clinical income. In those days UCSF received state educational appropria-
tions large enough to pay FTE salary and benefits of  every ladder-rank fac-
ulty member, plus those of  many administrative staff. Today, UCSF’s average 
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ladder-rank faculty researcher receives only 27% of  her/his salary from state 
instructional funds, as a later table in this chapter will show. 
By the mid-1990s this cozy arrangement had begun to deteriorate: State 
support for faculty and administrative salaries decreased—slowly at first, then 
faster—as the economy faltered in the early 1990s and taxpayers complained 
about paying for education. As FTE dollars for ladder-rank faculty became 
scarcer, they were replaced by money from multiple sources: higher supple-
ments from (i) research grants (in basic science departments, almost always) 
and/or (ii) clinical income (in clinical departments), plus (iii) whatever funds 
department chairs, deans and chancellors could squeeze from endowments 
and budgets. Diminished FTE support and UCSF’s responses to it profoundly 
altered the institution. 
The erosion of  tenure at UCSF parallels situations in most US medi-
cal schools, owing largely to big increases in numbers of  clinical faculty and 
reduction in dollars available to pay them. Nationally, the relative reduction 
in tenured faculty has been especially severe for MD faculty in clinical de-
partments of  those schools (5): in such departments, since 1984, the number 
of  tenured MD faculty has remained at or below ~20,000 since 1984, while 
the number of  untenured faculty increased about six-fold (from ~8,000 to 
~56,000); the proportion of  tenured faculty consequently fell from 60% to 
less than 25%. Moreover, the financial security associated with tenure deterio-
rated over the same time period (6). 
In residence faculty. Numbering 458, or 18% of  all UCSF faculty (4), indi-
viduals in this series advance in rank depending on criteria weighted just like 
those of  ladder-rank faculty (Table 6-2). In residence faculty are not promised 
support from the institution, but instead “must generate the funding for their 
salary from contracts and grants, and/or clinical activities, or receive a sal-
ary from an affiliated institution” (7). In this series promotions to associate 
professor carry no whiff  of  tenure: appointments of  assistant professors in 
residence must be renewed every year; appointments at higher ranks have no 
end date, but if  funds to support a faculty member’s salary are not available, a 
department may formally impose a “term appointment, . . . [with] a minimum 
of  twelve months of  support at the level of  retirement-covered compensa-
tion” (7). Thus in residence faculty members are very much on their own, 
and usually pay 90% or more of  their salary from a combination of  research 
grants and clinical income. In consequence, most in residence faculty are lo-
cated in clinical departments. 
Adjunct faculty. Faculty in this series, numbering 398 (16% of  all faculty; 4), 
earn advancement in rank by criteria weighted differently from those applied 
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to the two series discussed above. Specifically, adjunct faculty can be promoted 
primarily for their contributions in either teaching, with minimal research, or 
in research, with minimal teaching. As teachers, they may run courses in basic 
science departments; as researchers, most PhD adjunct faculty are located in 
clinical departments, less often in basic science departments. Often, but not 
always, adjunct researchers work under the direction of  other faculty and do 
not conduct fully independent research programs. They usually receive lower 
salaries (at any rank) than ladder-rank or in residence faculty, are appointed for 
one year at a time, can work part-time, and lack privileges like Academic Sen-
ate membership and sabbatical leave. 
Two series limited to clinical faculty. These series contribute relatively less than 
the others less to UCSF’s research mission. Primary responsibilities of  the 
422 faculty members (17% of  all faculty; 3, 7) in the professor of  Clinical X 
series (where “X” stands for the specialty of  a clinical department—e.g., ra-
diology, urology, ophthalmology, etc.) are teaching and clinical work, but they 
also engage in “creative activities,” including research. Health sciences clini-
cal professors (784 faculty, or 31% of  all UCSF faculty) make up the largest 
of  all the five faculty series. They include hospitalists and other clinicians in 
UCSF’s clinical enterprise who qualify for advancement primarily on the basis 
of  teaching and clinical work, but may also engage in research and university 
and public service; like adjunct faculty, members of  this latter series may work 
less than 100% time. Faculty in both these series are appointed on a yearly 
basis. For details, see Table 6-2 and reference 2.
Finances, culture, and expansion. Faculty in basic science and clinical depart-
ments (8) responded very differently to losing state support for faculty sala-
ries, although the losses afflicted both at the same time. Most UCSF faculty in 
basic science departments are in the ladder-rank series, and over many decades 
became accustomed to substantial salary support from state dollars. As PhDs, 
most are not able to supplement their salaries with clinical income. Conse-
quently, most basic science departments did not increase numbers of  their 
research faculty beyond the number of  FTEs previously paid from gener-
ous state support; now they find it increasingly difficult to garner support for 
recruiting new faculty, even for positions vacated by retirement. In contrast, 
clinical departments continued in the same years to expand their research ac-
tivities, recruiting new faculty researcher-clinicians at both junior and senior 
levels. Between 2004 and 2014, UCSF’s clinical departments increased their re-
search support—federal, private, and total combined—by 73%, while support 
for basic science departments and Organized Research Units (ORUs) from 
the same sources increased only 11-18%, as chapter 7 will show in greater 
  Researchers’ salaries           89
detail (9). 
Differing sources available to pay researcher salaries led basic science and 
clinical researchers to develop different academic cultures. For decades, the 
former (mostly PhDs) received modestly lower average salaries, for which they 
depended primarily on state educational funds; now many of  them consider 
having to pay more of  their salary from grants an unwarranted time- and 
energy-consuming distraction from serious research. In the same decades, 
numbers of  MD faculty in clinical departments increased as the clinical en-
terprise expanded. Consequently, the gradual decline in university dollars for 
salary support has reduced the proportion of  clinical faculty (i.e., ladder rank 
faculty) who receive any salary from the institution, and the university contrib-
utes smaller fractions of  salary to those who do. Many who play large roles 
in clinical teaching must seek most of  their salary from clinical revenues, and 
those who play large roles in research (especially ladder rank and in residence 
faculty) predominantly support their salaries from research grants and from 
clinical revenues. Adjunct faculty in clinical departments (many of  whom are 
PhDs) previously obtained large fractions of  their salary from grants, and 
continue to do so. 
The effects of  different cultures were potentiated by other influences that 
favored expansion of  clinical departments and clinical research. Of  these the 
most critical was the abundant and persistent financial success of  the health 
care industry, which has expanded faster than most of  the US economy (see 
chapter 1). In keeping with that success, NIH funding has tilted away from 
basic investigation of  biological mechanisms and toward large grants oriented 
toward goals considered more clinically relevant. In addition, increased private 
research funding for the most part supports research aimed at diagnosis and 
treatment of  human disease. The tilt toward the clinic strongly influences aca-
demic researchers, leaders, and philanthropic donors at UCSF and elsewhere 
(see chapters 7-10).
Salary sources for research faculty
Of  UCSF’s faculty in FY2014 (i.e., defined as faculty by belonging to a specific 
faculty series; 4)—1,498 received at least some portion of  their salaries from a 
research grant or contract with a federal or a private source, philanthropic or 
industrial (Table 6-3; 10). Thus of  UCSF’s 2,545 faculty members (Table 6-1), 
59% were “sponsored” faculty—i.e., engaged in research and paid, at least in 
part, by a sponsoring source. All salary for the “unsponsored” 41% came from 
clinical income and/or other UCSF coffers. Overall, sponsored faculty re-
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ceived $114M from sponsoring sources—that is, 38% of  all UCSF salary they 
received, and 21% of  the $532M in total salary UCSF paid its faculty (spon-
sored and unsponsored; see Tables 6-1 and 6-3) in FY2014. Sponsored faculty 
received a total of  $148M from sponsored sources, if  we include $114M in 
take-home salary plus ~29.7%, or ~$34M, in benefits.
Now we are ready to examine the gross distributions of  sponsored sal-
ary among faculty ranks, age, and series, as well as departments (Table 6-3), 
and compare the relative amounts of  salary faculty received from sponsoring 
and other sources (Table 6-4). Then we shall consider distributions of  salary 
sources among deciles of  sponsored faculty who receive different percentages 
of  their salary from sponsoring sources (Figures 6-1 to 6-3). 
*Data in this table (10) pertain to the 1,498 UCSF faculty members who were (i) explicitly 
designated as belonging to a particular faculty series (4) and also (ii) obtained at least some 
part of  their salaries from sponsored projects. Twelve departments are classified as basic sci-
ence departments, and 26 as clinical departments (8). 
¶% of  all salary in the category on the left (e.g., in the second row of  data: 35% of  total salary 
of  sponsored faculty in clinical departments, or, in the last row of  data: 24% of  total salary of  
all sponsored faculty in the HS Clinical series).
§Abbreviations: spons, sponsored; $M, millions of  dollars; $ thou, thousands of  dollars; ORU, 
Organized Research Units, such as the Cardiovascular Research Institute, the Cancer Research 
Institute, and others; Instr, instructor; Asst, assistant professor; Clinical X, Professor of  Clini-
cal X series (where X is a clinical department); Health Sci Clinical, Health Science Clinical 
Professor series.
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Gross distributions of  sponsored salary. Among academic departments, the 
distributions of  sponsored and unsponsored faculty are not surprising. While 
virtually every faculty member in a basic science department or an Organized 
Research Unit (ORU) is sponsored, both types of  unit are small; consequently, 
their faculty account for only 13% or 5%, respectively, of  all sponsored fac-
ulty, while the remaining 82% of  sponsored faculty are in clinical departments 
(Table 6-3). Clinical departments also contain a large proportion of  unspon-
sored faculty (41% of  their total of  2,076 faculty; 10). 
Sponsored faculty members are distributed asymmetrically among faculty 
series at UCSF, in keeping with the defined role (Table 6-3) of  each series. 
Based on headcounts of  total faculty (Table 6-2) and sponsored faculty (Table 
6-3), the proportions of  faculty members who receive some portion of  salary 
from sponsored sources were 89% for in residence, 88% for adjunct, 85% for 
ladder-rank, 50% for Clinical X, and 32% for Health Science Clinical. These 
data correlate with the relative importance of  research prowess for advance-
ment in the in residence and ladder-rank series. Within the adjunct series, the 
data indicate that researchers outnumber teachers (promotion in this series 
may depend predominantly on either research prowess or teaching). Spon-
sored salary goes to smaller proportions of  faculty In the clinical X (50%) 
and health science clinical series (32%), which place less relative emphasis on 
research as an absolute criterion for promotion. If  we focus instead on subsets 
of  faculty who receive sponsored salary in each series, we see parallel results. 
Thus the sponsored faculty in the two predominantly clinical series, Professor 
of  Clinical X and Research Sciences Clinical, receive relatively low percent-
ages of  total salary from sponsored sources (20% and 24%, respectively), as 
compared to sponsored in residence or ladder-rank faculty (45% and 32%, 
respectively). Sponsored adjunct faculty receive by far the highest percentage 
of  salary (71%) from sponsored sources. 
Other data in Table 6-3 (focusing only on faculty with some sponsored 
salary) also confirm inferences any knowledgeable observer of  UCSF’s faculty 
might make: (i) faculty in clinical departments are not only more numerous 
than those in basic science departments or ORUs, they also (on average) re-
ceive modestly higher average individual salaries and garner lower percentages 
of  salary from sponsored sources; (ii) on average, faculty who are older or 
at higher academic ranks receive more salary; (iii) average yearly salaries are 
highest for ladder-rank ($267,000) and clinical X faculty ($258,000), lowest for 
adjunct faculty ($114,000), and intermediate for in residence ($221,000) and 
health science clinical faculty ($172,000). 
Most sponsored faculty members receive salary from other sources as 
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well (Table 6-4). The population of  all 1,498 sponsored faculty in FY2014 
garnered an average $76,000 per year from sponsored sources (38% of  their 
mean yearly salary; Tables 6-3 and 6-4). Individual sponsored faculty mem-
bers, of  course, may have received salary from no other source or from any 
one or a combination of  four additional sources, as tabulated in Table 6-4. 
Of  these other sources, the largest (Clin) was clinical professional fees, which 
paid a total of  $246M in salary to 1,064 sponsored faculty, accounting for 
51% of  the salary they earned; this subgroup earned 32% of  its income from 
sponsored sources (Table 6-4). A smaller number of  sponsored faculty, 564, 
received some amount of  “instructional” income, paid from the State Educa-
tional Appropriation; their instructional or sponsored income accounted (on 
average) for 27% or 44% of  their salary, respectively. Gifts, endowments, and 
other sources contributed relatively little salary to smaller numbers of  spon-
sored faculty (Table 6-4). 
Faculty members receive different proportions of  sponsored salary. At research-in-
tensive medical schools in the US, faculty researchers reportedly receive about 
50% of  their salary from sponsored sources (11). At UCSF, the overall per-
*In FY2014, all faculty in this Table belonged to a defined faculty series (4) and received at 
least part of  their salary from a sponsoring source (10). Note that in each horizontal row the 
headcounts and percentages do not add up to 100%; this is because virtually every faculty 
member who received money from sponsored sources also received dollars from one or two 
or even three additional sources. 
§Abbreviations: Spons = sponsored; Instr = instructional; Clin (aka S&S); G/E = gifts & 
endowments.
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centage is lower: the 1,498 faculty who receive some salary from sponsored 
sources receive, on average, 38% of  salary from such sources, but averages like 
these can hide instructive heterogeneity. At UCSF this is very much the case, 
as shown by dividing sponsored faculty into deciles ranked by the proportions 
of  sponsored salary in each decile (Figs. 6-1 to 6-3). Each decile includes 150 
or 149 faculty members (Fig. 6-1 legend). In all three figures, the ten faculty 
deciles (numbered 1-10) are arranged in order of  increasing proportions of  
sponsored income, from left to right; those proportions are indicated by di-
agonal lines that rise from the left, showing mean, maximum, and minimum 
% sponsored salary in each decile (quantified in the ordinate at the right of  in 
Figs. 6-1 to 6-3). In these figures, each decile shows a pair of  columns, whose 
heights correspond to millions of  dollars in salary (left-hand scale) received 
by that decile; the leftward column of  each pair represents sponsored salary, 
while the rightward column represents total salary dollars paid from UCSF 
Fig. 6-1. Sources of  salary for research faculty (those who received some salary from spon-
sored research). Each pair of  columns (moving from left to right) represents a single decile 
of  the 1,498 UCSF faculty who received some dollars in salary from a sponsored source in 
FY2014 (10). Deciles (numbered 1-10) are arranged in order of  increasing percentage, from 
left to right, of  total salary earned from a sponsoring source. For each decile, the column on 
the left represents the millions of  dollars ($M; scale at far left) in sponsored salary (Spons $) 
earned, while the height of  the column on the right represents the total salary dollars ($M, 
scale at far left) earned from all sources. Segments within each rightward column indicate the 
relative $M (scale at far left) earned by that decile from various sources, including (from bot-
tom to top): sponsored dolllars; state educational funds; clinical revenues; gifts and endow-
ments; other. Diagonal lines rising from left to right indicate the mean (circles), maximum 
(triangles), or minimum (squares) of  sponsored dollars for each decile, as percentages of  
total salary, indicated on the scale at the far right. Black numbers above deciles 1, 2, 5, and 10 
represent the mean total yearly salary of  individuals in those deciles; the average salary was 
calculated by dividing the total $M for that decile by the number of  individuals in that decile. 
Because the 1,498 faculty represented could not be evenly divided by 10, two deciles (numbers 
5 and 10) contained 149 individual faculty; the other deciles contained 150 faculty.
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sources to members of  that decile and contains bands whose meanings (and 
sizes) differ in Figs. 6-1 to 6-3. Together, these column pairs tell a pair of  in-
tertwined, intriguing stories. 
Let us begin with Fig. 6-1. Note that in this and the other two figures the 
total salary dollars received by deciles (and thus mean total annual salary of  
the deciles’ faculty) decrease markedly as % sponsored salary increases: fac-
ulty members who receive the highest annual salary (a mean of  $327,000 per 
person for decile 1) receive less than 1%, on average, of  their income from 
sponsored sources; at the scale’s other end, decile 10’s faculty receive nearly 
all their pay from sponsored funds, for a mean of  $91,000 per year, or ~28% 
of  the mean yearly salary of  colleagues in decile 1. In an institution that re-
veres research, faculty whose incomes depend almost entirely on sponsored 
research receive far less total income than their richer colleagues. In a moment, 
we shall return to this striking irony. 
A second story told in Fig. 6-1 is subtler, but still comes as a surprise to 
many academics. Although the average sponsored faculty member at UCSF 
Fig. 6-2. Departments of  research faculty (those who received some salary from sponsored 
research). Each pair of  columns (moving from left to right) represents a single decile of  the 
1,498 UCSF faculty who received some dollars in salary from a sponsored source in FY2014 
(10). With the single exception of  the segments shown in the rightward column correspond-
ing to each decile (for which, see below), all other aspects of  this figure are identical to the 
same aspects in Fig. 6-1, including: scales at far left and far right; order and arrangement of  
deciles; heights and meaning of  the leftward column in each decile; actual total height of  the 
rightward column in each decile; diagonal lines rising from left to right; dollars of  average 
annual salary (e.g., $327K) for deciles 1, 2, 5, and 10. For each decile, segments within each 
rightward column indicate the relative $M earned by faculty in that decile who belong to 
different kinds of  academic department (8), including (from bottom to top): basic science; 
clinical; Organized Research Units; Other. Note that Organized Research Units are not pres-
ent in decile 1, and the rather small “other” category is completely absent from deciles 2, 3, 6, 
and 8-10.
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received only 38% of  her/his salary from sponsored sources (Table 6-1), half  
of  UCSF’s $114M in sponsored salary went to about one third of  its spon-
sored faculty, each of  whom received 65% or more of  her/his salary from 
sponsored projects. (This one third are faculty in the 3.3 deciles toward the 
right of  the graph.) The remaining half  ($57M) of  sponsored dollars went to 
the other 67% of  sponsored faculty. This is no paradox: the bulk of  sponsored 
salary must go to faculty who receive higher proportions of  their salary from 
sponsoring sources. Still, the former dean of  a large, research-intensive medi-
cal school (not UCSF) told one of  the authors he was certain that not one of  
his research faculty received anywhere near 100% salary from grants, because 
sponsored research provides, on average, only about half  a researcher’s salary. 
The latter assertion may have been correct (11), but the first was almost surely 
wrong. Like an optical illusion, knowing that the average sponsored researcher 
at UCSF receives ~38% of  her/his salary from sponsored sources encourages 
the illusory inference that most faculty members receive similar proportions 
of  salary from grants. Instead, the deciles show that a substantial subset of  
Fig. 6-3. Faculty series of  research faculty (those who received some salary from sponsored 
research). Each pair of  columns (moving from left to right) represents a single decile of  the 
1,498 UCSF faculty who received some dollars in salary from a sponsored source in FY2014 
(10). With the single exception of  the segments shown in the rightward column correspond-
ing to each decile (for which, see below), all other aspects of  this figure are identical to the 
same aspects in Fig. 6-1, including: scales at far left and far right; order and arrangement of  
deciles; heights and meaning of  the leftward column in each decile; actual total height of  the 
rightward column in each decile; diagonal lines rising from left to right; dollars of  average an-
nual salary (e.g., $327K) in deciles 1, 2, 5, and 10. For each decile, segments within each right-
ward column indicate the relative $M (scale at far left) earned by faculty in that decile who are 
appointed in each of  five different faculty series (from bottom to top): ladder rank (absent in 
deciles 9 and 10); in residence; professor of  clinical X; health science clinical; Adjunct.
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UCSF faculty researchers receives most of  its salary from sources over which 
the host institution has no little or no control. 
What do the deciles really tell us? Examining the different non-sponsored 
funds these faculty receive and how they distribute among different depart-
ment types, academic ranks, and faculty series (Figures 6-1 to 6-3) tells a more 
complex tale, which interweaves the inverse correlation between total annual 
salary and % sponsored salary with the blunted perception of  the highly lever-
aged salaries of  research faculty. Thus segments in the taller right-hand col-
umn of  each decile’s pair in Fig. 6-1 show how the salary dollars received by 
that decile are distributed among different salary sources. The proportion of  
sponsored salary increases from left to right: in deciles 1-4 (with proportion-
ally lower sponsored salary, on the left), three other salary sources predomi-
nate: clinical revenue (Clin); a smaller contribution from the State Education 
Appropriation (Instructional); and an even smaller amount from gifts and 
endowments (G&E); in deciles 5-10, these latter segments progressively de-
crease in size, as they are replaced by sponsored salary.
Fig. 6-2 shows how total salary dollars in different deciles distribute among 
different types of  academic departments. Because most (82%; Table 6-3) of  
UCSF’s sponsored faculty are located in clinical departments, by far the most 
total salary dollars in every decile go to clinical faculty. Most salary received 
by researchers in basic science departments falls into the middle deciles of  
sponsored faculty (deciles 3-8)—that is, the deciles in which faculty receive 
between 20 and 75% of  salary from sponsoring sources. The basic vs. clinical 
differences reflect two circumstances. First, relative absence of  basic science 
faculty from the first two deciles (high total salaries, low proportions of  spon-
sored salary) reflects the inability of  PhDs to supplement meager grant funds 
with clinical revenues. Second, basic science faculty are scarce in deciles 9 and 
10 because, as we noted earlier, the historical dependence of  basic science 
researchers on generous salary support from the university produced a culture 
in which young scientists are unwilling to be recruited without such support 
and established faculty insist on receiving it, despite dramatic reductions in the 
tax dollars needed to maintain it. For faculty in Organized Research Units, the 
decile distributions of  salaries do not support strong inferences, because the 
numbers are too small. 
As might be expected, age and academic rank also vary among the deciles 
(data not shown): assistant professors predominate in deciles 8-10, full pro-
fessors in the more highly remunerated first four deciles; associate professors 
distribute more evenly among deciles.
So far, we can infer that: (i) clinical income and (to a much lower extent) 
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state instructional funds account for most of  the salaries paid to sponsored 
faculty who receive 50% or less of  their salary from sponsored projects; (ii) 
most faculty in all deciles are members of  clinical departments, but basic sci-
ence department faculty tend to accumulate in the middle deciles, with spon-
sored salaries between 20% and 75% of  total salary; (iii) faculty with the high-
est total salaries tend to receive most of  their salary from clinical revenues 
(i.e., in deciles 1-4), with relatively small amounts from sponsored sources, 
while faculty with lower total salaries tend to receive fewer dollars from clinical 
sources (even though they belong to clinical departments), and earn very high 
proportions of  salary from sponsored sources. 
Fig. 6-3 shows how dollars paid to faculty in the five different faculty se-
ries distribute among faculty deciles sorted according to proportion of  spon-
sored salary. We might expect nuanced distributions of  faculty series among 
these deciles, because membership in each series is supposed to specify both 
coveted privileges (e.g., sabbatical leave or voting in the Academic Senate) and 
how UCSF judges a faculty member for promotion. Two trends stand out. 
First, faculty with less than 80% of  salary supplied from sponsored sources 
(deciles 1-7) tend to belong predominantly to one of  three faculty series: (i) the 
ladder rank series, probably because this series includes many highly respected 
(and highly remunerated) members of  clinical departments, who are expected 
to contribute equally in research and teaching; (ii) perhaps for similar reasons, 
earnings of  the in residence series also group toward the left side, although this 
series extends more widely into deciles 8 and 9 as well; (iii) the professor of  
clinical X series probably distributes toward the left side because they can earn 
substantial salaries from clinical service and because research prowess is not as 
strong a requirement for their promotion. Second, the adjunct series is distrib-
uted mostly into deciles 7-10, which earn high proportions of  sponsored sala-
ries, in keeping with the fact that an adjunct faculty member can be promoted 
on the basis of  excellence in research or teaching, but equal contributions in 
both areas are not required (Table 6-2). 
Fig. 6-3 contains two mysterious surprises. The first is decile 1, in which 
150 sponsored faculty appear to receive less than $1M in total sponsored sal-
ary but earn (on average) very large salaries. One suspects that their researcher 
status is largely honorary, and that few of  these well remunerated individuals 
seriously engage in research. Still, the apparition of  150 ghostly researchers in 
honorary lab coats—along with ~$50M earned from non-sponsored sources 
(Fig. 6-1)—probably explains why the overall population of  UCSF’s spon-
sored researchers garner on average only 38% of  their salaries from spon-
sored sources; in contrast, the ~50% average (11) at other research universities 
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suggests their non-researchers find honorary lab coats less attractive. A sec-
ond mysterious surprise is the low average salary ($91,000) of  faculty in decile 
10. Some may be part-time employees; full-time employment is not required 
for adjunct faculty, who predominate in this decile.
Perspective
In FY2014, soft-money salaries paid ~38% of  all UCSF faculty researchers’ 
salary, and ~21% of  all faculty salary, but many researchers receive very large 
fractions of  their salary from grants. Their resulting vulnerability to slight 
downturns in external funding makes them less likely to promote innovative 
discovery, and heavy reliance on soft money salaries for those researchers may 
weaken UCSF’s willingness to apply its own standards to judge the quality of  
research, at a time when that quality is severely threatened by external eco-
nomic forces. Subsequent chapters will return to these issues.
Chapter 7
Put money in thy (research) purse: 
Funds, administration, and goals
In previous chapters we began to see how multiple external pressures test and re-test UCSF’s ability to accomplish its research mission. Here and in 
subsequent chapters, our focus shifts to examining how UCSF’s internal en-
vironment shapes goals and day-to-day conduct of  research in labs, research 
groups, and departments. In addition to competing institutional missions, the 
research effort’s milieu intérieur includes a formidable array of  schools, depart-
ments and other administrative entities; dense thickets of  academic rules, 
regulations, and customs; diverse funding models awash in acronyms, com-
petition, and occasional mystery; changing standards of  scientific value; and 
tightly woven webs of  dollars and programs designed to train young scientists. 
This chapter describes the different types of  academic units—clinical 
departments and non-clinical departments, which include basic science de-
partments, social science departments, and ”Organized Research Units” 
(ORUs)—that administer UCSF’s research. Here we sketch histories of  these 
types, compare their scopes, relative sizes, and funding, and set the stage for 
focusing on basic and social science departments and ORUs (chapter 8) and 
on clinical departments (chapter 9). Chapter 10 weighs answers to large ques-
tions posed in chapters 7, 8 and 9.
A short history
For many decades, a troublesome fault line has zigzagged through most US 
medical schools, separating their faculty into either of  two department types: 
clinical, which teach medical students and resident physicians how to diag-
nose and treat disease, and non-clinical sciences—originally grouped under 
the rubric of  “basic” sciences—which teach human biology and pathogenesis. 
Through the 20th century, clinical and basic science professors sometimes 
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worked together, but also competed—sometimes fiercely. When a geologi-
cal fault line produced the devastating 1906 earthquake in San Francisco, the 
“UC Medical School” split in two, geographically and pedagogically: first-year 
students were taught anatomy, physiology, and pathology in Berkeley, and 
transferred across the Bay to the Parnassus campus the next year, to learn 
clinical medicine. For fifty years, Berkeley’s academic ethos encouraged the 
medical school’s pre-clinical science faculty to take pride in “pure” research, 
unblemished by any need to produce useful results. Meanwhile, their clinical 
colleagues across the Bay criticized basic research as not relevant to patients 
and disease (1). UC finally brought pre-clinical departments and their students 
back to San Francisco in 1958, when the UC Medical School combined with 
other schools to become UCSF. An illustrious basic science faculty member, 
who elected to stay in Berkeley, characterized UCSF’s new 14-story hospital as 
a “skyscraper exclusively inhabited by pygmies” (2). Emphatically disagreeing, 
UCSF’s clinicians and its chancellor staunchly followed the banner of  teaching 
and practicing clinical medicine, and many feared that growing NIH largesse 
and “rat-doctors” would divert precious university resources to research (1). 
In 1964, a formidable delegation of  UCSF faculty triggered a decisive 
directional shift, by requesting that UC’s president, Clark Kerr, find a replace-
ment for their chancellor, John Saunders—who, they argued, would never 
foster the outstanding research required of  a leading academic biomedical 
center. Sharing their hopes for UCSF, Kerr made his own inquiries, and deftly 
replaced Saunders in 1965. This academic coup depended on crucial but sur-
prising support from chairs of  five clinical departments, who acted in coalition 
with the medical school dean and a visionary physiologist who headed the 
Cardiovascular Research Institute (CVRI; 3), which was to become UCSF’s 
first and most successful Organized Research Unit, or ORU. (ORUs are aca-
demic units of  UC whose principal function is research, within a specifically 
targeted area; see 4.) That clinical support was made possible by the dean’s re-
cent recruitments (unopposed and perhaps undetected by Saunders) of  clinical 
department chairs from first-rate research-intensive east coast schools. Their 
presence in the delegation to UC’s leader made it clear that a campus that 
failed to support research would not long retain ambitious, forward-thinking 
clinician-scholars (1, 4, 5).
Indeed, the coup did produce important consequences for research at 
UCSF, initially by freeing up new laboratory space in towers constructed with 
UC dollars and bringing bright new researchers to clinical departments. By 
the end of  the 1960s, these researchers, along with others in the CVRI, began 
to attract enough NIH dollars to match those of  leading east coast medical 
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schools, Johns Hopkins and Columbia (6)—an impressive “catch-up” feat for 
a late arrival to the federal research banquet. The coup also allowed the medi-
cal school dean, working with the chair of  medicine in 1969, to recruit William 
Rutter to the chair of  Biochemistry, where he fashioned a pattern that later 
extended to other basic science departments (7). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, UCSF produced four remarkable and surpris-
ing discoveries: development of  recombinant DNA technology; the first 
*Abbreviations: Asst, assistant; CEO, Chief  Executive Officer; CSO, Chief  Scientific Officer; 
HHMI, Howard Hughes Medical Institute
¶With Stanley Cohen, Stanford University.
§With UCSF colleagues.
‡Telomerase was co-discovered with Carol Greider.
**This table’s information was compiled as described in reference 9.
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oncogene, src; a new class of  infectious agent, the prion, which transmits 
Creuzfeldt-Jakob disease; and founding of  the first successful biotechnology 
company, Genentech (8). Each surprise transformed biomedical research and 
much of  clinical medicine, world-wide. 
Since the 1970s, UCSF faculty made major contributions to biomedicine 
and many discoveries (Table 7-1; 9). While the four surprises did not directly 
result from the 1964 coup or from Rutter’s recruitment, in combination they 
exerted important effects: 
1. Research in UCSF’s basic science departments rapidly accelerated, owing 
both to the DNA-based revolution in biological research and to the fact 
that three of  the four surprises of  the 1970s-1980s originated in basic 
science departments (8). Following Biochemistry’s lead and strongly 
supported by the institution, in the 1980s these departments recruited 
new chairs and exciting scientists, created an innovative coalition of  
graduate programs, and produced superb science, recognized by multiple 
honors, including prestigious Lasker, Shaw, and Nobel prizes (Table 7-2; 9). 
2. Combined with the DNA revolution, the success of  Genentech and 
other biotechnology companies kindled entrepreneurial research at 
UCSF and many other biomedical research centers, in both clinical and 
basic science departments.
3. In 2003 UCSF moved many basic science faculty to the new campus at 
Mission Bay. Their new quarters distanced them from clinical faculty 
at Parnassus, and not only geographically: clinician-scientists began 
wondering why—despite outnumbering the departees and garnering 
more sponsored research dollars—they seemed to attract less of  UCSF’s 
attention and remained in cramped, less lavish laboratories.
Over time, the ascendancy of  basic science research increased UCSF’s pres-
tige and attracted more excellent scientists to UCSF, to join clinical and other 
departments. These and other influences gradually promoted growth and in-
creased power of  clinical departments. A key part of  UCSF’s research story 
stems from this new ascendancy.
In the meantime, UCSF’s research continues to make widely recognized 
contributions to biomedical science. Table 7-2 emphasizes awards and honors 
in the 21st century: in 2014 UCSF had 18 Howard Hughes Medical Insti-
tute (HHMI) Investigators; since 2000, 17 UCSF faculty were elected into 
the National Academy of  Sciences, six received awards that often precede the 
Nobel—including four Lasker Awards, one Passano Award, and five Shaw 
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Prizes—and two did receive Nobel prizes. 
Before we proceed further, it is important not to conflate classifications 
of  research as “clinical” vs. “basic” in scope, methods, and goals with its clas-
sification as conducted, housed, and funded in clinical departments vs. basic 
science departments and ORUs. Years ago, the classification of  research may 
have accorded more closely with the type of  department, but walls do not eas-
ily confine scientific curiosity. In fact many researchers in clinical departments 
seek to answer “basic” questions focused on underlying mechanisms, biologi-
cal and otherwise—just as researchers in basic science departments and ORUs 
often delight in questions regarding the pathogenesis and therapy of  disease. 
*Award information was compiled as described in reference 9.
¶Abbreviation: HHMI, Howard Hughes Medical Institute
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In this and the next two chapters we focus primarily on research similarities 
and differences between different department types, but we shall also point 
out differences—which may exist within individual departments and depart-
ment types—that relate to the basic vs. clinical scope of  the research itself. 
Traditional department types and the geographic separation of  researchers in 
those types may pose important questions for guiding UCSF’s future research, 
to be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
*Data represents all UCSF’s schools and departments in FY2014, but excludes faculty who 
received no salary from any sponsored research project. Numbers of  sponsored faculty are 
not identical with those of  PIs on sponsored projects, because some faculty receive salary 
only from research dollars awarded to another faculty member.
¶UCSF’s schools include 12 basic science departments, seven ORUs, and 26 clinical depart-
ments (10).
§Numbers of  faculty with primary appointments in the different department types and their 
total and sponsored salaries are as shown in chapter 6, Table 6-3, except that the present 
table combines ORUs with the very much smaller “other” category. Note: all salary figures 
pertain to faculty who received sponsored salary; salaries paid to non-faculty personnel from 
sponsored project funds are not included.
‡TDC and IC of  contracts and grants are in (11). 
**Abbreviations: avge, average; C&G, contracts and grants; fac., faculty; IC, indirect cost; 
rec., recovered; spons, sponsored; $M, millions of  dollars; $K, thousands of  dollars; ORU, 
Organized Research Unit, such as the Cardiovascular Research Institute; sal., salary; TDC, 
total direct cost.
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Research in department types: quantitative comparisons
This section will examine numbers of  sponsored faculty and their salaries, 
research funding, and research space in different department types. Tables 7-3 
and 7-4 present FY2014 data from UCSF’s four Schools, with their total of  
26 clinical departments, 12 non-clinical departments broadly defined as “basic 
science,” and seven ORUs (4, 10). 
Clinical department faculty researchers greatly outnumber researchers in 
other department types (Table 7-3). The 1,223 clinical department faculty who 
receive some portion of  their salary from sponsored research contracts and 
grants are ~6-fold more numerous than their sponsored colleagues in basic 
science departments and ~4-fold more numerous than the 275 sponsored fac-
ulty in basic science departments and ORUs combined. Total research funding 
in clinical departments ($720M = total direct costs + indirect costs) is also 
several-fold greater than in either basic science departments or the combina-
tion of  basic science and ORUs. Compared to the headcount difference, the 
funding difference is less marked: for clinical vs. (basic + ORU) the fund-
ing ratio is 2.7 while the headcount ratio is 4.5. The difference reflects two 
differences between research grants and contracts in clinical vs. other UCSF 
departments: (i) per capita, sponsored faculty in basic science departments or 
ORUs receive larger ($584K or $1,030K, respectively) total direct costs (TDC) 
in grants and contract dollars than do sponsored clinical faculty ($487K); (ii) 
indirect cost recovery (here termed ICR* because it is calculated as a % of  
TDC, rather than MTDC; see chapter 6) is higher in basic science or ORUs 
(ICR* = 36% or 39%, respectively), compared to clinical departments (ICR* 
= 21%); in turn, these differences reflect the fact that a larger proportion 
of  clinical department contracts and grants comes from non-federal (private) 
sources, which usually pay indirect costs—when they do so at all—at much 
lower rates than does the NIH. So far, the comparisons in Table 7-3 support 
straightforward inferences. 
1. As a group, clinical departments have many more sponsored faculty and 
bring in substantially larger numbers of  sponsored dollars than non-
clinical departments. 
2. The average sponsored faculty member in a clinical department attracts 
fewer research dollars than her/his colleagues in other departments, and 
the average basic science researcher brings in fewer grant dollars than 
the average ORU researcher; these differences may reflect, at least in 
part, the relative time and effort “average” faculty members in each of  
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these units devote to research. 
3. The difference is even greater if  we compare only indirect costs per 
sponsored faculty member: $212,000 or $397,000 per basic science or 
ORU researcher, respectively, vs. $102,000 per average clinical researcher 
(Table 7-3). 
In summary, average individual researchers in clinical departments attract 
fewer direct cost dollars, and recovery of  indirect costs on their sponsored 
research pays lower proportions of  the associated indirect costs incurred by 
the university. We shall ask in a moment what these differences may mean for 
UCSF’s overall research effort.
One source of  smoldering contention relates to a third difference between 
clinical and basic science departments—that is, the disproportionate greater 
*Data represents all UCSF’s schools and departments in FY2014, but excludes faculty who 
received no salary from any sponsored research project. Numbers of  sponsored faculty are 
not identical with those of  PIs on sponsored projects, because a few faculty members do 
not serve as PIs of  a grant or contract, but nonetheless receive salary from research dollars 
awarded to another faculty member.
¶Together UCSF’s schools include 12 basic science departments, seven ORUs, and 26 clinical 
departments (10).
§Exactly as described in the legend of  Table 7-3.
‡TDC and IC of  contracts and grants are in reference 11. 
#Research space is tabulated in reference 12. 
**Abbreviations: avge, average; fac., faculty; IC, indirect cost; rec., recovered; spons, spon-
sored; $M, millions of  dollars; K, thousands, $K, thousands of  dollars; ORU, Organized 
Research Unit, such as the Cardiovascular Research Institute; Sq. ft., square feet; TDC, total 
direct cost.
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research space available to basic scientists and ORUs (mostly on the Mission 
Bay campus), relative to space available to researchers in clinical departments 
(mostly on the Parnassus campus). In raw numbers, the disparity is real (Table 
7-4): the average sponsored faculty member in basic science departments and 
ORUs “owns” 2,091 and 3,090 assignable square feet, respectively, while the 
average sponsored clinical faculty researcher “owns” 766 assignable square 
feet, or ~3- to 4-fold less. But researchers in clinical departments can devote 
(on average) less time and effort to research, so it may be useful to compare 
the research “earnings” (TDC + IC) of  the average square foot of  research 
space. Calculated in this way (Table 7-4), in FY2014 the average square foot of  
research space in basic science departments or ORUs garnered, respectively, 
$381 or $461 in sponsored dollars (TDC + IC), while the average square foot 
of  clinical research space garnered $771 such dollars—nearly twice as much. 
Although quantitatively impressive, these differences may also mislead, 
owing to specific aspects of  the space required for some kinds of  research 
in clinical departments: (i) a clinical trial may be performed (mostly) in space 
that belongs to the medical enterprise and formally not “research space” at 
all; (ii) certain research with living patients is not performed in clinical space, 
but must be rented by researchers in departments and divisions; (iii) patient-
focused research (e.g., studies of  clinical outcomes, implementation of  alter-
native diagnostic or therapeutic regimens, analysis of  biomarkers in patient 
populations, etc.) often requires mostly “dry-lab” space (where researchers 
work with computers, desks, and files, and little or no “wet-lab” space like 
that in basic science departments and many ORUs. Analysts at UCSF and 
elsewhere have not accurately quantitated proportions of  dry-lab, wet-lab, 
hospital-furnished, and rented clinical research space in any departments. So, 
we don’t know whether, or to what extent, the apparent space-crunch reflects 
wet labs smaller than their basic science department counterparts, a plethora 
of  dry-lab research and space, research in clinics and wards not defined as 
research space, research with patients in space the clinical enterprise cannot 
provide, or, most likely, a combination of  all these possibilities.
Thus the clinical department space crunch is probably real, but it is pre-
mature to “fix” it without thinking hard about the actual value, for the institu-
tion, of  different kinds of  research space. Imagine that UCSF magically knew, 
to the square inch, the size of  every kind of  research space imaginable, in ev-
ery department, throughout the institution—what should UCSF do with that 
information? We encounter yet another confounding example of  the Muddle-
ment Uncertainty Principle (M-UP). One way or another, UCSF and other 
institutions will have to work out (or blindly decide) how to compare values of  
108 Follow the Money
different kinds of  space (13). While it will be fascinating to see how these co-
nundrums are resolved, we remind readers that the Executive Vice Chancellor 
has already issued a quantitative requirement that research units must recover 
indirect costs of  $90/asf, a value that will increase to $120/asf  in 2016. We 
refer readers to chapter 4, where we argued that charging ICR dollars as rent 
is an unfortunate and misguided approach. Instead, UCSF must gather better 
data and define the values of  different kinds of  research with genuine care 
and clarity. 
Clinical department research grows faster
Although the actual numbers are hard to pin down, clinician researchers al-
most surely outnumbered basic scientists at UCSF in the early 1970s, and clini-
cal departments also garnered more NIH grant dollars—and probably con-
tinued to do so through the rest of  the 20th century. What about the critical 
11 fiscal years from 2004 to 2014? Congress doubled NIH’s budget between 
1999 and 2003, but a severe recession and Congressional gridlock decisively 
damped the budget’s growth for the next 11 years. The disastrous result : in 
inflation-corrected dollars (14), NIH had 21% less to spend in FY 2014 than 
in FY2004. (In nominal dollars, the NIH budget in 2014 was $29.9B, barely 
6.7% greater than in 2004.) 
Within UCSF, we shall focus on growth of  research in the School of  
Fig. 7-1. Changes in sponsored research funds, FY2004 vs. FY2014: All Contracts and Grants 
(C&G). Values are graphed in nominal dollars (left panel) or 2004 dollars (right panel); in 
each panel, numbers to the right show dollars in FY2014 and percentage change relative to 
FY2004. Lines connect the 2004 and 2014 values for (in order, from top to bottom of  each 
panel) Total dollars, and those awarded to different department types: Clinical, ORU, Basic 
Science (Basic), or Other.
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Medicine, which hosts by far the largest number of  researchers and garners 
most of  UCSF’s grant money. In this School, rivalry between clinical and non-
clinical departments is especially keen. Compare three measures of  the medi-
cal school’s sponsored research dollars in 2004 vs. 2014 (11, 15): total research 
dollars (Fig. 7-1), federal research dollars (Fig. 7-2), and private, non-federal 
research dollars (Fig. 7-3). In each Figure, the dollars represent the sum of  
total direct costs plus indirect costs, either in nominal dollars (on the left) or 
inflation-corrected, 2004 dollars (on the right). First, consider the relative sizes 
of  all research funds garnered by different department types in 2004, when 
clinical departments received $301M in total sponsored research, or 60% of  
the School’s entire $500M in sponsored research (17). Other department types 
garnered fewer dollars: $87M (17% of  the total) for basic sciences; $96M 
(19%) for ORUs, and $18M (3.6%) for units in the “other” category. Federally 
sponsored research awards ($387M) to different department types showed 
a similar pattern. From private, non-federal sources, UCSF received $113M, 
with clinical departments garnering the lion’s share ($81M; 72%). 
How did the different department types fare in FY2014, as compared to 
2004? In nominal dollars, total sponsored research funds in 2014 ($769M) 
exceeded the 2004 total by $269M, or 54% (Fig. 7-1, left panel). Four fifths 
(81%) of  the increase reflects the $219M (73%) increase in research funds 
received by clinical departments. Basic science and ORUs showed lower per-
centage gains (18 and 11%, respectively); for this reason, and because they 
Fig. 7-2. Changes in sponsored federal research funds, FY2004 vs. FY2014. Values are 
graphed in nominal dollars (left panel) or 2004 dollars (right panel); in each panel, numbers to 
the right show dollars in FY2014 and percentage change relative to FY2004. Lines connect the 
2004 and 2014 values for (in order, from top to bottom of  each panel) Total dollars, and those 
awarded to different department types: Clinical, ORU, Basic Science (Basic), or Other.
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started at a lower level in 2004, in 2014 their contributions to the large increase 
in the school’s overall sponsored research dollars were not impressive. [The 
tiny “other” category grew rapidly (+117% in 11 years), but started at such a 
low level that its contribution to the overall picture was small.] 
It is instructive to compare changes in the school’s federal vs. its private 
(non-federal) sponsored research from 2004 to 2014. In nominal dollars (left 
panels of  Figs. 7-2 and 3), overall federal C&G rose by $167M (+43%: Fig. 
7-2), while private research rose by $102M—less in absolute terms, but pro-
portionately more than twice as fast (90% increase; Fig. 7-3). For both funding 
sources, the bulk of  the overall increase took place in clinical departments: a 
56% rise in federal funding for these departments accounted for three fourths 
of  the overall federal increase, while their 107% increase in private research 
funds accounted for 85% of  the overall growth in private funding. Contribu-
tions of  basic science departments and ORUs to the growth in overall grant 
revenues were diminished both by their relatively low percentage increases in 
federal grant dollars and also by the comparatively low proportions of  total 
grant dollars awarded to these department types by private funders (Figs. 7-2 
and 7-3, left panels). 
All in all, the medical school fared well in a period that saw less than 7% 
cumulative growth in NIH’s budget, in nominal dollars. But correcting dollar 
values of  research funds accrued in 2014 for inflation during the past 11 years 
Fig. 7-3. Changes in sponsored research funds from private (Priv) sources, FY2004 vs. 
FY2014. Values are graphed in nominal dollars (left panel) or 2004 dollars (right panel); in 
each panel, numbers to the right show dollars in FY2014 and percentage change relative to 
FY2004. Lines connect the 2004 and 2014 values for (in order, from top to bottom of  each 
panel) Total dollars, and those awarded to different department types: Clinical, ORU, Basic 
Science (Basic), or Other.
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(right-hand panels of  Figs 7-1 to 7-3) presents a more realistic and sober-
ing story. In inflation-corrected dollars, the School’s federal research funds 
increased by 8.2%, while NIH budgets fell by 21% (Fig. 2); in part owing 
to a 44% increase in private research funding (Fig. 7-3), the School’s overall 
research funding rose by 16% (in 2004 dollars; Fig. 7-1). In sharp contrast 
to the 31% overall increase for clinical departments, however, basic science 
departments and ORUs experienced 10 and 16% reductions, respectively, in 
overall research funding (Fig. 7-1, 2004 dollars); although ORUs managed to 
increase their private research funding by 29%, private funding for basic sci-
ence departments decreased by 21%—both changes were dwarfed by the 57% 
increase for clinical departments (inflation-corrected dollars, Fig. 7-3, right 
panel). 
Now compare these changes with changes in revenues of  UCSF’s campus 
and its clinical enterprise: from 2004 to 2014, inflation-corrected revenues of  
the clinical enterprise rose by 58%, total campus revenues by only 20% (17). 
Two correlations are striking: (i) clinical enterprise revenues and the medical 
school’s research funds from private (non-federal) sources rose by high (58% 
vs. 44%) margins; (ii) similarly, inflation-corrected growth of  the School’s 
overall research funds and that of  campus revenues were both low (16 and 
20%, respectively). Anti-correlations to the parallel prosperity of  clinical de-
partments and the clinical enterprise are equally striking: basic science and 
ORU research funds both decreased substantially during the same period (Fig. 
7-1, right panel). Correlations do not prove causation, but these correlations 
strongly suggest two tentative inferences, which may be correct: (i) clinical de-
partments successfully attracted private funds in parallel with continued pros-
perity of  the clinical enterprise itself; (ii) non-clinical departments and some 
ORUs had much less success in attracting private research funds because do-
nors and companies considered their research less likely to benefit patients 
or increase profits of  the medical care industry. Basic science researchers re-
ceived more prizes and honors awards than their clinical counterparts, who 
instead garnered increasing support for their work.
Perspective
The histories of  UCSF’s different department types and quantitative compari-
sons of  their present grant revenues and growth over the past 11 years reveal 
both encouraging success and disturbing hints of  present and future difficul-
ties. This chapter highlights issues that should concern researchers in both 
clinical and “basic” departments: 
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1. UCSF devotes immense resources to its research mission, with gratifying 
results in a 21st century barely 15 years old, as indicated by overall 
research funding, prizes and other accolades, and ability to attract 
excellent students and faculty. 
2. The institution’s research investments and accomplishments are even 
more impressive in view of  the many serious economic and financial 
challenges during this period: decreases in state funds, stagnant federal 
research budgets, and stiffer competition from rich institutions with 
vast endowments, well-heeled alumni, and ability to attract generous 
philanthropy. 
3. As UCSF’s clinical enterprise prospered and grew in the 20th century, 
research in clinical departments became highly successful in attracting 
both federal and private research funds. Its research growth persisted 
through the past 11 years, even when economic stresses severely slowed 
growth of  most academic research.
4. During this latter 11-year period, research in UCSF’s basic science 
departments and ORUs suffered gradual but substantial reductions in 
overall research funding (corrected for inflation), and their research 
faculty and personnel did not increase. Compared to the 1990s, basic 
science departments find it more difficult to support faculty salaries and 
attract new faculty (see chapter 8). 
5. Ignoring inflation blurs visions of  both past and future. Nominal-dollar 
increases mask stark contrasts in research funding between clinical 
departments and basic science departments and ORUs, while inflation-
corrected figures show why the latter researchers are discouraged: 
overall UCSF research triumphs over adversity, but their own resources 
continue to diminish. In a time of  unparalleled research opportunity, 
their well-founded fear of  falling behind is tinged with bitter irony.
 
Before we begin to focus more narrowly on research in the two major 
department types, differences between them raise important questions. First, 
related to causation: why did research funding rise in clinical departments be-
tween 2004 and 2014, but fall in ORUs and basic science departments (Fig. 
7-1)? The second asks what to do: how should UCSF respond to the rising arc 
of  one kind of  research and decline of  another? 
It is by now means clear that UCSF has actually posed the what to do 
question in a deliberate, conscious fashion. But it may have already begun to 
answer hit, by unconsciously heeding the economic imperative of  two para-
doxes: compared to their colleagues in basic science departments and ORUs, 
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individual researchers in clinical departments receive fewer research funds (in 
direct or indirect costs) and “own” considerably less research space; nonethe-
less, collectively the more numerous clinician-researchers garner ever-growing 
shares of  UCSF’s research dollars, so an average square foot of  their research 
space accounts for almost twice as many research dollars as it does in their 
counterparts’ laboratories. Rather than hire more basic scientists and build 
more laboratories, the university can attract more grant dollars by hiring many 
clinician-researchers, partly paid by the clinical enterprise, and investing less 
money for their laboratory space. 
We suggest, in contrast, that UCSF should deliberately pose both ques-
tions and answer the second by judging the relative values of  different kinds 
of  research to the university, to its present and future researchers, and to or-
dinary citizens. These value judgments can prove critical for UCSF’s future, as 
we shall see in chapter 10.  
Chapter 8
Basic science departments: 
The future ain’t what it used to be
As chapter 7 showed, basic science departments and ORUs together gar-nered 29% of  UCSF’s sponsored research funding in FY2014, although 
their sponsored funding (corrected for inflation) had decreased 10-16% over 
the preceding 11 years. During the same period, in contrast, sponsored fund-
ing in clinical departments grew by 40%. If  clinical departments find it so 
much easier to attract funds for studying diseases and new treatments, what 
is the present role of  basic science departments within UCSF? In practical 
terms, research is the basic scientists’ primary task, and determines their pro-
motions and salaries; their teaching roles in medical or other professional 
schools have become much attenuated. A second question must be posed: 
what will or should be the proper role of  basic science research at UCSF, 10 
or 20 years hence? 
This and subsequent chapters examine such questions, as they face re-
searchers in both non-clinical and clinical departments. We describe research 
opportunities, strategies, and challenges of  each department type in funding 
and guiding their investigators and in educating young scientists. Amid many 
similarities, these department types show striking differences.
Why don’t basic scientists teach basic science to 
medical students?
This question relates directly to the present predicament of  basic science de-
partment faculty at UCSF. Until the 1970s, their central function in UCSF’s 
ecosystem was to teach “basic” human biology to professional students; their 
research focused on academic fields reflected in department names—anato-
my, biochemistry, physiology, microbiology, and pharmacology. As research 
in basic science departments came to depend more on the fruits of  the DNA 
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revolution, in the early 1980s, their research began to explore questions be-
yond old departmental confines, gradually achieved national prominence, and 
attracted generous NIH funding. Eager to focus more intently on research, 
young molecular and cell biologists preferred teaching graduate students 
(who would work in their labs), and their departments began to shift teach-
ing responsibilities in professional courses to adjunct faculty PhDs. The new 
adjunct faculty became extremely good teachers—often better than the re-
searchers who preceded them—and by the late 1980s assumed much greater 
roles in teaching and supervising professional courses. At first the basic sci-
ence departments—then recipients of  generous state support for faculty and 
administrative salaries and of  more generous NIH grants—supplied substan-
tial financial support for adjunct teaching faculty. As state support diminished 
and grants became harder to obtain, the medical school’s contribution to sal-
ary support for adjunct teaching faculty progressively increased, but was still 
funneled through basic science departments. 
By the 21st century, UCSF’s medical school had begun a major shift of  
basic science teaching for medical students: away from traditional lectures and 
toward learning in small-group sessions focused at interfaces between “basic” 
knowledge and its application in the clinic. Pedagogically effective and by now 
predominant in the medical school, the new approach has been adopted by 
other schools (1). A cadre of  8-10 education-focused adjunct faculty, including 
several basic science department faculty hired more than two decades ago, plays 
a large role in planning and coordinating this new approach, and it appears to 
work well. It requires large numbers of  teachers capable of  teaching teach basic 
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aspects of  human biology and pathogenesis, integrated with clinical problem-
solving. But medical school places less emphasis on basic human biology than 
in the 1980s, and UCSF’s basic science researchers—well-versed in molecular 
biology and genetics—lack training in anatomy, pharmacology, physiology, 
microbiology, as well as clinical knowledge and skills.  Although they still give 
a few lectures in professional courses, and/or teach small-group sections for 
medical students, their teaching focuses mostly on graduate students. 
Bottom line: even if  they wanted to, UCSF’s basic science departments 
could never recapture their formerly un-replaceable status as teachers of  
health professionals. Thus the rationale for UCSF’s support of  basic science 
departments relies almost exclusively on the quality of  their research. 
Opportunities, goals, and diverse approaches
In basic science departments and ORUs, research targets range across broad 
expanses of  biology, exemplified by Table 8-1’s list of  currently active proj-
ects. Like most basic science research projects, these share key elements: 
1. Grounding in molecular genetics, structures of  macromolecules, and how 
molecules work together in cells. 
2. Primary focus on mechanisms underlying critical life processes, such as disease, 
pain, sex, functional diversity, and response to stress. 
3. Work conducted in laboratories funded by public and private sources, in 
which PI faculty members direct efforts of  graduate students and 
postdocs. 
4. Intense collaboration with other labs in basic science or clinical 
departments at UCSF or other institutions. 
5. Driven by curiosity about mechanisms, these projects also impinge, 
directly and indirectly, on devastating human diseases (projects 1 and 
4), focus on processes that concern human welfare (projects 2 and 3), 
or explain fundamental life functions (5, 6 and 7) that are deranged in 
human disease. 
The projects in Table 8-1 flourish in the second decade of  the 21st 
century, owing to their PIs’ imagination, drive, and scientific prowess. But 
those scientists’ environment also made a huge difference. When they came 
to UCSF—three in the 1980s, three in the 1990s, one in 2003—they found 
able, welcoming, and interactive basic science colleagues, bright and vigorous 
graduate students and postdocs, and an administration eager to help them 
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succeed. In 2003, they moved their laboratories into spacious new facilities on 
the new Mission Bay campus. They unite in emphasizing the significance for 
human welfare of  fundamental research and its limitless opportunities in the 
21st century. These opportunities “have never been brighter,” says Jonathan 
Weissman (9). “New technologies provide unprecedented speed and depth, 
making studies of  human tissues and cross-species comparisons vastly more 
powerful—especially at UCSF, with its ready access to technology, scientific 
talent, and patients.”
In that context, we proceed to nitty-gritty quantitative facts about research 
in UCSF’s non-clinical academic departments and ORUs (Table 8-2). UCSF 
moves back and forth between two general classifications of  its non-clinical 
units. In one, adopted in earlier chapters of  this book, these units are either 
ORUs or “basic science” departments. The second, which we use in the pres-
ent chapter, separate “basic” from “social” science to come up with three 
headings: basic science, social science, and ORUs. Of  20 separate non-clinical 
administrative units, 15 are located in the School of  Medicine, with the others 
distributed among three other Schools. 
Researchers in basic science departments and ORUs do most of  their 
research in “wet-lab” facilities, where they study animals, cells, and macromol-
ecules: social science department researchers perform mostly “dry-lab” re-
search, often involving computer analysis of  patient outcomes vs. treatments 
or other variables, assessed from a variety of  sources. The former bring in 
more research grant dollars (in total direct costs, TDC): $96 and $88M for 
basic science and ORUs, respectively, vs. $20M for social science. Research 
in wet-lab departments employs many more postdocs and occupies more re-
search space than do dry-lab departments like Epidemiology and Biostatis-
tics. The latter department, with many sponsored faculty, few postdocs, and 
relatively few square feet of  research space, nonetheless garnered $12.6M in 
FY2014 research funds (see below). 
Heterogeneities within unit subtypes are also striking. For ORUs, differ-
ences in faculty numbers (3-fold range) and sponsored research funds (10-
fold) reflect their histories as well as the relative ability of  particular research 
themes to attract funds. In Table 8-2, compare the Cardiovascular Research 
Institute (CVRI, which studies heart disease) or the Diabetes Center to the 
Institutes for Health and Aging, for Health Policy Studies, or the Proctor 
Foundation (for research in ophthalmology). Among ORUs, the CVRI has 
the most faculty and next to the top number of  sponsored research dollars; 
UCSF’s first ORU, it enjoys generous funding from an endowment dating 
back to the ouster of  UCSF’s Chancellor, engineered by the CVRI’s leader in 
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the 1960s (chapter 7 and reference 13). The Diabetes Center, with the highest 
number of  research dollars and a middling number of  sponsored UCSF fac-
ulty, attracts unusually generous funding from federal and non-federal sources 
for collaborative research projects that bring dollars to researchers at UCSF 
and other institutions. Also, several ORUs with lower research dollars are quite 
young. Similar differences in history and scope probably account for heteroge-
neity among social science departments. 
Heterogeneities among basic science departments are less striking, but 
real. With the largest research space, postdocs, and sponsored research funds, 
Biochemistry and Biophysics was the first basic science department to focus 
primarily on research, when William Rutter became its chair in 1969 (13); it 
helped foster expansion and regeneration of  research in other basic science 
Legend for Table 8-2 opposite page
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*Abbreviations: Anthro/Hist/Soc, Anthropology, History, and Social Medicine; asf, 
Assignable Square Footage; Basic Sci depts, Basic Science Departments; CVRI, Cardiovascular 
Research Institute; Cell/Tissue Biol, Cell and Tissue Biology; Biochem/Biophysics, 
Biochemistry and Biophysics; Bioeng/Ther Sci, Bioengineering and Therapeutic Sciences; CM 
Pharmacol, Cellular and Molecular Pharmacology; depts, departments; D, M, P, N, Schools of  
Dentistry, Medicine, Pharmacy and Nursing, respectively; Epidemiol/Biostat, Epidemiology 
and Biostatistics; HDFC Cancer C, Helen Diller Family Comprehensive Cancer Center; 
Foundn, Foundation; Health and Aging, Institute for Health and Aging; Health Policy, Philip 
R. Lee Institute for Health Policy Studies; IC, indirect costs; Lad rank, Ladder rank; Microbio/
Immuno, Microbiology and Immunology; Neurodeg Dis, Institute for Neurodegenerative 
Disease; No., number; ORU, Organized Research Unit; PhD std, PhD students; Pharm Chem, 
Pharmaceutical Chemistry; Phys Nurs, Physiological Nursing; Postdocs, postdoctoral scholars; 
Sci, Science; Space, Research Space; Sch, School; Spons fac, Sponsored faculty; Spons rsrc, 
Sponsored Research; Soc/Behav, Social and Behavioral Sciences; $M, millions of  dollars; 
TDC, total direct costs. 
§Sponsored faculty are those who received any dollars from sponsored research projects in 
FY2014, as recorded and cited in chapter 6. For sponsored research dollars (Total Direct 
Costs, TDC) received by each unit’s faculty, see reference 10. 
¶The postdoc numbers were as of  1 January 2015 (11).
‡Research space is assessed by UCSF’s analysts as assignable square feet (asf) used to support 
sponsored activity at the end of  each fiscal year, and includes office space assigned to PIs with 
active sponsored activity in the fiscal year, as well as all rooms classified as laboratory research 
space (wet, dry, and support space). See reference 12. 
‡‡Several apparent anomalies merit explanation, including (besides HHMI support, described 
in the main text): (i) the Diabetes Center’s very large amount of  sponsored research dollars, 
which reflects very large grants awarded to one of  its faculty members; (ii) Bioengineering’s 
faculty all belong to the School of  Pharmacy, but the Department shares space from the 
Schools of  Medicine and of  Pharmacy, and part of  its total sponsored TDC ($10.9M) is 
administered through the School of  Medicine. (iii) The Hooper Foundation has space and 
postdocs, but its faculty are listed as members of  other departments and their sponsored 
support is administered in those departments.
departments since the 1980s. Basic science department research is more vigor-
ous than their sponsored research dollars indicate, owing to a happy anomaly, 
the Howard Hughes Medical Institutes (HHMI). In basic science departments, 
HHMI supports 14 faculty; they receive substantial sponsored funds from 
non-HMMI sources as well, but their departments’ recorded sponsored funds 
include neither HHMI-paid salaries for faculty and some staff, nor HHMI-
derived research funds (14). So, while UCSF basks in the HHMI’s reflected 
radiance, departments with HHMI-supported faculty conduct more research 
than their sponsored dollars (Table 8-2) indicate. In FY2014, HHMI support-
ed six faculty in Cellular and Molecular Pharmacology; three in Biochemistry 
and Biophysics, three in Physiology; and two in Microbiology and Immunol-
ogy (15). 
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Faculty salaries
In principle, the dean of  each School distributes salary money (from the state 
appropriation) and assigns space (offices, seminar rooms, and laboratory 
space, etc.) to each department or ORU. Within constraints imposed by avail-
able resources, chairs or directors of  these units then distribute the dollars and 
space to individual faculty members in ways that differ in details among units, 
based on custom and need. 
PhDs in basic science and ORU faculty PhDs at UCSF are well paid: 
salary comparisons for assistant or full professors show that UCSF pays this 
*Basic science department faculty (PhDs only) in UCSF’s School of  Medicine (UCSF) are 
compared with PhDs in the same type of  department in US medical schools (All), and with 
those in schools funded by public (Pub, usually state) funds or by private funds (Priv). Data is 
from the AAMC (16). The AAMC data on basic science salaries includes neither faculty in the 
Schools of  Dentistry, Pharmacy or Nursing, nor MD faculty with primary appointments in 
basic science departments. 
¶Median values for total annual compensation are shown as thousands of  dollars per year, and 
include total income (before taxes or set-asides for retirement) but not benefits paid by the 
University. While the AAMC records two classes of  income, Fixed and Total, we show only 
the AAMC-defined Total income here, because in basic science departments, at UCSF and 
elsewhere, Fixed and Total values differ by an average of  1% or less. Fixed compensation is 
the amount fixed at the beginning of  the year and contractually obligated to the faculty mem-
ber. Total compensation includes, in addition to the fixed/contractual component, bonus or 
incentive pay that results from achievement of  specific performance goals by the individual, 
the department, or the institution; examples may include bonuses from a faculty practice plan 
or outside earnings limited or controlled by the institution. 
#Ratios are calculated by dividing UCSF’s total compensation for assistant or full professors 
by the corresponding compensation for that rank in the AAMC category (all US, public, or 
private medical schools) shown.
‡Abbreviations: No., number of  faculty assessed in a category; $K, thousands of  dollars.
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group 20-30% more than the average US medical school, public or private 
(Table 8-3; 16). Because magnitudes of  those differences persist in comparing 
the 75th percentiles of  these groups (not shown), salaries of  UCSF basic sci-
ence faculty match those of  counterparts in upper echelons of  respected US 
research universities. Still, UCSF’s basic science faculty salaries are constrained 
in critical ways: 
1. In FY2014, faculty researchers in basic science departments and ORUs 
paid, respectively, 51 and 59% of  their salaries from sponsored 
research projects (see Table 6-3, above). Their salaries are competitive, 
but legislators continue to shrink state funds for paying them. As 
competitors abound and NIH funding stagnates, PIs are distracted from 
real research by scribbling multiple grant requests in hope of  receiving a 
single award, which may then be consumed to pay their own salaries.
2. San Francisco’s high (and still climbing) housing costs make it extremely 
difficult to buy a small house on a basic science assistant professor’s 
median UCSF salary ($118,000; Table 8-3; 16), even combined with a 
spouse’s salary (Box 8-1). Superb young scientists, unfortunately, can find 
acceptable jobs in less expensive cities. 
3. House prices pose a subtler problem: senior professors bought houses 
15-20 years ago, enriching them well out of  proportion to the ~$108,000 
salary difference between their median UCSF salaries and those of  
assistant professors (Table 8-3; 16; and see below)—a disproportion, 
oppressive to the young but often invisible to their elders, that can 
generate resentment and stifle communication. 
 
As in most academic biomedical research centers, at UCSF basic science 
departments determine the size of  a faculty member’s salary by beginning 
with the university’s prescribed salary scale for each department, based on 
academic rank and responsibilities of  specified groups of  faculty. Every year 
the department chair and the individual faculty member negotiate a somewhat 
higher salary for that year (Box 8-2). 
Basic science departments and ORUs find money to pay those negoti-
ated salaries in complicated ways. They can pay salaries from three sources: (i) 
the state educational appropriation (SEA), supplemented by dollars from the 
Dean’s office; (ii) sponsored research funds of  the individual faculty member; 
(iii) department “reserves” (discretionary funds or endowments. For most ba-
sic science departments, the first two sources are critical, the third minuscule, 
though Biochemistry and Biophysics has a modest endowment and that of  the 
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Box 8-1. Attracting and recruiting scientists
For half  a century, UCSF found it easier than many rival institutions to attract 
the best and brightest young people. In the 1960s, it was still a fairly ordinary 
institution, but California’s climate, scenery, and opportunities for adventure 
combined with state resources to attract doctors, scientists, and students from 
all over the US to the Parnassus campus (13). When UCSF began be seen as a 
potential leader in research, education, and patient care, it could compete suc-
cessfully for recruits against richer and more illustrious institutions. 
Now, however, UCSF’s basic scientists express grave concern about the 
institution’s continuing ability to attract bright young talent, from students 
and postdocs to faculty researchers. Graduate program directors say many 
top candidates choose competing schools, because prospective students who 
otherwise place UCSF at the top of  their lists cannot afford to live in the 
Bay Area. UCSF offers them apartments at rents well below market rates, but 
available apartments are too few to meet current demand. In May 2015, rent 
for the average one-bedroom apartment ($38,600 per year, $3,213 per month; 
17), exceeds the annual student stipend of  $32,500 and is barely 10% less than 
the yearly salary of  a first-year postdoc (18). Prospective basic science as-
sistant professors (beginning salary, ~$110,000) quail at $1.0M+ mean house 
prices (mid-2015). Driven by rapid growth of  Bay Area technology compa-
nies, the mean price rose 12% since 2012 and is predicted to rise a further 6% 
by mid-2016 (19). 
Housing is a “very high priority for UCSF,” according to Daniel Low-
enstein, UCSF’s Executive Vice Chancellor (20). Over the next 15 years, he 
adds, UCSF will focus on constructing, renovating, or purchasing apartments 
and offer them at rates much lower than the San Francisco market, primarily 
to students and postdocs. He expects UCSF will increase the present number 
of  apartments at least three-fold; many will be located in or near the Mission 
Bay and Parnassus campuses, in renovated space owned by the university, or 
in purchased or newly constructed buildings.
Recruiting young faculty poses complex, longer-term problems for UCSF. 
“It isn’t just finding a house, because young couples also seek assurance that 
they can find good schools for their children, all the way from pre-school 
day-care to college and beyond,” says Joe Derisi, chair of  Biochemistry and 
Biophysics (21). 
Other basic science leaders worry that prospective basic science faculty 
members are not eager to assume the significant a long-term risk that depends 
on where the dollars come from—from the university vs. a less secure “soft” 
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source, like NIH grants. Science professors in some universities may be sur-
prised to hear that a basic science appointment does not obligate UCSF to pay 
more than ~50% of  total salary. Most medical schools, however, do require 
rely basic science faculty researchers to provide substantial proportions of  
their salaries from grants. A survey (22) conducted for the Association of  
American Medical Colleges reported “extramural salary expectations” at nine 
top-ranked US medical schools. Although the schools were identified only by 
letters (A through I), we suspect that Harvard and UCSF were among them. 
Five of  nine schools said they expected average basic science faculty to obtain 
70-75% of  their salaries from extramural sources, and one reported an expec-
tation of  100% after three years on the faculty; the remaining three schools 
reported such average expectations of  25%, 40-60%, or 60%, respectively. 
Thus UCSF basic science faculty do earn high salaries, comparable to those 
paid in other top medical schools, as noted above, and their average soft-
money support (~50%; chapter 6) is less than that expected at seven of  nine 
(anonymous) medical schools. We do not have good data to compare UCSF’s 
soft money for basic science salaries to “extramural salary expectations” of  
most universities for their PhD biologists or biochemists. It does appear likely 
that declining institutional support for academic salaries at UCSF and other 
medical schools adds yet another obstacle to recruiting and retaining faculty. 
CVRI, an ORU, is quite substantial. 
Now we turn to university-supplied SEA and Dean’s office contributions, 
and proceed later to grants. From the 1970s until the early 1990s, the SEA 
supplied “Full Time Equivalent” (FTE) dollars, which paid ~75% of  the aver-
age salary and benefits of  basic science department professors in the ladder-
rank series. (Most basic science faculty members were ladder-rank faculty, and 
still are; see chapter 6.) In the 1990s, diminishing SEAs gradually reduced the 
dollar value of  FTEs, so departments had to ask faculty to tap their grants 
for larger proportions of  salary—to 50% or even more, as compared to the 
earlier ~25%. In the 21st century, state funds dropped still further and grant 
money also became scarcer than before, leading to increasing financial deficits 
for departments, which (in the School of  Medicine) were defrayed by separate 
yearly subventions from the Dean’s office to each department. 
To stabilize faculty and programs, basic science department chairs and 
the Dean of  Medicine devised a new Basic Science Funding Model (BSFM), 
which first took effect in FY2015. Its key elements (25) include: (i) an execu-
tive committee (the Dean and basic science department chairs) reviews the 
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model at regular intervals and advises the Dean on allocation of  vacant faculty 
slots; (ii) rather than having to depend solely on FTEs of  diminishing value 
and ad hoc Dean’s office subventions, each department gets an annual block 
allocation from the Dean’s office, including a base administrative allocation 
($335,000 per year, identical for each department) plus ladder rank allocations 
for each position, depending on ranks of  individual faculty; (iii) allocations for 
Box 8-2. Setting the salary of  a UCSF 
basic science professor
Following UCSF’s Faculty Health Sciences Compensation Plan, salaries in 
departments and ORUs are determined in three stages:
1. X factor. The university prescribes minimum salaries for full-time faculty, 
depending on academic rank and a salary scale (Scale 0 to Scale 9), 
assigned by departments to individual faculty according to their 
academic responsibilities, recognizing that “departments with 
limited revenue will not have enough money to fund a high covered 
[compensation] . . . supported by departmental income and taxes” (23). 
Most faculty in basic science departments or ORUs are compensated on 
Scale 3. Rank and scale determine the “X” component of  each faculty 
member’s salary. 
2. Y factor. Each year the department chair negotiates with the individual 
faculty member to set the “Y” salary component. Y is a multiplier 
that brings the individual’s salary from the X value to a value (X+Y) 
that meets the negotiated target (see main text), which is that year’s 
contracted salary, constrained by available funds.
3. Z factor. This salary component is a bonus or incentive that conforms to 
university rules and available funds. For faculty discussed in this 
chapter, most Z dollars are compensation for consultation for an 
external company or institution; few basic science faculty members 
earn appreciable Z compensation, so the Z component contributes on 
average less than 1% of  total earnings. 
Most university-paid benefits (e.g., UC retirement and health care insurance) 
are fixed as a percentage of  the X component of  a faculty member’s salary.
(Note: This account omits many details; for a less streamlined account, readers may subject 
themselves to the rigors of  UC’s Academic Personnel Manual; 24.) 
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faculty positions include separate components for their salaries and adminis-
trative support (Table 8-4); (iv) block allocations are to the departments, not 
to individual faculty; (v) vacant FTEs revert to the Dean’s office, with their 
associated funds distributed through the block allocation to the departments; 
(vi) chairs reach a consensus to recommend recruiting into vacated positions. 
Codicils (26) largely follow custom and precedents of  earlier years. The Model 
provides, depending on rank, between 36% and 49% of  actual median salaries 
paid to UCSF basic science faculty in FY 2014 (Table 8-4); the remaining 51-
64% must come from grants. 
A federal “salary cap” could limit use of  grant dollars to pay salaries of  
highly remunerated basic science professors at UCSF (and of  a much higher 
proportion of  clinical department faculty, as shown in the next chapter). This 
federal salary cap—the maximum salary federal grants can pay any individual 
grantee—was lowered in 2011 from $199,700 to $179,700, and rose slightly 
in 2014, to $181,500. The 2014 cap would not pose a serious threat to the 
§Assuming payouts of  5% per year, these are the values of  endowment principal that would 
be required to pay the model salary amount. 
¶Actual faculty salary is based on AAMC records (16) of  UCSF’s median salaries for these 
three ranks in FY2014.
‡Salary + benefits calculated by multiplying the actual salary by 1.297.
#The proportion paid by the model allocation is calculated by dividing the model’s allocation 
by the actual median salary for that rank or position. 
‡‡Actual administrative salary is calculated as described in reference 32, assuming an average 
of  29.7% for benefits.
§§Full professors are paid on scales with incremental steps, increasing from 1 to 5 and finally 
(at the top) above scale (A). The table compares each of  these only with the average actual 
salary (at all possible scales) for full professors at UCSF.
*Abbreviations: Avg, average; equiv, equivalent; $K, thousands of  dollars; $M, millions of  
dollars; rel to, relative to. 
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Box 8-3. Running a basic science department 
on the BSFM
To ask how a basic science department can or cannot function on the new 
Model, we compare expenses and “income” of  a fictional UCSF basic science 
department, with 12 ladder-rank faculty members: two assistant professors, 
two associate professors, and eight full professors. The department’s total ex-
penses, $2,442,500 per year, include:
• Faculty salary plus benefits, based on average salaries for these ranks in 
basic science departments, come to a total of  $3,000,000 (28). If  (as 
estimated in reference 25) the BSFM were to cover 48% of  assistant and 
associate professor salaries and 41% of  professor salaries, the BSFM 
would pay $1,280,000 for department faculty salaries, while sponsored 
projects would pay $1,720,000 (29). 
• Mandatory charges from UCSF Human Resources, pro-rated to the 
department’s number and type of  employees: $125,000 per year (30). 
• Mandatory charge for pre-award administration of  grant applications, 
pro-rated for type of  application: $300,000 (30).
• Mandatory charge to support graduate programs, $4,250 per student x 
30 students in departmental laboratories: $127,500 (31). 
• Miscellaneous unavoidable charges (32): $130,000 
• Administrative salaries for four personnel, x $120,000 (including salary 
and benefits) for each (33): $480,000. 
 
Another expense is the basic science departments’ contribution to 
support of  adjunct faculty who plan, coordinate, and teach courses for medical 
students. Amounts of  these contributions are substantial and vary greatly 
among the different departments. Such adjunct faculty have been supported 
in part by Dean’s Office subventions, but some basic science departments lack 
resources necessary to pay the rest of  the tab.  
Income. The BSFM would supply a total of  $2,195,000 per year, including 
$1,260,000 to support faculty salaries, plus $600,000 for their staff, plus a de-
partmental “base” of  $335,000 (34). 
Inevitable deficit. With the expenditures above, the department must end 
the year $247,500 in arrears (= $2,442,500 - $2,195,000)—a deficit higher 
than “reserves” available to the department. Reserves, in theory, include 
endowments and grant dollars awarded for faculty salaries, if  they exceed what 
the university agrees to supply via the BSFM. To pay that $247,500 deficit 
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average UCSF basic science professor, who in FY2014 earned $225,000 per 
year (16; and Tables 8-3 and 8-4): with benefits equal to 29.7% of  total sal-
ary, she would need a total of  $292,000, of  which $105,000 could come from 
the BSFM. To collect the remaining $187,000 of  the $292,000 from federal 
grants, her grants would have to support $144,000 in actual salary plus $43,000 
in benefits (29.7% of  $144,000). That $144,000 is 64% of  her $225,000 sal-
ary, but also ~21% less than the current NIH salary cap. What if  she and her 
basic science department chair were instead to negotiate a very high salary—
i.e., the maximum in BSFM dollars ($130,000; Table 8-4) plus the maximum 
allowed by the salary cap? Combining both sources, such a professor would 
earn a maximum of  $281,500 in actual salary (27). Of  112 sponsored faculty 
in UCSF’s basic science departments in FY2014, at least nine (8%) received 
gross salaries higher than $281,500 in 2014 (27). 
The BSFM was devised to stabilize faculty salaries, but has so far not done 
so. This is because its dollars conspicuously do not suffice for departments to 
pay unavoidable charges incurred by carrying out their research and teaching 
and also maintain a minimal staff  (see Box 8-3); as a result, some departments 
have to “tax” faculty salary dollars supplied by the BSFM to support essential 
departmental functions. 
from endowment, at an annual 5%payout rate, the endowment principal 
would have to be $4.95M—much more than the endowments of  most basic 
science departments. The department could require its faculty to provide the 
$247,500 by increasing the overall percentage of  their salary supplied from 
grants by an additional 14%, from $1,720,000 to $1,967,500. A final alternative: 
the department could dismiss two of  its four administrative personnel, saving 
~$240,000 per year. No alternative is attractive.
In devising the BSFM, the Dean’s office and department chairs clearly 
under-estimated the costs of  faculty salaries and staff  salaries and manda-
tory or unavoidable administrative costs. Actual faculty salaries of  the fictional 
department, including benefits, amount to $3,000,000, for which the BSFM 
explicitly provides $1,260,000, or 42% overall. As its executive committee 
planned from the outset, the BSFM will have to be re-adjusted. Probably the 
Dean’s office will supply extra funds to help pay inescapable administrative 
costs and staff  salaries; sponsored projects may also have to pay somewhat 
larger proportions of  faculty salaries higher than guessed earlier.
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Research space
Next to research dollars and salary, academic researchers tend to worry most 
intensely about adequate (that is, bigger) space for their laboratories. Conse-
quently, research institutions seek dollars to construct and maintain research 
facilities, with an intensity matching their devotion to recruiting first-rate sci-
entists. Different subtypes of  non-clinical academic units—basic (Table 8-5) 
and social science (Table 8-6) departments, and ORUs (Table 8-7)—deploy 
researchers and research space in distinctive ways. Taken together, “basic” 
departments (narrow definition) have the most sponsored faculty members, 
research space, and sponsored research dollars: 112 sponsored faculty vs. 85 
for social science, and 73 for ORUs; 379,000 assignable square feet (asf) vs. 
228,000 for ORUs, and much less (~27,000) for social science; $132M in re-
*Abbreviations: Exactly as in Table 8-2, plus the following: Fac, Faculty; Spons, Sponsored; K, 
thousands; $K, thousands of  dollars; $M, millions of  dollars; No., number
§Sponsored faculty, sponsored research dollars, and space are defined as described in the 
legend of  Table 8-2, which also describes where the information was obtained. 
‡Notable anomalies include those described in the legend to Table 8-2. It should be noted that 
the fortunate anomaly of  HHMI support, described in the main text, misleadingly reduces the 
sponsored dollars and thus reduces the dollars per faculty member and the sponsored dollars 
per asf  for departments that have HHMI faculty. The Hooper Foundation is omitted from 
this table sponsored support of  its faculty is administered by other departments.
¶For definitions of  research space and Assignable Square Footage (asf) used by UCSF’s ana-
lysts in this table and elsewhere in this chapter, see Table 8-2 legend and reference 12.
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search TDC + IC vs. $116M for ORUs and ~$26M for social science depart-
ments. 
Within each category, heterogeneities abound (Tables 8-5, 8-6, and 8-7). 
Among basic science departments, Biochemistry and Biophysics (School of  
Medicine) has much more asf  and somewhat more sponsored dollars than its 
near competitors in the School of  Pharmacy (Bioengineering and Therapeutic 
Sciences and Pharmaceutical Chemistry), one of  which has more sponsored 
faculty. Among social science departments, Epidemiology and Biostatistics 
has by far the most faculty members and sponsored dollars. Among ORUs, 
the CVRI has 2.5- to 11-fold more space than other ORUs and also more 
sponsored funds, with one exception, the Diabetes Center (owing to grants 
awarded to one of  its faculty; see Table 8-2 legend). 
Comparing the three types of  non-clinical academic units to one another 
offers more useful lessons, specifically with respect to ratios of  sponsored re-
search dollars to asf  or faculty numbers (Fig. 8-1). First, social science depart-
ments (including Epidemiology and Biostatistics) have about as many faculty 
as do the other two unit types, but very much fewer asf, making their collective 
asf-faculty ratio less than one seventh the mean for non-clinical departments 
at UCSF (Fig. 8-1, top left panel). Sponsored dollars per social science faculty 
member are also lower, but the difference is less marked than the asf  differ-
ence: relative to means for all non-clinical departments, means for social sci-
ences are 30% or 24%, depending on whether TDC or IC is compared (Fig. 
8-1, two right upper panels). Most strikingly, social science departments gar-
*Abbreviations are as described in the legends of  Tables 8-2 and 8-5.
§Sponsored faculty, sponsored research dollars, and space are defined as described in the 
legend of  Table 8-2, which also describes where the information was obtained.
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ner 2- to 3-fold greater sponsored research dollars per asf  than basic science 
departments. This difference reflects different ways of  conducting research: 
as compared to basic science, social science departments (i) focus on dry-lab 
rather than wet-lab research; (ii) use sponsored faculty to carry out higher 
proportions of  actual research, so that (iii) smaller groups (and many fewer 
postdocs; Table 8-2) tackle each problem; (iv) expect individual sponsored 
faculty to attract smaller amounts of  sponsored dollars, so that (iv) one asf  of  
(predominantly) dry-lab research space brings the university three times more 
TDC dollars and double the IC dollars earned in one asf  of  predominantly 
wet-lab space. The comparisons also suggest that wet-lab research leads to 
greater recovery of  indirect costs (per TDC dollar) than does dry-lab research, 
which may reflect greater reliance on private funding for the latter. Further, 
we speculate—the necessary data are not yet available—that, paradoxically, 
research in dry-lab space may actually incur less indirect cost for the institu-
tion to pay (per TDC dollar), because dry-lab research uses smaller teams of  
scientists and less space and technical equipment.
How do ORUs fit into this comparison? Their apparent ability to bring in 
almost twice as many sponsored TDC dollars per asf  (on average) than basic 
science departments (Fig. 8-1, lower panels) may partly reflect dry-lab research 
approaches (e.g., in Institutes for Health and Aging and for Health Policy), but 
not in intensively wet-lab ORUs like the CVRI. Again, more careful analysis 
is in order.
Note that a substantial and increasing, but not yet quantitated, proportion 
*Abbreviations are as described in the legends of  Tables 8-2 and 8-5.
§Sponsored faculty, sponsored research dollars, and space are defined as described in the 
legend of  Table 8-2, which also describes where the information was obtained.
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of  research in UCSF’s clinical departments applies dry-lab approaches, and 
thus requires more sponsored faculty (and probably fewer postdocs) per spon-
sored dollar. It will behoove UCSF’s leaders to pay attention to these changes 
(see chapter 9). Note also (and again) that quantitative comparisons—e.g., 
sponsored ICR dollars per asf—are not always valid. For instance, in FY2014 
three of  eight basic science departments brought in less than the $90/asf  
specified in the UCSF policy described in chapter 4, and only two would meet 
the $120/asf  requirement for 2016 (Table 8-5). Such arbitrary cut-offs could 
result in ignoring anomalies like HHMI funding and can tempt leaders and 
researchers to pay less attention to a more critical concern: quality of  the 
research itself. 
Research training
After obtaining her bachelor’s degree, an aspiring biomedical scientist begins 
learning to do science as a PhD student and then as a postdoctoral scholar. 
Both stages focus on performing laboratory research directed by an academ-
ic scientist, and together can last 10-12 years, or even more. PhD aspirants 
Fig. 8-1. Space and research dollars in Basic Science and Social Science departments and in 
ORUs, in relation to number of  faculty and to each other, FY2014.
Top panels show research space (in asf, or Assignable Square Footage) and sponsored dollars 
(total direct or indirect costs—i.e.,TDC or IC) per the numbers of  sponsored faculty mem-
bers (Fac) in each type of  administrative unit (see chapter 6 and Tables 8-2 and 8-5 to 8-7). 
Bottom panels show TDC or IC per research asf  for these same units. Numbers within each 
bar show the relation of  the absolute value in that bar (as a percentage) to the mean value for 
all three classes of  unit together; these mean values are depicted as vertical dashed lines in 
each panel. Abbreviations are as in the legend of  Table 8-2. 
132 Follow the Money
can easily opt for more lucrative careers with shorter preparation times, so 
biomedical PhD programs routinely pay their students’ tuition and fees, plus 
stipends of  $30,000-40,000 for living expenses. Postdoctoral scholars pay no 
tuition or fees and receive bigger (but still niggardly) stipends, set by NIH at 
~$42-55,000 per year, depending on experience (18). 
Producing young scientists is expensive. In UCSF’s non-clinical depart-
ments, it costs about $33M per year to train a PhD pipeline of  ~670 basic sci-
ence PhD students, and ~$24M to pay about 500 laboratory postdocs (Table 
8-8). The ~$57M devoted to both stages of  training exceeds the total com-
*The data provides a general overview of  all non-clinical departments at UCSF. The data are 
not related precisely to one another, in that some refer to FY2014 and others to 2013 or 2015, 
as noted below. The categories also overlap, in that the total dollars for sponsored research 
include (but are not limited to) dollars that paid faculty salaries, supported PhD training, or 
paid postdocs. 
§Faculty number and sponsored dollars include basic science and social science departments 
plus ORUs, based on data in Tables 8-5, 6, and 7, above.
¶Faculty salaries are taken from chapter 6, Table 6-3. 
‡Data for graduate student numbers refer to FY2013 (35). Postdoctoral salaries are estimated 
by multiplying the number of  postdocs at UCSF (in 2015; 11) by the salary NIH stipulated for 
third year postdocs in FY2014; 18, 44). The cumulative cost of  UCSF’s student tuition, fees, 
and living stipend is based on estimates of  $33M for basic science PhD students, as described 
in the main text.
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bined salaries of  sponsored faculty in those departments, and comes to 18% 
of  total (estimated) sponsored research costs in laboratories of  basic science 
departments and ORUs. (Caution: in comparing such costs, note that research 
and training costs partially overlap; see Table 8-8 legend and text below.) The 
training dollars produce good scientists. Career outcomes of  UCSF’s PhD 
alumni are more successful than the national average: 78% obtain research 
jobs in academia, industry, or government, with only 3% in non-scientific oc-
cupations, as compared to national figures, respectively, of  69% and 13% (36). 
UCSF’s postdoctoral alumni probably also fare well; the percentage of  alumni 
engaged in actual research is likely to exceed the 67% national average in 2012 
(37). Now we turn to our focus on funding, and touch on salient issues regard-
ing both stages of  training. 
Training PhD students. In 2013 UCSF trained 670 PhD students (35) in ten 
separate basic science training programs (38) and 165 in five social science 
training programs in 2014, including 94 students in the Nursing PhD program 
(39). In 2015, the annual average cost per student for basic science programs 
is ~$50,000, including tuition and fees of  ~$16,800 and (for basic science stu-
dents) a $32,500 stipend for living expenses (40); total cost would thus come 
to ~$33M per year (~670 students times $50,000); average time-to-degree is 
5.92 years (41). The annual cost for training social science PhDs is not avail-
able but is certainly lower, because student numbers are smaller and social 
science PhD programs may not all support their students at rates comparable 
to those of  basic science programs. Graduate programs in both categories 
differ considerably in size and time-to-degree. Among basic science programs, 
times-to-degree vary from ~5.2 to ~6.2 years (41). 
Where does this money come from? Here we could obtain only very rough 
estimates (42): the ~$33M annual cost for basic science programs appears to 
be paid from three sources: (i) roughly 30% from UCSF itself, principally from 
the Chancellor’s office to the Graduate Division, plus smaller amounts from 
UCSF’s four Schools; (ii) roughly 40% is paid by extramural sources, including 
individual student fellowships and institutional (federal) training grants; (iii) fi-
nally, roughly 30% is paid from research project grants (RPGs) to support stu-
dents working in labs of  UCSF PIs. Overall, of  2015’s estimated $33M total 
cost, these percentage estimates suggest these sources provide, very roughly, 
$10M from the institution, $10 M from fellowships and training grants, and 
$13M from extramural sources. 
Because the estimated 30% from RPGs goes exclusively to students in 
later years of  PhD training, a shorter average time-to-degree would dispro-
portionately diminish the drain on PIs’ research funds. If  so, why do UCSF’s 
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PIs persist in paying approximately $10M of  their RPG dollars for graduate 
student stipends? The most likely answer: UCSF’s PhD students in their later 
training years not only provide skilled labor, but also constitute a workforce as 
creative and strongly motivated as any a PI is likely to find elsewhere, and at a 
relatively cheap price. Moreover, that price is dictated by market competition: 
most other major biomedical research centers in the US pay living stipends 
similar to those paid at UCSF, plus tuition and fees that are often higher. Still, 
biomedical PhD students pay yet another price: that is, the length of  graduate 
training may delay their careers as much as two years longer than is absolutely 
necessary, and that training may not always provide optimal learning opportu-
nities for the brightest students (43). Thus market competition maintains the 
costs research centers pay to attract graduate students, and the need for cheap 
but highly motivated laboratory workers probably prolongs the years required 
to get a PhD degree. Chapter 10 will return to these issues. 
In sum, for the past 25 years graduate training at UCSF has met with 
remarkable success. UCSF has raised the number and quality of  its graduate 
programs, slowly reduced the time-to-degree (by perhaps more than half  a 
year), and replaced many lectures in the first year with pedagogically effective 
workshop courses focused on specific problems and new research tools. It has 
also achieved the most critical goal, by training students who enjoy excellent 
career outcomes (36). 
Postdoctoral scholars. As noted above, UCSF’s basic science departments and 
ORUs paid an estimated $24M to 508 postdocs in FY2014 (see figure legend, 
Table 8-8, and 44). Still, labs in basic science and ORUs (in all UCSF Schools) 
employ in 2015 14% fewer postdocs than in 2005 (508 now vs. 592 earlier). 
For basic science and ORU labs in the School of  Medicine, the decrease over 
that period was 18% (11)—paralleling decreases in inflation-corrected spon-
sored dollars over the same period: 10% for basic science departments in the 
School of  Medicine, 16% for ORUs (see Fig. 7-1). San Francisco living costs 
that dismay prospective students and assistant professors may make it even 
harder to recruit postdocs to basic science labs. 
Before we proceed to weightier matters, ponder this contrast: as an in-
stitution, UCSF appears to deem graduate students infinitely more valuable 
than postdocs, in that it pays approximately $10M from intramural funds for 
PhD students, vs. close to zero for postdocs, who receive (almost) all their sal-
ary from extramural grants. In part, this difference reflects UCSF’s dedication 
to its educational mission. In contrast, however, PIs appear to assign almost 
identical economic values, in dollars per worker, to an average later-year gradu-
ate student and an average postdoc (44).
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What is the future of  basic science at UCSF?
Surveying their present predicament, faculty, students, and postdocs worry 
about the future. Exciting questions and technology offer limitless opportunity, 
but dicey dollars and insecure employment foster passivity and sap resolution. 
Of  the four main causes for worry—three economic, one psychological—
each increases the others’ power.
1. Inflation and stagnant federal support make it hard for faculty to 
maintain their research momentum, and frantic scrambles for grant 
dollars weaken their appetites for tough but critical scientific questions. 
2. Decreasing state appropriations for academic salaries may convert NIH’s 
decision not to fund a grant request into loss of  a research program 
or a PI’s sudden inability to feed her family, and make it harder for 
departments to recruit students, postdocs, and new faculty—especially 
in competition with rich institutions or UC campuses with many 
undergraduates and thus higher state salary appropriations (Box 8-1).
3. Rapidly rising costs of  housing and living in the Bay area lead 
prospective students, postdocs, staff, and faculty to seek—and often 
find—opportunities elsewhere. 
4. UCSF’s basic science community remains eager to share scientific goals 
and technology, welcome new ideas, and nurture young colleagues, but 
lacks its once keen interest in shared visions for the future and initiatives 
for constructive change. 
How can we explain the current psychological malaise of  UCSF’s basic sci-
entists? Pressed by tighter economic constraints, do investigators simply pre-
fer the short-term solace of  laboratory research to the thorny dilemmas of  
their communal future? As clinical medicine’s prosperity grows, do deans and 
chancellors—like the society around them—pay less attention to scientists’ 
triumphs or troubles? Do scientists suffer mainly from loss of  their former 
autonomy and high regard? To what degree does their present insecurity re-
flect their much-diminished responsibility for teaching professional students? 
Do pride and self-pity promote exaggeration of  troubles less dire than at oth-
er institutions? Are basic scientists spoiled aristocrats who should pull up their 
socks at once, and devise new ways to adapt and prosper?
Each harsh interpretation contains a tiny kernel of  truth, but none offer 
cogent explanations of  the present predicament or straightforward remedies. 
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As with most real-world problems, variables are many, causes hard to prove, 
and actions replete with risk. After chapter 9 examines research in clinical 
departments, chapter 10 will suggest approaches for dealing with some 
predicaments, but not all. 
 
 
Chapter 9
Science in clinical departments: 
Ambition vaults to success
The size, variety, and sponsored funding of  research in UCSF’s clinical departments make analysis difficult. By every measure, the clinical de-
partments’ research dwarfs that of  basic science departments: 6.3-fold more 
sponsored clinical research faculty; 4.6-fold more sponsored funding; 2.3-fold 
more research space; 4.0-fold greater proportional growth over the past 11 
years (1). A major contributor to the success of  clinical department research 
at UCSF is the rapid expansion and growth over the past three decades in size, 
dollars, and social-political power of  the entire US clinical enterprise and—
in direct parallel, and even more successfully in financial terms—of  UCSF’s 
clinical enterprise (see chapter 1). This expansion: (i) attracted many clinician-
researchers—both unfledged and well established—who competed effectively 
for research support and recognition against researchers in other institutions; 
(ii) drove an increase in professional fee dollars, earned by the clinical prowess 
of  clinicians, which provided modest funds essential for boosting progress of  
research projects less strongly supported (after 2004) by federal dollars; (iii) 
helped persuade both NIH and private funders to target greater proportions 
of  their portfolios toward clinical and translational research. 
Clinical department research is impressive in quality as well as quantity. 
In the 1970s through the 1990s, UCSF’s clinical departments made major ad-
vances in pioneering surgery for tiny fetuses in the mother’s uterus, preventing 
cardiac arrhythmias by ablating cells in small areas of  the human heart, invent-
ing the clinical hospitalist (now a key contributor to patient care in many large 
centers), and discovering tobacco company cover-ups of  smoking’s dangers 
(which provoked medically critical changes in public policy). This quality and 
diversity persists in the 21st-century (see examples in Table 9-1; 2). Several 
advances reflect careful analysis of  pathogenesis, especially of  disorders of  
immune responses and the brain. Some are “basic,” others clearly “applied,” 
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but all aim to benefit patients, in the near term or later. 
Of  the advances in Table 9-1, only the AIDS-focused example reflected 
research primarily oriented to patients or involving dry-lab analysis (e.g., epi-
demiology, clinical management questions, etc.). The table probably does not 
reflect the true quality (or abundance) of  UCSF’s patient-focused research, for 
a curious and critical reason: the 18 individuals in clinical departments asked 
to recommend advances for this table (including department chairs, division 
chiefs, and even first-rate scientists in clinical departments) proved almost uni-
versally unable to cite recent discoveries or advances outside their own field 
or clinical unit; this reticence was even stronger among dry-lab researchers (2). 
Interviewees deemed deserving candidates for the table too numerous for any 
clinical department scientist to know. In sharp contrast, almost every faculty 
member interviewed in the smaller, better-integrated basic science community 
readily expressed a judgment (see Table 8-1). The difference points straight 
to sheer size of  the clinical enterprise, which directly reflects the diligence 
and ability of  its faculty, but appears also to hinder their opportunities, and 
perhaps even their motivations, for exploring science outside their immediate 
purviews. We shall return to this issue.
The rest of  this chapter considers three aspects of  clinical department 
research: (i) how administrative units manage the flow and distribution of  
*These examples were culled from suggestions by 18 leaders and researchers at UCSF. Be-
cause most of  these individuals claimed knowledge only of  advances in their own fields (2), 
the authors suspect that at least one non-overlapping table could present advances compa-
rable in number and quality to those listed.
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*FY2014 sponsored funds in the categories listed are tabulated in reference 10. Unlike tables 
in chapters 7 and 8, this data includes only departments or ORUs that are located within the 
UCSF School of  Medicine. These include seven basic science departments and five ORUs, 
plus 20 clinical departments and other units (in categories defined by the UCSF Chancellor’s 
office; see 11). The data includes only funds derived from federal donors (principally NIH) or 
private funds (e.g., foundations or industry); funds from the state or local government are not 
included. In addition to regular clinical departments, the “clinical” category includes 7 School 
of  Medicine administrative units designated as “other” in Figs. 7-2 and 7-3. These other units 
include the AID Research Institute, the Center for Health and Community, the Clinical and 
Translational Sciences Institute (CTSI), the office of  the Medical School Dean, Human Ge-
netics, the Osher Center, and Regeneration Medicine; altogether, these units account for 5.1% 
of  the School of  Medicine’s sponsored funds, of  which the CTSI accounts for nearly two 
thirds. The table does not separate these from regular clinical departments for two reasons: 
(i) to simplify the discussion, based on the low proportion of  sponsored funds in the School 
of  Medicine these units receive; (ii), like clinical departments, the “other” units are oriented 
towards research on a disease or a discrete set of  clinical problems, and are geographically 
close to UCSF’s clinical facilities on the Parnassus campus.
¶IC (indirect costs) are given in millions of  dollars and as a percentage (in parentheses) of  the 
sum of  total direct costs plus indirect costs. 
#These proportions represent total + indirect costs under a particular funding heading (fed-
eral, private clinical trials, private C&G, or total private funding, or all federal + private funds), 
as a percentage of  the total sponsored funds received by the indicated department type (basic, 
ORU, clinical, or “all SOM”). 
§These proportions represent total + indirect costs under a particular funding heading (fed-
eral, private clinical trials, private C&G, or total private funding, or all federal + private funds), 
as a percentage of  the total sponsored funds (federal + private) received all SOM administra-
tive units; that total amount in FY2014 was $769M. 
**Abbreviations: C&G, contracts and grants; TDC, total direct costs; IC, indirect costs; $M, 
millions of  dollars; ORU, Organized research Unit; SOM, School of  Medicine.
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research dollars to scientists; (ii) competing research styles (dry-lab vs. wet-lab, 
clinical vs. basic science); (iii) training clinician researchers. Finally, we summa-
rize our findings and identify challenges clinician researchers now face. 
Where the dollars flow
We begin by asking how faculty and administrators obtain grant and contract 
dollars from external sources, how internal funds are channeled to separate 
administrative units and individual researchers, and how faculty salaries are 
paid.
Dollars from external sources. Table 9-2 documents the predominant role 
of  research in clinical departments in UCSF’s School of  Medicine. As ear-
lier chapters indicated, at UCSF three of  every four sponsored dollars (73%, 
in FY2014) support research in clinical departments. In dollar terms, clinical 
departments garner greater than 5-fold more sponsored funds than do basic 
science departments or ORUs. For private (non-federal) funds, the difference 
is even greater: $174M to clinical departments, vs. $17M to basic science and 
~$24M to ORUs (10- and 8-fold greater, respectively). This difference is not 
due to clinical trials: while basic science departments and ORUs participate in 
few clinical trials, privately sponsored clinical trials account for less than 5% 
of  sponsored funds going to clinical departments (10). Clinical departments 
also participate in federally-sponsored clinical trials (not shown as a separate 
category in Table 9-2), but such trials pay UCSF only ~$15M per year, making 
up ~4% of  the $389M per year (TDC+IC) clinical departments get from fed-
eral funders (10). Clinical departments recover proportionately fewer indirect 
cost dollars than other department types (Table 9-2), because clinical depart-
ments derive more of  their sponsored funds (31% vs. 17% or 22% for basic 
science or ORUs) from non-federal sources, which reimburse indirect costs at 
lower rates (see chapter 3). 
Researchers in clinical departments depend on federal grants for 69% of  
their sponsored funds (Table 9-2). Such funds come in many grant types (12), 
including several frequently used in basic science departments, such as RO1 
grants for specific research projects, and PO1 or “project grants” in which 
multiple labs approach complementary aspects of  a larger scientific problem. 
More familiar to clinician researchers, sometimes almost exclusively so, are 
federal grants designed especially for large projects aimed at understanding 
and treating clinical problems, including: P30 Center Core grants, P50 Special-
ized Center grants; clinical trials, which usually involve more than one institu-
tion; and U-grants (cooperative agreements in a specified area of  research, 
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which often fund large projects involving multiple institutions). U-grants of-
ten result from requests for applications aimed at a programmatic objective of  
an NIH center or institute, but may also originate from curiosity or interests 
of  individual researchers or groups of  researchers in a particular field. Most 
NIH K-awards for training go to clinician scientists, although some go to re-
searchers in basic science departments. 
In mid-2013, a high UCSF official told one of  the authors that the days 
of  curiosity-driven research were numbered. Instead, the official said, the old 
model was being rapidly replaced by institutional “resource aggregators” (a 
group to which he proudly belonged) who work in concert with industrial 
funders to organize university investigators, basic and clinical, into consor-
tiums focused on large research projects. Although UCSF had already hosted 
many projects funded by private industry, such projects did increase in num-
ber and size with following the appointment of  Susan Desmond-Hellmann, 
an outstanding clinical investigator from Genentech who served as UCSF’s 
Chancellor from 2009 to 2014 (13). UCSF is now engaged in research agree-
ments with multiple industrial partners, which include Pfizer, Genentech, GE 
Healthcare, Nikon Instruments, Abbott Diagnostics (14), and others. Private 
(non-governmental) funds also come to UCSF from drug company-spon-
sored clinical trials (see above), and a host of  foundations and philanthropists. 
The “research aggregator” probably exaggerated, although we were not able 
to estimate accurately how many dollars industrial partnerships contributed to 
UCSF’s privately sponsored funds in FY2014 (Table 9-2). 
What makes clinical departments so much better at attracting research 
funds than other UCSF department types? The causes are not amenable to 
quantitation or experimental tests (see Muddlement Uncertainty Principle in 
chapter 6), including: 
1. The expanding clinical enterprise provides many recruits who are active 
researchers. 
2. Clinical departments have access to professional fees, which pay 
substantial parts of  their salaries and may also be used, in limited 
amounts, to support research. As federal dollars shrank, these “extra” 
dollars became much more valuable.  
3. Clinical departments can truthfully point to their daily work and 
expertise as reasons for philanthropy aimed at near-term improvements 
in human health and welfare. 
4. Responding to voters, Congress and NIH target federal dollars to 
clinically relevant “translational” research based on hopes that short-
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term efforts can quickly transform untapped reservoirs of  basic 
knowledge into cures for disease.
5. UCSF’s clinician-researchers eagerly take advantage of  new federal 
initiatives, such as NIH requests for applications, Clinical and 
Translational Sciences Institutes, support for clinical research centers, 
and large “cooperative agreements” (U-grants). 
6. Past partitioning of  academic clinical medicine into specialty silos (e.g., 
cardiology, neurology, rheumatology, etc.) created compartments in 
which small groups of  highly motivated clinician-researchers can 
mobilize resources and personnel to tackle targeted goals, through: (i) 
multi-center collaborative trials involving many patients and subsets of  
clinical specialties; (ii) dry-lab approaches to understanding and treating 
disease; (iii) K-awards and other grants to convert MD-PhDs, young 
resident physicians, and specialty fellows into investigators who perform 
research in UCSF labs and clinics and go on to research positions at 
UCSF and elsewhere. 
For various reasons, all these advantages have proved inaccessible and/or 
less attractive to PhDs in basic science departments (see chapters 7, 8 and 10).
Administering research in the medical school and its departments and divisions. The 
School of  Medicine accounts for ~85% of  all expenditures of  UCSF’s cam-
pus (15) and is also responsible for most of  both its clinical income and its 
research. From the Chancellor, its Dean’s Office gets a modest portion of  
indirect costs on sponsored projects and distributes these directly to depart-
ments in proportion to the ICR each generates. Although the Dean has little 
or no direct clinical income, his office plays major roles in supporting research 
and teaching throughout the School. Fig. 9-1 diagrams six discrete sources of  
that office’s revenues and shows how that money was distributed among three 
uses: operations of  the Dean’s Office itself, medical education, and—most im-
portant—support of  programs (16). Most of  the $31M devoted to program 
support was derived from the Dean’s Tax and interest and investment income 
($25M and $17M, respectively; a dotted box in Fig. 9-1 surrounds those two 
sources). Although professional fees of  different departments are taxed at 
somewhat different rates (see Fig. 9-1 legend), on average this tax in FY2014 
came to 5.6% of  the $449M of  such fees, which are collected by the clini-
cal enterprise and distributed to departments in proportion to their faculties’ 
clinical earnings (17). 
In FY2014 almost all program support went either to clinical departments 
($13M, which included $6M in packages for recruiting department chairs and 
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$7M of  other purposes, including research and new programs) or to basic 
science departments ($17M). Of  these, the $17M for basic science is devoted 
to recruiting new and retaining current faculty, support of  selected research 
endeavors, some funds for PhD education, and making up arrears in the ac-
counts of  six of  the seven basic departments (18), which lack the necessary 
reserves and endowment income to pay all their faculty and administrative 
personnel (see chapter 8). In FY 2015, the annual “arrears” of  basic science 
departments will be defrayed by the Basic Science Funding Model (see chapter 
8), using dollars drawn from sources similar to those in Figure 9-1. 
Dean’s Office support for programs in basic science departments rep-
Fig. 9-1. Sources of  Dean’s Office funds and their use for operating and program support 
in the UCSF School of  Medicine, in FY2014 (16). Boxes (in the top row, and the third and 
fourth rows) represent, respectively: sources of  Dean’s Office dollars; large categories of  
uses, including operations of  the office, medical education, and support of  specific school 
programs; and four categories of  program support. The “Reserves” box ($12M, in the row 
just below the top row) represents dollars held in reserve (and earning interest) for use in 
future years. The dashed line around the Dean’s Tax and Interest and Investment Income 
boxes indicates the sources of  most program support. Of  this program support, $13M was 
used for clinical department programs and to prepare packages for recruiting chairs of  clinical 
departments. The basic science department category includes dollars for specific basic science 
department programs, some funds for graduate education, and supplementation of  arrears 
in department budgets for that year. [In FY2015, an amount similar to the last of  these items 
will be combined with some State Educational Appropriation (SEA) funds to support the 
Basic Science Funding Model, described in chapter 8.] The Dean’s tax itself  ($25M) represents 
the average 5.6% “tax” on professional fees of  $449M (17); in reality, different individual clini-
cal departments are subjected to Dean’s taxes of  different percentages, based on decades-old 
agreements between Deans of  Medicine and those same departments. 
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resents a bone of  contention for many clinical leaders and faculty. A senior 
clinical department faculty member told one of  the authors that many clinical 
colleagues fear that “the basic sciences are bleeding us white”—a fear based, 
apparently, on four perceptions: (i) the $17M is greater than the sum received 
by highly regarded, fiscally prosperous, and much more populous clinical de-
partments; (ii) the $17M is derived mostly from clinical professional fees, with 
no contribution from basic science faculty; (iii) UCSF clinicians’ salaries lag 
behind those of  their counterparts in other universities, while UCSF basic 
scientists earn more, on average, than most academic basic scientists (Table 
8-3, above, and see below); (iv) assignable square footage of  prime research 
space occupied by basic science laboratories on the Mission Bay campus is 
disproportionately greater than that devoted to clinical research (measured 
in relation to numbers of  research faculty, to sponsored research funds, or to 
indirect cost dollars (19). (For research space, see chapters 7 and 8, Table 7-4, 
and Fig. 8-1; its distribution has not yet been analyzed with respect to use for 
dry-lab vs. wet-lab approaches.)
Although we began by discussing dollars from the Dean’s Office, the 
Dean of  Medicine does not directly control research in clinical departments. 
Instead, “the departments, along with their divisions, determine the numbers 
of  their research faculty, depending on space and departmental income,” says 
a knowledgeable senior department chair (20). The Dean appoints depart-
ment chairs and may influence how much research space they control, but 
department chairs and division chiefs make all key decisions related to hiring, 
paying, evaluating, and retaining faculty. In this respect, US medical schools 
differ, he says. “In some other schools, the dean must approve all faculty hires. 
But at UCSF, research-intensive clinical departments, and often their divisions, 
function as distinct entities which may collaborate with one another but in 
many ways operate as separate silos.” Research-intensive departments include 
Medicine, Pediatrics, Pathology, and Neurology. Within departments, certain 
divisions (often bigger than small departments) are especially research-inten-
sive (21). 
Several clinical department chairs say their departments comprise “two 
separate economies.” In the larger economy, focused on patient care, faculty 
receive guaranteed salaries plus incentive supplements that depend on extra 
clinical activity, and participate modestly in research. In the research economy, 
faculty spend ~30% of  their time in clinical work, following the dictum that 
an active research program requires a 70+% time commitment; most (but not 
all) their remaining income is derived from research grants. Each economy 
is said to be governed by a wryly termed “eat what you kill” principle, where 
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“kill” denotes salary incentives for clinical productivity or grant dollars that 
sustain the bulk of  a researcher’s salary. (We shall return to salaries in a mo-
ment.) 
In practical terms, clinical departments and divisions derive their incomes 
from multiple sources. One source is professional fees earned by their faculty 
members, which are taxed not only by the Dean but often also by departments 
and sometimes by divisions; some units need pay no more than 90% of  their 
professional fees as faculty salaries, and so can devote the rest to other pur-
poses, while poorer units may devote virtually all professional fees to faculty 
salaries. Units are “rich” or “poor,” depending on: (i) the actual amount of  
their professional fees (among specialties, incomes differ markedly); (ii) abil-
ity to attract philanthropy (i.e., endowments from patients or their families 
may pay part of  the salary of  an individual faculty member, be devoted to a 
designated purpose, or serve as general support at the discretion of  a unit’s 
director); (iii) ability to attract sponsored research funds from private, state, 
local, and federal sources, including the small proportion of  indirect costs that 
trickles down to individual administrative units; and (iv) quite limited support 
from the state. Each unit uses dollars from these various sources to support 
multiple activities, including—in addition to research—unit administration, 
supplementing faculty salaries; improving patient care; teaching students, resi-
dents, and fellows; recruiting new faculty; and supplementing pay of  trainee 
researchers (see K-awards and research training, below). With so many vari-
ables at play, it is not surprising that research is stronger and better supported 
in some departments and divisions than in others. 
Similarly, it should not surprise that researchers in clinical departments 
disagree about the quality of  their research environment and its administra-
tive support. In response to our request to nominate projects and scientists 
for listing in Table 9-1, one clinician-researcher noted (22) that “big scientific 
discoveries don’t seem to be high on clinical department chairs’ radar screens,” 
and added, in a later interview, that “UCSF should squeeze the hospital hard-
er than it does” to support research and other academic missions. In broad 
agreement, another clinician-researcher (23) felt that the Teaching Hospital’s 
leadership must “buy in to research as an important function, not just as an 
occasional tool for implementing new ways to save money.” But “this they 
don’t do—at least, not yet,” owing to “the big gap between the medical school 
and the hospital.” Others take a more sanguine view, pointing to widespread 
success of  clinical department research and its ability to attract bright young 
people and make them into highly productive scientists. One leader argues 
that the “silo problem” has a potentially brighter face: compartmentation into 
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separate clinical specialties allows investigators to probe in original and inno-
vative directions, which can prove highly productive (24).
Faculty salaries. One reason clinical departments have trouble recruiting 
young researchers from other institutions, according to two chairs of  re-
search-intensive clinical departments (25, 26) is that UCSF doesn’t pay sala-
ries high enough for young clinicians to live in the ultra-expensive Bay Area. 
This problem, they agreed, also limits recruitment and retention of  clinical 
*Clinical department faculty (MDs only) in UCSF’s School of  Medicine (UCSF) are compared 
with MD faculty in clinical departments of  US medical schools (All), or with those in schools 
funded by public (Pub) funds or by private funds. Data from the AAMC (27). The AAMC data 
on clinical department faculty salaries includes neither faculty in the Schools of  Dentistry, Phar-
macy or Nursing, nor PhD faculty with primary appointments in basic science departments. 
¶Median values for total annual compensation are shown as thousands of  dollars per year, and 
include total income (before taxes or set-asides for retirement) but not benefits paid by the 
University. The AAMC records two classes of  income, Fixed and Total: fixed compensation is 
the amount fixed at the beginning of  the year and contractually obligated to the faculty mem-
ber; total compensation includes, in addition to the fixed/contractual component, bonus or 
incentive pay that results from achievement of  specific performance goals by the individual, 
the department, or the institution; examples may include bonuses from faculty practice plan or 
outside earnings limited or controlled by the institution. We show both classes of  income data 
here because in clinical departments they differ substantially, as the table shows. (In a previous 
chapter, the comparable table—i.e., Table 8-3—for PhD basic science faculty showed only the 
AAMC-defined total income, because in basic science departments the values differed by an 
average of  1% or less, at UCSF and elsewhere.) 
#Ratios are calculated by dividing UCSF’s fixed or total compensation for assistant or full 
professors by the corresponding fixed or total compensation for that rank in the AAMC 
category (all US, public, or private medical schools) shown.
‡Abbreviations: No., number of  faculty assessed in a category; $K, thousands of  dollars; 
UCSF, University of  California, San Francisco; US, United States.
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stars. Indeed, median UCSF clinician salaries are lower than median salaries at 
medical schools in places where living costs are lower, as shown for MD as-
sistant and full professors in UCSF’s clinical departments in FY2014, vis-à-vis 
those in other US medical schools, public and private (Table 9-3; 27). At both 
ranks, so-called median “fixed” salaries—i.e., those guaranteed for the com-
ing year—are similar at UCSF to those at public and private medical schools. 
But fixed salaries in medical school clinical departments are significantly lower 
than “total” salaries, which include incentive dollars earned by clinical produc-
tivity. By the “total” measure—most relevant for a person considering a new 
job in a particular city—assistant and full MD professors in UCSF’s clinical 
departments earn median salaries lower (by 7-20%, depending on the com-
parison; Table 9-3) than their counterparts in other US medical schools. (Table 
9-3 does not compare salaries for physicians in specific subspecialties.) 
Underlying causes for these differences in total salary are not clear. Does 
UCSF need to raise incentive supplements to clinical salaries? Or do San Fran-
cisco’s attractions, over time, induce an excess of  clinicians to look for jobs 
in the area, allowing the local market to hire aspirants at lower salaries than 
elsewhere? If  so, UCSF may have attracted young physicians at those lower 
salaries more easily in previous years, before living costs rose so rapidly (see 
chapter 7). Also, it is worth noting that UCSF faculty must somehow find ways 
to live in the same city, whether they are MDs in clinical or PhDs in basic sci-
ence departments. For the former, median total assistant professor salaries in 
FY 2014 were 60% higher than median salaries of  assistant professors in basic 
science departments; for full professors, the difference (18%) was lower but 
still substantial (compare Tables 9-3 and 8-3).
Clinical department researchers in the in residence series, which does not 
guarantee a university salary, earn much of  their salary from sponsored proj-
ects. One senior physician scientist, Kevin Shannon (28), sees proportionately 
large “soft-money” salaries as drivers of  “a virtuous cycle.” His division of  pe-
diatric hematology/oncology has 17 faculty members whose salaries are 60% 
supported (on average) from research grants. “As a result, we have 17 faculty 
to share a clinical job that might require seven, if  they saw patients every hour 
of  their work-day. That means we have extra time to pay careful attention 
to the sickest patients and to teach students and residents—a real win/win!” 
[Often expressing the opposite view, UCSF’s basic science researchers fondly 
recall an era (20 years ago) when they needed to earn only ~25% of  their sal-
ary from grants, and the state took care of  the rest; see chapter 8.] 
Clinician researchers and their chairs now confront a different threat, from 
the $181,500 federal salary cap—i.e., the maximum salary, set by Congress, 
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that federal grants can pay any grantee (see chapter 8). It does not materially 
affect academic clinicians, who can earn whatever the clinical enterprise charg-
es for their services. But clinician-researchers (and others) strongly believe that 
a satisfactory research program requires 70% of  a faculty researcher’s time. 
If  so, for a clinician researcher who gets 30% of  her salary for clinical work 
and the rest from grants, maximum “take-home” salary would be $181,500 ÷ 
0.70, or $259,571 per year—a number slightly greater than the $255,000 median 
“fixed” salary received by UCSF’s MD full professors, and ~$6,500 less than 
the $266,000 median “total” (that is, incentivized) salary of  MD full professors. 
The dilemma is straightforward: without a subsidy, one of  every two 
professor-rank faculty researchers in UCSF’s clinical departments receives 
more than the median full professor salary, and so cannot maintain her/his 
income from clinical earnings and grants alone. Half  of  all full professors 
(and a greater fraction in low-earning clinical specialties) are unaffected by 
the NIH salary cap, but the other half  must scramble to find that subsidy, and 
scramble harder if  they belong to a highly paid specialty. For now departments 
pay necessary subsidies from reserves, professional fees, endowments, and 
other philanthropy. But it is not hard to imagine a further arbitrary reduction 
in the federal cap (increased to its present level in early 2014, by barely $1,000; 
see chapter 8), and increases in median salaries are surely inevitable. In either 
case, like most other medical schools, UCSF will face a troubling quandary: 
should the institution reduce take-home salaries of  many clinical researchers, 
require them to derive more than 30% of  salary from the clinic, or subsidize 
their salaries with money diverted from different purposes? None of  these 
approaches is attractive. 
Wet- vs. dry-labs: how shall these twain meet?
Profound economic and organizational changes in US medical care drive a rev-
olution that is slowly transforming UCSF’s three central missions: not only pa-
tient care and medical education, but also research. Explicitly recognizing that 
revolution, UCSF’s new “Bridges Curriculum” for medical education (slated 
for implementation in 2016) will augment traditional “foundational sciences” 
(which gave their names to basic science departments, including Epidemiol-
ogy) with “emerging sciences (e.g., clinical informatics, change management, 
continuous quality improvement, metacognition, public and global health, 
systems engineering)” that are crucial for patient care in complex health care 
systems and for improving health of  populations (29). These changes in pa-
tient care also drive the growth and immense complexity of  the UCSF clinical 
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enterprise, with profound effects on research. In clinical departments, promi-
nent effects are expansion and growing strength of  patient-oriented “dry-lab” 
research. Here we compare and contrast wet- and dry-lab research and explore 
consequences of  the latter’s growth.
Wet-lab research. Until about 1990, almost all research in UCSF’s clinical 
departments focused on understanding the biology of  disease. In depart-
ments like medicine, pathology, pediatrics, and neurology, researchers eagerly 
jumped on the DNA bandwagon, with gratifying success in studying and de-
veloping therapies for certain kinds of  disease; other kinds, of  course, proved 
harder to crack (30). 
Moreover, as we might expect, individual silos created by clinical depart-
ments and their divisions may be better suited for tackling some problems than 
for others. In general, for instance, a particular silo may lack broad interactions 
with disparate experts needed to explore mysterious pathogenic mechanisms, 
like those underlying psychiatric disease or inflammatory bowel disorders. But 
the same silo, or a different one, may offer precisely the right focus and col-
laborative intensity required to explore therapeutic approaches, under either 
of  two special circumstances, when: (i) an anatomical site or a new technology 
provides unique opportunities for diagnostic or therapeutic advances—e.g., in 
electrophysiology of  arrhythmias, microsurgery, or radiologic diagnosis and 
guided interventions; (ii) disease pathogenesis is better understood and more 
amenable to truly translational research, as in some types of  cancer, infec-
tious diseases, or immune disorders (30). In this respect, rheumatology and 
infectious disease divisions in UCSF’s Department of  Medicine are unusually 
strong. Not surprisingly, these two divisions have also actively explored and 
contributed to collaborations with faculty in basic science departments; in 
other cases, collaborations are comparatively rare. 
Clinical departments and divisions have trouble fostering wet-lab research 
for two more reasons. First, most of  UCSF’s wet-lab clinician-researchers are 
home-grown, not recruited from other institutions, because (26): (i) the na-
tional “market” for wet-lab clinicians is weak, owing both to a dearth of  excel-
lent scientists and to their tendency to remain where they were trained, as they 
do at UCSF; (ii) recent increases in San Francisco’s cost of  living make it even 
harder to hire young scientists; (iii) clinical departments choose not to risk the 
substantial expenditures (start-up costs, salary, laboratory space) required to 
recruit a young scientist before her/his long-term success appears assured. 
This third possible cause is discussed further below.
Dry-lab research. As mentioned earlier, so-called dry-lab (or patient-focused) 
research in medical schools refers to many different kinds of  goals and proj-
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ects, all focused on disease and patients. These may include epidemiology of  
disease or injury in relation to environmental or other variables (e.g., smoking 
and lung cancer); clinical tests (from measurements of  uric acid or electrolytes 
to genome analysis) as markers of  diseases or their outcomes; implementation 
of  new management standards or therapies; clinical trials; costs vs. benefits 
(e.g., in dollars, distress, deaths vs. longevity, patient satisfaction, level of  func-
tion) of  diagnostic or therapeutic approaches. 
Patient-focused research has strong roots at UCSF, dating back to the 
late 1970s (31). It received a large financial and organizational boost in 2006, 
with a large NIH grant ($109M over five years) to found UCSF’s Clinical 
and Translational Sciences Institute (CTSI); by 2016 the renewed grant (2011) 
will have brought $112M to UCSF. Mike McCune, the CTSI’s first director, 
explains that clinical research requires more collaboration and longer delays 
between posing initial questions and getting good answers, and, because it 
focuses on humans, is based on less detailed biological knowledge and cannot 
perform certain kinds of  experiments. So, UCSF’s CTSI sought initially to 
establish training and infrastructure and build a coherent clinical and transla-
tional research community at UCSF within 15 years (32). Now a large part of  
CTSI’s grant (33) supports courses and other training of  young clinician re-
searchers and promotes independent creative activity by awarding small grants 
to young scientists to initiate promising projects. A third goal was to promote 
increased productive research interactions between researchers in clinical and 
basic science departments.
Of  these goals, expansion of  training has met the most success. To be 
fair, the Department of  Epidemiology and Biostatistics was already teaching 
courses in methods and practice of  “dry-lab” research, but these were expand-
ed and now extend to more students. Offerings include summer workshops 
and formal courses in statistics and epidemiology, an internship in transla-
tional research, mentoring of  individual clinical research projects, a master’s 
degree program, a doctoral program, and programs for clinical K-awardees 
(34). Former students in many of  these courses rate them highly; now, as 
clinician faculty members at UCSF, many use what they learned in successful 
research (see K-awards and training, below). The small-grant program has also 
made a positive impact by helping young clinical researchers. Efforts to bring 
basic science and clinical department researchers together gained little trac-
tion, owing to lack of  interest on the part of  some basic scientists, geographi-
cal separation of  the two groups on different campuses, and the irreplaceable 
roles of  actual conversation and mutual potential advantage in initiating pro-
ductive collaboration—roles websites and internet connections can never play 
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as effectively. 
The financial or space “footprints” of  dry-lab research in clinical depart-
ments at UCSF are substantial and have almost surely expanded over the past 
decade. Jeffrey Olgin, chief  of  the division of  cardiology (Department of  
Medicine), estimates that 50% of  the division’s faculty researchers employ 
predominantly “dry” approaches in their research; of  incoming cardiology fel-
lows, he says, 70% prefer “dry” to more biological (wet-lab) approaches (24). 
To our knowledge, however, no one has yet quantitated dry-lab vs. wet-lab 
science in any UCSF context. 
Nonetheless, as compared to wet-lab research, dry-lab research should ap-
peal to space- and dollar-strapped chairs and division chiefs for two reasons: 
smaller start-up costs; personnel costs and square feet of  research space are 
also smaller at the outset of  individual projects, although they grow if  the 
research succeeds. Medical students and many resident physicians, clinical fel-
lows, and would-be clinician researchers may also prefer the goals and meth-
ods of  dry-lab research, because it: (i) has greater relevance to sick patients; 
(ii) is more in keeping with their previous training; (iii) in short time frames, is 
more likely to succeed; and finally, (iv) requires shorter training than the MD-
PhD route followed by most wet-lab researchers, thus imposing shorter delay 
(by 4-5 years) before research independence is achieved (see training, below). 
Neither CTSI’s efforts nor dry-lab clinical research receive high marks 
from all clinical faculty, however. Three clinical aficionados and successful 
practitioners of  wet-lab clinical science all levy some version of  at least two 
of  the following criticisms: (i) bright young K-awardees may profit from CTSI 
courses, but the courses cost their divisions or departments too much money; 
(ii) the CTSI has not effectively improved UCSF faculty access to sources of  
“big data,” whether in terms of  genomes, specific mutations, clinical profiles, 
or any other information (one investigator opined that in this regard UCSF is 
far behind leading biomedical research centers); (iii) CTSI teaches techniques 
for assessing data, but does not try to teach students to distinguish between 
useful/interesting questions and dull questions of  the “me-too” variety. (Dry-
labbers expressed no opinions, and near-zero interest, with regard to wet-lab 
research.)
It is hard for non-experts (like the authors) to judge whether wet-labbers’ 
criticisms are correct, but it seems possible that wet and dry camps are pitch-
ing their tents on opposite sides of  a ravine that can divide them for some 
time. Such a ravine recalls a disturbing parallel gulf  between basic and clinical 
department researchers. 
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Training new scientists in clinical departments
Once upon a time, young science-inclined MD easily straddled the border 
between clinical medicine and biomedical science. But now it takes longer 
to acquire both sets of  complex knowledge and skills, as well as credentials 
necessary to certify them. After college, a young person may devote 18 years 
to preparing for a combined clinician-scientist career in academia, at age 40 or 
even older. The once porous border has become a series of  hurdles (Fig. 9-2, 
*The table includes K-awards received by individuals in UCSF’s Department of  Medicine 
from 2003 to 2012. Its data was derived from a survey conducted in 2012-13 and reported to 
faculty and leaders of  the Department in 2014 (40). 
¶This number includes the 124 awardees still at UCSF in 2013, plus 30 who left UCSF. In the 
interim, one of  the 155 awardees died.
§These include only the 120 awardees who remained in the Department of  Medicine in 2013.
‡Abbreviations: Clin-X, Professor of  Clinical X faculty series; DOM, Department of  Medi-
cine; HSC, Health Science Clinical faculty series; ORUs, Organized Research Units. 
#The total number for whom faculty series was listed (122) is between the 120 still in the 
Department of  Medicine as of  2013, and the 124 still at UCSF in the same year. We cannot 
determine the source of  this apparent discrepancy, but it is too small to affect materially tenta-
tive inferences from the series data (see main text).
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top bar): MD and PhD degrees, residency training, a specialty fellowship, and 
an uneasy period of  candidacy for full faculty status, signaled by receipt of  a 
five-year NIH K-award, also known as a “career development award.” 
Despite these exacting demands, hurdles persist, partly because many 
young people still take up the challenge: in the US, about 500 enter MD/PhD 
training every year, including, in 2015, 13 at UCSF (36). According to a 2010 
survey of  MD-PhD training at 24 US medical schools (37), about 90% of  
matriculated students finish MD-PhD training; of  the graduates, 81% remain 
in academia, where most engage in research; on average, ~16% opt for private 
medical practice. 
Medical schools have not effectively reduced the temporal burden on 
MD-PhD students, in part because making either a competent academic 
physician or a competent scientist is not easy. Judging clinical competence is 
straightforward, but it remains fiendishly hard to predict whether a budding 
scientist will succeed, and long-term investments in clinician-scientists are ex-
pensive. So, the university uses NIH K-awards to help decide whether or not 
to accept candidate clinician-scientists as full faculty members. According to 
the chair of  one clinical department (26), the K-award period provides a pe-
riod during which the NIH—first by awarding the K-grant and later by award-
ing (or not awarding) an RO1 research project grant—promotes or blocks a 
candidate’s success. “By ourselves we can’t judge quality or predict success 
well enough,” he added, so faculty candidates are judged by this “Darwinian” 
selection—even though departments know NIH’s judgments can be arbitrary 
and incorrect. 
K-awards defray only part of  the large cost of  multi-year auditions of  
candidates for faculty status. At the outset, clinical department awardees are 
usually adjunct assistant professors receiving ~$130,000 per year, of  which the 
K-award itself  covers ~$80,000 (~60%); once awardees transfer into the in 
residence series, which signals faculty status, divisions usually contribute more, 
bringing total annual salary up to $150,000 and sometimes higher, depending 
on specialty (38). UCSF’s clinical departments find that K-awards satisfactorily 
reduce the dollar investment they make. Indeed, they may pay (collectively) 
as much as $2M per year (= ~40 new K-awardees x $50,000) to first-year K-
awardees, over and above the K-award. From 2006 to 2013, UCSF’s scientists 
received 350 K-awards—40% more than the closest rival school (39). 
In general, MD-PhD students are thought to become wet-lab investiga-
tors, although a recent survey shows that a small but increasing proportion 
conducts more patient-focused research (37). In any case, the (mostly) wet-lab 
scientist training track has a formidable rival in clinical departments at UCSF: 
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* Between October 2013 and December 2014, CTSI surveyed all individuals who had entered 
its K Scholars program between 2005 and 2011 and had completed their K award before the 
time of  the survey (41). The 63 responders represent ~95% of  the individuals who fitted 
these two criteria.
¶Abbreviations: Assoc, Associate; CTSI, Clinical and Translational Science Institute; C/T, 
clinical and translational; MAS, Master of  Advanced Studies; MS, Master of  Science; No., 
number; Prof, Professor. 
§The five other degrees include: one Doctor of  Dental Science; one PharmD, Doctor of  
Pharmacy; three ScD or DSc, Doctor of  Science. 
#Non-academic biomedical research institutions constitute the “other” category.
‡Data in all these categories (Position, Effort (%) in C/T research, and Research grants or 
contracts) was correct at the time of  the survey. In each, the data shows the number of  
individuals and, in parentheses, their percentage within the cohort. Not surprisingly, awardees 
who entered the program earlier are more likely to have been promoted to the rank of  Profes-
sor and to have received more research support from the NIH and industry. Conversely, % 
effort devoted directly to C/T research tends to be somewhat reduced for awardees who en-
tered the program early, perhaps because older individuals gradually assume additional respon-
sibilities, while individuals just out of  training enjoy greater freedom to engage in research. 
¶¶The number of  publications refers to the median number published by all respondents; 
these are not divided with respect to cohort (year of  entry into program). The order of  
authors on a scientific publication often indicates whether an author wrote the paper and 
performed the experiments (first author) or is the Principal Investigator who supervised and 
directed the research (often last author): authors listed between first and last author contrib-
uted to the paper but were (usually) not primarily responsible for it. 
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to skip the PhD hurdle altogether, MDs can instead opt for dry-lab research, 
by joining the CTSI K-Scholar Program. This program teaches them dry-lab 
concepts and methods in courses on statistics, clinical trials, epidemiology, 
and health-care delivery and mentors each trainee’s efforts to develop research 
programs in her own specialty. During the entire training period, trainee sala-
ries are partially supported by individual K-awards or by an NIH K12 award, 
administered by the CTSI, and supplemented by the trainees’ departments or 
divisions. This shorter track allows trainees to become full-fledged faculty and 
begin independent research by age 35 or 36, about the age PhD scientists be-
gin independent research in basic science departments (compare middle and 
lower training tracks in Fig. 9-2, which presents rough time estimates; as noted 
in the legend, wide variations are not rare). 
Overall, UCSF invests substantial energy and dollars to recruit young 
people in its residency and specialty fellowship programs into applying for 
Fig. 9-2. Estimated duration of  three alternative routes to becoming an academic biomedical 
researcher. These potential routes, from top to bottom of  the diagram, include: in the top 
bar, Clinical Science, wet-lab [Clin Sci (wet)]; in the middle bar, Clinical Science, dry-lab [Clin 
Sci (dry)]; in the bottom bar, Basic Science, wet-lab [Basic Sci PhD (wet)]. Different stages in 
the transition from college graduate (at age 22; far left in the diagram) to faculty investigator 
(far right) include: four years for the MD degree; between 5.8 and 7.2 for the PhD degree; 
two to three years for medical residency (Res.); two years for specialty fellowship, which may 
include one year of  research training (Fe.); K-award; postdoctoral scholar (Postdoc, five to 
eight years). Time estimates for these stages are not based upon objective data, but rather 
upon conversations with researchers. It should be noted that the variation in length of  several 
stages is quite large—in some cases even larger than indicated than indicated by dotted or 
cross-hatched regions between certain stages in the diagram. More specifically: MD degrees 
usually take four years, but may be faster in MD-PhD programs; K-awards are usually for five 
years, but frequently overlap with faculty status at some point; residency training may require 
from two to five years; specialty fellowships from 1-3 years; probably the most variable dura-
tions are those required for PhD degree (6.5 years, on average, in the US; 35) and postdoctoral 
training (four to seven years, or even more). 
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Legend to Table 9-6 opposite page.
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and receiving K-awards. These investments have proved highly successful, as 
documented in recent surveys of  two groups of  awardees: (i) 155 K-award-
ees in the Department of  Medicine (DOM), 2003-2012 (Table 9-4; 40); (ii) 
63 CTSI trainees in its K-Scholar Program, 2005-2011 (Table 9-5; 41). The 
groups overlap (to a degree not precisely determined), but together represent 
~180 awardees and 50% of  all UCSF K-awardees during the years surveyed. 
Of  the 155 awardees in the DOM survey, 124 (80%) remained members 
of  the UCSF faculty in 2013 (Table 9-4). As suggested by their types of  K-
award, about half  of  these were trained in “clinical” research, probably with 
a substantial dry-lab component, while many or most of  the other half  were 
probably trained in wet-lab research. Ninety-nine of  those still on the UCSF 
faculty (~80%) were supported by research grant dollars in 2013, including 
50 (40%) supported by NIH grants. As would be expected, the early and late 
cohorts among them (whose K-awards began in 2003-2007 and 2010-2012, 
respectively) show a time-dependent transition from adjunct to in residence or 
clinical faculty status. Of  the 30 individuals who left UCSF for jobs elsewhere, 
24 (80%) remain in academia, and 19 are now associate professors (Table 9-4). 
The 63 graduates who responded to the survey of  CTSI’s K-Scholars (Ta-
ble 9-5) included 45 MDs (including four MD-PhDs), an additional 12 PhDs, 
and five with other doctoral degrees. At the time of  the survey most were 
active in academia, with academic ranks that rose as years passed after they en-
tered the program. Their ability to obtain research grants also increased: 96% 
of  the oldest cohort had NIH RO1 (or equivalent) grants. In all cohorts, most 
spend substantial proportions of  time in clinical and translational research, 
and publish results of  their work at respectable rates. By every measure, a high 
proportion of  K-Scholar program trainees became productive academics, 
with most of  their research focused on patients. (This survey did not record 
how many respondents were still at UCSF vs. how many took jobs elsewhere.) 
In summary, the bare facts in both surveys indicate that K-award training 
at UCSF produces productive scientists who make valuable contributions to 
the growth and quality of  research in the clinical units responsible for their 
Legend to Table 9-6 (oppposite):
These young clinician-scientists, interviewed by Henry Bourne, tell us how some K-awardees 
view their training experience. To help young physician-scientists speak frankly, the table does 
not reveal their names, genders, and specific research interests. Nonetheless, each un-named 
individual, from A to J, has read and approved both data and descriptions attributed to her or 
his code letter.
¶Abbreviations: appl., applicant; Asst, assistant; Assoc, associate; In res., in residence; Post-
grad., post-graduate.
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training. Those who depart for positions elsewhere prove similarly successful. 
Personal interviews with nine recent UCSF K-awardees (Table 9-6) con-
firm this group’s impressive quality and success. Before we discuss them fur-
ther, however, a few caveats: the number of  interviewees is too small to sup-
port strong inferences about all UCSF K-awardees; most interviewees were 
recommended to the authors by leaders of  clinical units, so their quality may 
be better than the average (at least in their leaders’ eyes). At best, the snapshot 
sketches in Table 9-6 add nuance to our picture of  the K-awardees’ experience 
at UCSF and suggest topics for further inquiry. 
The nine interviewees are bright and hard-working, with ages ranging 
from 35 (the youngest) to a few years past 40. Seven are in the in residence 
series, including two associate professors and five assistant professors; two 
are adjunct assistant professors. In addition to K-grants, three have their own 
NIH RO1, and most enjoy additional support from private sources or another 
faculty member’s NIH grant. Three conduct primarily dry-lab research, four 
conduct wet-lab experiments, and the remaining two take both approaches. 
All are MDs; four have PhDs also, and two have Master’s degrees. Eight came 
to UCSF years before the K-award (one as a medical student, three for resi-
dency training, four for specialty fellowships). Five are male, four female.
Transition from dependent status (K-award only) to RO1 funding— “the 
gold standard,” one termed it—marks independent “full faculty” status. The 
interviewees in Table 9-6 recognize the uncertainty and stress surrounding 
this transition, but handle it differently. At one end of  the spectrum, Dr. B—
explicitly rejecting second-tier adjunct status—transferred directly into the 
UCSF faculty from training elsewhere, with an RO1 and a K08 obtained soon 
after arrival. Dr. A, blessed with good mentors and committed to a specific 
patient population, moved steadily from one grant to another, and now has 
an RO1. Near the spectrum’s middle, Drs. J and H see real difficulties ahead 
but feel reasonably sure they can be managed: J, who never got a PhD degree, 
nonetheless appears on the verge of  getting RO1 support for wet-lab projects; 
worried about the RO1 transition, H pushes a hard project forward with great 
enthusiasm and energy. At the spectrum’s other end, Dr. C fears a faculty 
appointment is an unlikely outcome for a hard struggle mired in a “pyramid 
scheme,” while Dr. F appears a bit discouraged and not firmly committed to 
her/his project. In sum, their experience and prospects are those expected 
for six smart young people competing in a difficult race to a worthwhile goal. 
The three remaining interviewees, Drs. D, G, and E, raise a question that 
merits further exploration. A steady, thoughtful MD-PhD who has become a 
productive clinician-scientist with able and helpful research colleagues, Dr. D 
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sorely misses belonging to a broadly interactive scientific community and finds 
the unrelenting demands on an assistant professor at UCSF “very isolating.” 
Dr. G, also an MD-PhD, feels distinctly uneasy about pursuing science in an 
environment full of  intense, able, almost “manic” clinicians whose work pays 
part of  G’s salary; G harshly criticizes relative unwillingness of  clinical de-
partment leaders to judge and champion research of  young scientists in their 
departments. The third, Dr. E, has successfully applied for an RO1 grant but 
expresses anger at being immersed in a small faculty enclave (in a large clini-
cal division) whose other members are (she/he feels) indifferent to research. 
In different ways, these three individuals feel afflicted by scientific isola-
tion, and hunger for a community that shares intense commitment to science. 
Their perceived plights beg a relevant question: Is scientific isolation likely to 
accelerate or hinder scientific discovery? Nowadays, truly innovative science 
often takes place in communities that obsessively exchange scientific ideas 
and questions. Similarly, superb scientists seek environments that foster com-
munication and provide ready access to new notions and facts. On the other 
hand, three modestly anomalous interviews may not constitute a real trend, 
but could instead reflect random chance or bias (42). Because the question 
itself  remains significant, Chapter 10 will return to it.
Perspective 
This chapter shows gratifying success of  research in UCSF’s clinical depart-
ments, documented by rapid and continued growth of  external funding, sig-
nificant scientific advances, and attraction and training of  excellent clinician-
scientist colleagues. Most strikingly, these successes were achieved in the face 
of  real difficulties, by subtle jiu-jitsu that converts formidable obstacles into 
substantial advantages (Table 9-7). The jiu-jitsu magic merits further scrutiny, 
although its triumphs have not resolved every issue. 
Jiu-jitsu triumphs. One example is the predominantly bottom-up gover-
nance of  research in clinical departments, which reflects their relative auton-
omy in hiring faculty and financial control over many endowments, as well as 
professional fees earned by their faculties’ clinical service. One might predict 
that relative lack of  top-down prescriptive leadership would make it difficult 
for any large component (like clinical departments) of  UCSF and other large 
biomedical centers to navigate successfully through the rapidly changing ex-
ternal difficulties, fiscal and otherwise, of  the past two decades. Observations 
by a recent newcomer to the UCSF faculty, Jennifer Grandis, suggest that top-
down prescriptive control was not necessary. As new director of  the CTSI, 
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Grandis finds that UCSF differs from her former “hierarchical” academic en-
vironment, in which leaders exerted strong top-down supervision over most 
activities, to promote cooperation for the larger entity’s benefit. In contrast, 
at UCSF she finds a constellation of  groups who focus on developing and 
sustaining the infrastructure and resources they need to succeed. She had not 
imagined such small, highly independent units could thrive, or conduct such 
innovative and exciting research (43). Indeed, it appears that compartmenta-
tion into separate clinical specialties provides opportunities for investigators 
to ask and answer innovative questions, as another faculty member suggests 
(24). UCSF’s clinical departments and their divisions may often have mounted 
faster and more creative responses to rapidly changing challenges than would 
have been possible for larger, less mobile entities like the School of  Medicine 
or UCSF itself. 
The most dramatic challenges to research in clinical departments were 
tight fiscal constraints from decreased SEAs and flat-lined NIH budgets 
(beginning, respectively, in the 1990s and in 2004. In less straitened years, SEA 
dollars paid partial salary to a few ladder-rank faculty and salaries of  some 
administrative personnel, and NIH grants were easier to tap for sponsored 
salaries. Forced to make do with less of  both, clinical units turned to two 
fund sources: (i) professional fee income, which served as a lubricant, in 
modest amounts, to defend against small fiscal challenges to the research 
mission; (ii) private funding sources from foundations and philanthropic 
donors, endowment gifts, projects in collaboration with (or funded by) drug 
companies and others, and clinical trials. Without the funds garnered by these 
strenuous jiu-jitsu moves, research in clinical departments would have been 
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severely curtailed. 
In addition to shortfalls in research funding, increases in actual costs of  
research caused problems for every investigator, but especially for wet-lab re-
searchers who had to pay students, postdocs, and technicians, and for tech-
nical instruments and care of  animals. Clinical departments recouped some 
losses by further increasing their dry-lab research efforts, which do not involve 
animals or very expensive equipment. This jui-jitsu was strengthened by NIH’s 
swerve toward translational research and generous CTSI grants (UCSF’s first 
began in 2006) that trained more dry-lab investigators. 
As SEAs waned, a third fiscal challenge was to increase contributions 
from sponsored research funds to investigators’ salaries. The clinical depart-
ments’ tradition of  piecing faculty salaries together from clinical and grant 
money helped them to exploit “soft-money” salaries as opportunities, rather 
than suffer them as burdens. 
Another major challenge to the research mission of  clinical departments 
was to “grow” more clinician-researchers. The task was made harder by stiff  
competition for talented young people from research centers in cities where 
living costs are less, by the long period of  training for people who wished to 
become first-rate researchers as well as skilled physicians, and by the clinician-
researchers’ habit of  staying where they were trained. Here UCSF’s effective 
jiu-jitsu strategy was to invest heavily into expanding training of  K-award-
ees as an audition process for faculty candidates. Beginning just before the 
21st century, UCSF persuaded excellent residents and fellows to apply to the 
NIH’s expanding K-award program. The high dollar cost of  supplementing 
K-awardees’ salaries, paid over many years, added ~200 clinician-scientists to 
UCSF’s faculty, and train dozens more who conduct research elsewhere. As 
many as 50% of  the new faculty may be dry-lab researchers. 
In addition to K-awardees, UCSF’s clinical departments hired in the past 
15 years a substantial number of  “top gun” (often senior) researchers from 
other universities. This was a significant departure from previous practice: 
as one former UCSF leader used to say, “We don’t wander looking for stars. 
UCSF makes its own stars, right here, from assistant professors.” The actual 
number of  top guns hired (a dozen, perhaps?) and, more important, their col-
lective impact on the research mission are unknown.
Prevailing conventions in US medical schools sharply constrain UCSF’s 
options for attracting first-class researchers to its clinical departments. The 
habit of  recruiting most young faculty from home-grown K-awardees makes 
it hard to attract outstanding young scientists from other schools. Given this 
constraint, as a rational response to market forces the K-award system has 
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worked very well for UCSF. It is far from perfect, however, because of  the eat-
what-you-kill principle and Darwinian selection of  faculty from K-awardees 
who get an NIH research grant. These defects, as we perceive them at UCSF, 
probably affect most US medical schools in similar ways. 
Growth also produces problems. Despite impressive successes, research in 
UCSF’s clinical departments needs to learn how to manage internal conflicts 
and contradictions. The foremost problem: reliance on relentless expansion as 
the principal—or perhaps only—strategy for guiding development of  clinical 
research and the entire clinical enterprise. Expansion can also generate seri-
ous long-term risks. If  changing circumstances were to make it impossible for 
growth to continue at its former rate, its slowing or cessation could severely 
damage whatever has already been accomplished. Worse, expansion tends to 
blind its adherents to problems that accompany vast size of  any institution or 
business, including a university. In particular, UCSF’s bottom-up governance 
allows the clinical enterprise to be driven by internal momentum and decisions 
of  department chairs and division chiefs. Lack of  power over hiring clinicians, 
severely limits the abilities of  the chancellor and medical school dean to guide 
or control growth. Uncontrolled growth of  research in clinical departments, 
driven mainly by growth of  the clinical enterprise itself, may not be healthy, 
especially in view of  the federal government’s stagnant commitment to sup-
porting high quality investigation. While leaders may count on increased clini-
cal revenues to provide extra dollars to nourish research and other academic 
missions, a clinical enterprise indifferent to its effects on UCSF’s other mis-
sions could limit access to those dollars. 
Moreover, sheer size also expands facilities needed for both clinical and 
academic activities, leading to geographic separations that limit interactions 
among clinician-researchers, and with basic scientists. As remedies, UCSF has 
tried well-designed websites, CTSI, and sincere exhortation without conspicu-
ous success. Larger size also makes it harder to judge and groom young sci-
entists for faculty positions, by limiting commitment to mentoring, training, 
and evaluating the young (and replacing that commitment with the eat-what-
you-kill principle and Darwinian selection). Will such strategies preserve and 
promote creative and innovative research?
Other problems may not be traceable entirely to large size, but size does 
not make their resolution easier. Some of  these include:
1. Increasing construction and maintenance costs of  wet-lab facilities may 
weaken clinical departments’ ardor for recruiting and supporting 
biologically-oriented investigators. As clinical growth continues, will 
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departments and divisions reduce their commitment to understanding 
mechanisms of  disease and therapy? 
2. The silo problem. Some clinical specialty silos promote good mentoring; 
others do not. Silos appear to hinder interaction and collaboration 
among wet-lab or dry-lab researchers in separate units, between 
clinician-scientists and basic science department faculty, and between 
dry-lab and wet-lab researchers. Is anyone paying attention?
3.  “Soft-money” contributions from sponsored projects to faculty 
researchers’ salaries continue to grow, despite funding shortfalls 
and NIH salary caps, but may deter young clinician-scientists from 
conducting innovative research. 
4. With drive and ingenuity, clinician-investigators garnered more private 
research funding as NIH dollars declined. Still, philanthropy can focus 
on narrow goals, industrial sponsors may specify conclusions to be 
drawn from experiments, and both pay lower indirect costs. Can UCSF 
manage such pitfalls to preserve ardor for tackling difficult scientific 
problems and producing innovative new knowledge? 
 
Each of  these hazards shares with the others closely related dilemmas: (i) 
how to ensure uniform high quality in a large institution that expands in re-
sponse to external pressures indifferent to its core missions; (ii) how to pre-
vent remedies from being hindered by excessive size, widely separated silos, 
and bottom-up governance; (iii) growing size, per se, does not provide a truly 
sustainable funding model for clinical department research in the long term, 
as indicated by soft-money as the prevailing salary source, and uneasiness 
about the extent to which clinical income should help to finance research. In 
this Rubik’s cube each dilemma, issue, or remedy impinges on and constrains 
the others, and the cube cannot be solved by rhetorical flourishes and ruth-
less edicts. Instead, chapter 10 will propose complementary approaches, 
compromises, and experimental measures designed to move separate parts 
of  the cube in the right direction. 
Chapter 10
Skies uncertain as a child’s bottom: 
Proposals for change
This book set out to perform three tasks. The preceding nine chapters were devoted to the first two: (i) to serve as a primer for readers who 
want to learn how and where research dollars flow in a large center devoted 
to academic biomedical research; (ii) to show, in broad terms, how distribu-
tion of  resources within such a center guides and constrains investigators’ 
goals and training of  young scientists. The present (and last) chapter focuses 
on the third—and most difficult—task: to examine the prospects for UCSF’s 
future research enterprise and propose tentative approaches to improve those 
prospects. Although the book focuses primarily on research at UCSF, read-
ers better acquainted with other research centers will have already recognized 
many underlying problems shared by most of  these centers. Indeed, at least 20 
large academic biomedical institutions in the US share triumphs and difficul-
ties very similar to those we have described at UCSF. Each differs in details 
from the others, but the underlying challenges closely resemble those at UCSF, 
and present similar arrays of  difficult choices. Thus an assessment of  UCSF’s 
problems—and perhaps even proposals for handling them—may prove use-
ful to academic scientists and leaders elsewhere. This chapter’s primary goal is 
to ensure that these problems are recognized, investigated, and debated—and 
then, if  necessary, carefully managed. Although none of  the dangers requires 
emergency intervention, ignoring them could pose real dangers, and paying 
attention now may prevent later troubles.
By any measure, UCSF has enjoyed remarkable success for almost six 
decades. Successes in all its missions—patient care, education, and research—
resulted from a fortunate combination of  influences (Table 10-1), including 
an attractive city, bottom-up institutional governance, a fast-growing clinical 
enterprise of  high quality, first-rate science, and agile handling of  change and 
adversity. In the 21st century, UCSF’s research community is rich in cultural 
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capital, with a critical mass of  excellent investigators, but external problems 
(Table 10-2) threaten its ability to exploit exciting opportunities—greater to-
day than ever—for biomedical discovery and innovative advances in health 
care. This last chapter will not dwell on triumphs, which are amply recounted 
in earlier chapters. Instead, here we focus on problems and challenges that 
need attention, and propose institutional responses that may help to overcome 
them. 
We begin by listing major problems we see for research at UCSF and simi-
lar institutions. Some problems are large in scope, while others affect separate 
elements of  the research community; all, however, are complex and multi-
faceted:
1. Academic health centers already face financial difficulties in sustaining 
their academic missions, especially research. The difficulties are unlikely 
to lessen soon. 
2. Researchers in basic science departments are severely constrained by 
needing to pay ever-larger fractions of  their salaries from “soft 
money”—that is, from research grants—and by the fact that the names 
and teaching responsibilities of  their departments bear little relation to 
their scientific goals or subjects they teach. 
3. Clinical department researchers face similar constraints from soft-money 
salaries.
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4. Academic silos narrow the focus of  many investigators and limit their 
interactions with scientific colleagues.
5. Compared to their elders, young biomedical researchers are 
disproportionately disadvantaged with respect to salary, grant awards, 
and research opportunities.
6. Rapid clinical expansion and sheer size of  biomedical centers encourage 
arbitrary quantitative criteria for research excellence that ignore creativity, 
innovation, and impact.  
Before we describe specific proposals, caveats are in order. First, four of  our 
five proposals focus primarily on research. Second, several of  these proposals 
resemble those proposed by others. Third, none of  the proposals guarantees 
success, owing to potential fatal flaws we did not detect, incorrect diagnoses of  
underlying problems, and the sheer unpredictability of  future events. Fourth, 
as readers will quickly realize, these proposals are not directly keyed to the six 
problems listed above, because each problem intertwines with others. Rather 
than conjure neat (but imaginary) “fixes” for mega-problems, we proffer spe-
cific measures to ameliorate complex effects that reflect multiple causes; some 
of  those causes cannot be tackled directly. If  readers find our diagnoses and 
proposals wrong or inadequate, we urge them to devise their own.
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Proposal 1. A substantial General Endowment for UCSF
For decades, UCSF’s inherited anti-authoritarian ethos and abundant exter-
nal resources allowed semi-independent entities, large and small, to grow in 
directions and at rates determined by opportunity, energy, and creativity; free-
dom from repressive authority made it possible for individuals and groups 
to develop agile, fast-moving projects. As we have seen, control of  most key 
resources—including space (chapters 4 and 7); many revenue sources (e.g., 
grants and clinical professional fees; chapters 1-3, 7-9); and endowment dol-
lars (chapter 4)—is distributed preferentially to individuals (e.g., salary endow-
ments), departments, and divisions, relative to deans or the Chancellor’s office. 
This preferential distribution of  power and autonomy to individuals and semi-
independent units can hinder responses to challenges like those listed in Table 
10-2, which require concerted action by many units at once.
Unable to wrest substantial monetary resources from the state, existing 
endowments, or clinical revenues, deans and chancellors have a single alterna-
tive: philanthropy. The Chancellor’s “Infrastructure and Operations Fund” 
(IOF; chapter 2) squeezes some dollars from UCSF’s other endowments; 
while some of  these dollars will be needed to maintain fund-raising efforts 
that attract them, yearly increases of  $17M or more in the Chancellor’s endow-
ment payout will help to stabilize central administration and maintain ongoing 
programs over the next decade. 
Over and above the IOF, however, reinforcing UCSF’s top-down ability 
to respond to external challenges absolutely requires the kind of  financial sup-
port and stability provided by a robust General Endowment, like those avail-
able to many private institutions, but lacking at UCSF. The institution’s leaders 
have not actively sought donations to a substantial General Endowment for 
UCSF, but should do so now, for powerful negative and positive reasons. On 
the negative side, as previous chapters show, at UCSF in the 21st century 
research is inherently not sustainable from multiple available resources—e.g., 
state and federal government, collaborations with profit-driven private com-
panies, or margins earned by the clinical enterprise. Moreover, for a Campus 
without undergraduates, tuition and fees cannot begin to suffice. None of  
these resources are themselves stable and likely to increase sufficiently over 
the short or long term; while clinical revenues may appear more reliable, they 
are already inadequate to foot the research bills, and future health care funding 
remains in flux, to say the least. 
The positive reason for a General Endowment: unexpected clinical mar-
gins, accumulated or projected in fiscal years 2015-2017, provide several tens 
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of  millions of  dollars (chapter 5) to nucleate such an endowment. Clinical 
largesse may wax or wane thereafter, like the fat and lean kine in a Pharaoh’s 
dream (1), but within a few decades UCSF’s reputation and the energy of  its 
development office—plus a change of  heart among UCSF’s leaders—could 
increase the General Endowment’s principal to as much as ~$500M, produc-
ing annual payouts of  ~$18-25M. No one can know what the future holds, 
but if  UCSF had started to accumulate a General Endowment 30 years ago, 
by now the principal would come to several hundred million dollars—enough 
to prove immensely useful for strategic purposes. 
Obvious potential benefits of  such a General Endowment include en-
hanced fiscal stability, funds for flexible responses to stormy future economic 
conditions, and repairing (albeit only in part) effects of  unrelenting cuts in 
state educational support over the past 25 years. In addition, such an endow-
ment may prove essential for maintaining and enhancing UCSF’s capacity for 
innovative academic missions, from training researchers and clinicians to fos-
tering world-class research.
Proposal 2. A Basic Science Division to replace 
basic science departments
Many researchers in UCSF’s basic science departments are discouraged by a 
slowly worsening drought of  inflation-corrected research grant dollars from 
NIH (for them, a 10+% decrease over 10 years, while the NIH budget dimin-
ished by 22%; chapter 7), and by increasing pressure to support large fractions 
of  their own salaries from grants (chapters 7 and 8; see proposal 3, below). 
They also feel neglected: deans and the Chancellor, they feel, focus more and 
more attention on clinical expansion and its attendant problems, and less on 
erstwhile star researchers in basic science. 
This malaise may be a relic of  a governance scheme that has become ir-
relevant: UCSF’s basic science departments form a congeries of  fossil silos 
inherited from earlier decades, when department names referred to subjects 
taught to professional students. Consequently, 112 researchers who currently 
receive sponsored funds (2) are distributed among eight basic science de-
partments in three Schools, where they pursue administratively unconnected 
agendas, rather than negotiating ways to handle their common problems with 
deans and chancellors. We propose a logical merger of  these 112 faculty into a 
Basic Science Division (BSD), replacing the eight fossil silos with a half-dozen 
sections (not fossil remnants) within the BSD; sections could represent re-
search disciplines, graduate programs, or—in order to foster communication 
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across disciplines—by random assignment or location within UCSF. 
The BSD would take primary responsibility for managing material re-
sources, while a quasi-federal arrangement would allow the BSD and sections 
to share control of  academic appointments, rank, obligations, and privileges. 
The BSD’s chief  would be appointed by the Chancellor and deans of  the three 
schools whose faculty now belong to basic science departments. This chief, 
with a steering committee of  faculty and section chairs (3), would control dis-
tribution of  faculty salary contributions from UCSF, faculty start-up packages, 
space, renovation and construction of  facilities, human resources, post-award 
grant administration, and salaries for the sections’ administrative staff. Sec-
tions would contain approximately equal numbers of  faculty slots (subject to 
initial negotiations and deans’ discretion), conduct searches for new faculty, 
vote on appointments and promotions, negotiate salaries, and approve space 
assignments. All section decisions would require approval and funds from the 
BSD chief  and steering committee, and the BSD chief  would be a member of  
the Chancellor’s Executive Cabinet (see chapter 5). Overall, such an arrange-
ment would facilitate negotiations between leaders and basic science faculty 
and better align key administrative decisions with needs of  the basic science 
community. 
This short account cannot do justice to all complications and difficulties 
the new arrangement may entail. The knottiest of  these is identifying which 
basic scientists should be included in the BSD, and which high official(s) 
should oversee it. We propose that the BSD include all 112 members of  UC-
SF’s basic science departments (2). In FY 2014, only 58 (barely more than half) 
of  these received sponsored dollars (see Table 8-2 and reference 4) through 
departments in the School of  Medicine (Anatomy, Biochemistry and Biophys-
ics, Cellular and Molecular Pharmacology, Microbiology and Immunology, 
and Physiology), while 54 received their sponsored funds through the Schools 
of  Pharmacy (Pharmaceutical Chemistry and Bioengineering and Therapeutic 
Sciences) and Dentistry (Cell and Tissue Biology). A few faculty with primary 
appointments in basic science departments received their sponsored funds 
through ORUs, and are counted within the 73 ORU scientists with sponsored 
funds (Table 8-2, and reference 4); the laboratories of  these latter individu-
als are often located in ORU space. If  the BSD (and perhaps its sections) 
were to include the 112 individuals whose sponsored funds come through aca-
demic departments in Medicine, Pharmacy, and Dentistry, the Division would 
operate across school boundaries, in collaboration with both the Chancellor 
and the Schools. Its faculty would be subject to the BSD’s jurisdiction and 
rules—and, through their section and the BSD, to both their Schools and 
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the Chancellor. Although by no means tidy, this solution has a clear prec-
edent, UCSF’s Graduate Division. Despite administrative difficulties, a BSD 
including faculty in multiple Schools presents critical advantages for research. 
Including researchers and departments from all three Schools would give the 
BSD more clout in negotiations and spread its benefits to a larger number 
of  faculty. Most important, all BSD faculty would share common interests in 
wet-lab laboratories, fundamental biology, human biology, and pathogenesis 
of  disease, and no present basic science department faculty would be left out. 
Proposal 3. Targeted endowment(s) to reduce researchers’ 
soft-money salaries
The widespread need of  research faculty to earn large (and increasing) por-
tions of  their salaries from research grants poses grave threats to the integrity 
and quality of  research. Such a need saps researchers’ morale and makes them 
vulnerable to arbitrary decisions of  external funders. It also attenuates their 
loyalty to one another and to their institution; reciprocally, an institution that 
pays only small fractions of  salary to researchers is less likely to respect and 
care for them in other ways. Another threat is even more critical: for inves-
tigators who depend on each year’s grant dollars to feed their families, risk 
of  failure becomes unacceptable, reducing their willingness to tackle difficult 
questions or propose experiments that do. The inevitable tendency of  soft 
money to sharpen the danger of  small failures undermines the creativity and 
innovation that make first-rate research useful to citizens and patients. 
Although UCSF and its competitor institutions recognize these dangers, 
the sheer size of  their financial dilemma stymies effective responses. For ex-
ample, UCSF could never make up for the annual $148M in salary plus ben-
efits its researchers derived from external sources in FY2014, combined with 
the additional $60M in ICR that comes with that salary; together loss of  both 
the sponsored salary support and the ICR would amount to a total of  $208M 
(see chapter 3). Replacing that amount would require 5% annual payout from a 
(new) endowment of  $4.16B (5)—effectively quenching all ardor for “fixing” 
(or even for trying to mitigate) the soft-money dilemma. 
Our proposal is straightforward: UCSF should begin by mounting a de-
liberate effort to remedy soft money’s worst consequences, by jump-starting 
an endowment—of, say, $80M rather than $4B—to target small but effective 
amounts of  research support (Targeted Research Awards, or TRAs) to critical 
subgroups of  important research faculty. TRA arithmetic might go something 
like this: a 5% payout from an endowment of  $80M would earn ~$4M per 
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year. Compared to $208M, $4M seems an insignificant sum, but compared 
to the zero dollars presently available it looks better: indeed, it could provide 
an average of  $80,000 in hard money (or ~$62,000 in salary plus $18,000 In 
benefits) to 50 researchers every year. Where might 50 dollops of  this size 
make the greatest possible difference to UCSF’s research effort? First, let us 
identify faculty groups who should not receive these dollars, under at least four 
headings:
1. Because soft money salaries adversely affect researchers in both basic 
science and clinical departments (6), neither group should be exclusively 
targeted for TRAs. 
2. TRA dollars should not go to senior researchers. If  their research is first-
rate, they will prosper in any case; the money is less likely to change 
other seniors’ careers. 
3. Deans, department chairs, or division chiefs already distribute abundant 
support from other sources, but should play no role in distributing 
TRAs. 
4. Rather than support long-lasting professorships, TRAs should be 
awarded to faculty for limited periods that can make a genuine difference 
to their subsequent careers. 
Together these restrictions help to assure that no choices to target TRAs to a 
specific faculty subset should bolster strength of  existing academic silos, pre-
serve advantages of  older as compared to younger faculty, or make it harder 
for the institution to sustain its research mission over the long term. (Nor 
should a TRA ever serve as a substitute for support already supplied through 
traditional department channels.) Rather than depend on chairs and existing 
leaders to distribute payouts from the TRA endowment, communities of  basic 
science department faculty and clinician-scientists can devise their own criteria 
for TRA awards to their members. For instance, payouts from $40M of  the 
TRA endowment could pay an extra $75,000 per year to every ladder rank 
basic science faculty member promoted to the rank of  associate professor, 
for a six-year period or until she/he is promoted to full professor (7). Such 
mid-career funding boosts can accelerate innovative advances that will drive 
subsequent research careers. 
UCSF’s Department of  Medicine (DOM) just announced an In Residence 
Associate Professor Support (IRAPS) program (8) designed to augment in-
stitution-supplied salary for its research-focused associate professors in resi-
dence by $50,000 per year. Thus the DOM is betting that mid-career research-
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ers will benefit most from the supplement, which will relieve them of  the need 
to divert a similar amount of  dollars (in salary plus benefits) from sponsored 
projects. While one large silo, the DOM, was able to commit enough dollars to 
pay this institutional supplement for all its in residence researchers at the level 
of  associate professor, it is not clear that all clinical departments will be able to 
follow suit. In light of  this recent development, the proposed TRA program 
would presumably specify that its dollars not replace supplementary institu-
tional dollars already provided by a department; as noted above, communities 
of  basic science department faculty and clinician-scientist faculty would de-
vise their own criteria for choosing the subset of  researcher faculty members 
to receive TRA dollars. 
For prospective philanthropists, the proposed TRA endowment com-
bines academic innovation with an attractive research goal, fundamental bio-
logical investigation. Additional advantages of  TRAs for basic scientists, clini-
cian-researchers, and UCSF itself  might include: research faculty participation 
in a broad coalition unconstrained by silos, chairs, and division chiefs; using 
UCSF’s persuasive faculty to help attract endowment dollars that can directly 
improve their colleagues’ careers and their scientific environment; focusing 
UCSF and its entire scientific community on their mutual responsibilities for 
both academic change and research. Similar principles should apply to all of  
UCSF’s large endowments and philanthropic gifts (see Box 10-1). 
Would the TRA endowment and the General Endowment (proposed 
above) compete against each other for philanthropic support? Although we 
are not expert seekers of  philanthropic dollars, we strongly suspect the answer 
is yes. Still, proper management can moderate the intensity of  that competi-
tion and reduce its potential detriments. Different donors may prefer the two 
endowments’ distinct purposes: one aimed at benefitting all UCSF’s missions, 
another targeted to a specific problem that threatens innovative research. It 
might also be useful to link the two endowments, supporting TRAs from a 
Fund Functioning as Endowment (FFE; see chapters 2 and 4), as a distinct 
component of  General Endowment, which would constitute a permanent but 
administratively flexible support for the entire institution. 
Proposal 4. Redress disproportionate advantages of  
seniority vs. youth
Many young UCSF researchers feel their progress is slower than it should be, 
and disproportionately so in comparison to senior faculty. Available records 
did not allow us to determine whether young UCSF faculty receive propor-
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tionately less sponsored funds than in the past, but the national data is crystal-
clear: from 1980 to 2006, federal grant funding shifted substantially away from 
US medical school faculty in their thirties and toward senior investigators in 
their late fifties and sixties (10). The shift continues: US PIs older than 60 received 
12% of  NIH research project grant dollars in 1998, vs. 28% in 2014 (11). No magic 
can have rescued UCSF’s young faculty from this strong trend. 
Similar pressures weigh on biomedical research trainees (graduate students 
and postdocs) and young people seeking their first faculty research position 
(chapters 8 and 9). At every level, pressures on the young reflect fierce com-
petition for volatile (and diminishing) federal funds, decreased state support 
for faculty salaries, long scientific training, and—especially in San Francisco—
higher costs for housing and for educating children (chapters 1, 2, and 6-9). 
PhD students, postdoctoral scholars, and MDs or MD-PhDs with K-awards 
worry about long years of  training and financial difficulties of  starting a fam-
ily. Supporting much of  their salary from grants, young basic science faculty 
are troubled to find that their seniors often pay lower mortgages and renew 
Box 10-1. Endowment dollars can accelerate 
academic change
Large endowments to UCSF often focus on providing benefits to a single 
worthy element of  a larger mission—the research program of  a small subset 
of  faculty, students of  this or that School or program, care of  a particular 
disease or a particular class of  patients. Chapter 2 discussed one such case: a 
$30M gift, to which UCSF added a similar sum from one of  its own FFEs, 
was targeted to support for graduate students in laboratories of  its faculty. 
The cause was eminently worthy, and the dollars have certainly relieved hard-
pressed graduate programs and researchers from part of  the financial burden 
of  supporting graduate students (to a large extent, from research grants). Fac-
ulty researchers, along with the graduate division and academic leaders, failed 
to ask a crucial question, however: whether, in addition to relieving some of  
the costs, the endowment money could be used to enhance the quality of  
graduate education at UCSF (9). In our view, UCSF’s leaders, its faculty, and its 
development office, should never assume that lack of  dollars is the only defect 
an endowment can or should correct; instead, they should be constantly alert 
to the possibility of  leveraging a large gifts to produce necessary academic 
change. To make this happen, UCSF’s leaders would have to adopt this ap-
proach and deliberately apply it as often as possible. 
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their grants more easily. Sharing those worries, young clinician-researchers 
may also feel trapped in small enclaves, where they depend on often-arbitrary 
Darwinian selection by granting agencies while their seniors pay substantial 
portions of  large salaries from endowments and large clinical incomes. Local 
interventions to mitigate these problems will vary, depending upon whether 
the young scientists are being trained, looking for their first faculty positions, 
or growing their labs for the first time.
In addition to learning how to do research, graduate students, PhD post-
docs, and MDs or MD-PhDs all face two severe problems: financial difficul-
ties of  living (and sometimes starting a family) in San Francisco, and/or the 
long duration of  their training. UCSF is working actively to provide affordable 
housing for trainees (see chapter 8), but has not streamlined or accelerated 
their scientific training. If  bright young people keep coming into biomedical 
research, institutions will not offer shorter training paths to attract trainees. 
But for graduate students this attitude is short-sighted (see chapter 8), because 
training that may not be necessary delays their careers by about two years. 
One US graduate program reduced time-to-PhD-degree by 1.5-2 years and 
preserved its graduates’ competitive edge (12). UCSF could easily fund a small 
experiment to ask whether PhDs who graduate in 4.5 years get research jobs 
comparable to those of  graduates whose training lasts for 6-7 years (12). If  
so, students would flock to programs that offer a better chance of  becoming 
scientists two years sooner. Other complications can be managed (13). 
As K-awardees, young clinician-scientists must survive years of  work in 
a faculty member’s laboratory before NIH’s Darwinian competition decides 
whether or not they get an RO1 (chapter 9). The notion that NIH reviewers 
are better winnowers than UCSF’s established clinician-researchers may be 
correct, but only if  the latter are simply too busy or too lazy to do a good 
job. And the K-award-to-obligatory-RO1-award ordeal prevails in part be-
cause clinical departments and divisions prefer not to invest time or money in 
scientists chosen by supra-departmental or supra-divisional (SD/SC) consor-
tiums, because the chosen candidates may join enclaves they do not control. 
Nonetheless, a committee of  first-rate UCSF clinician-researchers could cer-
tainly choose faculty better than the NIH does, providing they can meet the 
candidate scientists and hear their research seminars. On a small scale, UCSF’s 
clinical departments are probably rich enough to devise and conduct an ex-
periment to ask whether a well-constituted SD/SC search committee can find, 
and UCSF can attract, one superb clinician-scientist each year, chosen from 
both visiting and local applicants. Over 10 years, four will probably become 
superb researchers, and most of  the others will perform excellent research—a 
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batting average comparable to that established by UCSF’s basic science de-
partments for decades. This experiment is worth a try. 
At a larger scale, of  course, as compared to established older faculty, 
young faculty clearly find it harder to obtain and maintain research funding. 
This is an excellent rationale for helping the best of  these young people by 
supplementing their salary and grants with TRAs, as described above. The 
total number of  available dollars probably will not suffice to help every wor-
thy young clinician-scientist in early years of  faculty service. If  so, it will be 
crucial—as a genuine contribution to salutary academic change—that TRA 
recipients be chosen by SD/SC committees, and not by barter/bargain nego-
tiations among chairs and division chiefs.
Finally, it is worth repeating that our limited, local proposals may help 
young scientists who represent the future of  research, but cannot relieve the 
underlying external pressures responsible for relative disadvantages of  young 
vs. older scientists: the competition for scarce research support, weak state 
support, long scientific training, and higher living costs. We do, however, urge 
senior scientists to remember when their own fledgling efforts were supported 
by their seniors’ generosity and by a system less severely stressed than it has 
become in the early 21st century. 
Proposal 5. Funds functioning as endowments to 
foster silo-bridging research
Creativity thrives when scientists exchange ideas freely, compare and share 
goals and technologies, and combine competition with collaboration. Squeez-
ing research into silos damps creativity by hindering communication. Consider 
three UCSF examples:
1. Intellectual separation. When the Department of  Biochemistry and 
Biophysics (B&B) regenerated its research in the 1970s, faculty in its 
turreted redoubts began to regard other basic science departments 
as entities justified only by fulfilling medical students’ need to learn 
their subjects. The DNA revolution of  the 1980s, however, converted 
B&B and the other basic science departments into a thriving research 
syncytium (13), and by the 21st century their former intellectual silos had 
become withered husks, ready to blow away (see Proposal 1, above).
2. Geographic separation. Once the basic sciences crossed the Bay to return to 
San Francisco in the late 1950s, clinical department chairs played major 
roles in fostering regeneration of  research in basic science departments 
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(13). But now basic science departments are more isolated from the 
rest of  UCSF than ever before, partly owing to their nearly complete 
relocation from Parnassus to Mission Bay in 2003. 
3. Administrative separation, by clinical specialty. Clinician-researchers receive 
scientific training, but their medical subspecialty specifies which 
department or division will recruit them to join the faculty. In 
combination with the size of  the clinical enterprise, dependence on 
dollars earned by delivering specialty care separates researchers into silos 
that rarely communicate with denizens of  other silos. 
 
Recognizing that multiple small silos are not optimal ways to organize research, 
deans and chancellors have tried to construct bridges between investigators of  
basic science and clinical departments, or among scientists in different clinical 
units. In the latter regard, such efforts—e.g., the Biomedical Sciences Gradu-
ate Program (centered at Parnassus), the CTSI, interdisciplinary seminar se-
ries, and modest research support awarded to collaborations involving two 
or more silos (see chapters 7-9)—have not been very effective, because small 
dollops of  money and seminars are no match for proximity, financial support 
from an administrative unit, or co-participation in clinical care. 
Silos will certainly always be with us, partly as convenient administrative 
tools, and also because their protection can sometimes encourage creativity 
within small groups. Still, it appears clear to us and to many researchers, that 
poor communication between large silos (e.g., basic science and clinical de-
partments) wastes opportunities for collaboration, while confinement within 
a small silo (e.g., a small division in a clinical department) can (and sometimes 
does) isolate and desiccate fertile minds. 
Accordingly, we propose that deans and chancellors cooperate with fac-
ulty to combat that isolation and desiccation by setting up small FFEs (dis-
cussed in chapters 2 and 4) to support research by groups of  faculty who 
reside in more than one department or division. This approach can be usefully 
fungible, in that endowment dollars for X research can open many differ-
ent kinds of  research opportunity: depending on X, such dollars could jump-
start nascent research, advance ongoing research, or bring disparate groups 
together to achieve shared long-term goals. Ideally, a thoughtful, imaginative 
dean could encourage such approaches by detecting and helping small nascent 
communities of  scattered researchers who have already had some success in 
coordinating their efforts with those of  scientists in other silos (15). While ex-
isting silos are loath to contribute dollars and effort to hoist researchers out of  
old silos and stuff  them into a new one, our imaginative dean would begin by 
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enlisting help from a leader in the small initial group, giving the imaginary con-
sortium a name (X, for “extraordinary”), and supporting X on a jump-start 
shoestring)—i.e., a small office and a part-time secretary (funded, perhaps, by 
the General Endowment envisioned in Proposal 1).
Then comes the pivotal next step: UCSF’s development office, with a 
dollop of  publicity and help from persuasive researchers in the initial group, 
launches a modest campaign to attract philanthropic dollars to support X. 
If  the campaign produces $25M for the new FFE’s principal, the ~$1.25M 
annual payout can: help X grow in directions guided by its researchers and 
the dean who started the campaign; circumvent UCSF’s formidable size by 
opening opportunities for X’s researchers to find expert collaborators in the 
institution; preserve the researchers’ relations to their original silos; and, fi-
nally, encourage other nascent research groups to transcend their silo-bound 
fates by cooperating with leaders to form consortiums Y and Z. If  the project 
either achieves its goal or proves unsuccessful within a pre-set period (15 years 
or so), the dean would presumably retain the original FFE and could apply it 
to a different project.
Can UCSF harness its clinical growth to sustain research?
We pose that critical question in lieu of  offering a concrete proposal for han-
dling three difficult and closely related problems: clinical expansion, the im-
mense size of  an institution like UCSF, and the (often unrecognized) near-
impossibility of  sustaining creative research by relying on the “margin” (aka 
profit) of  a clinical enterprise.
We begin with a straightforward fact: since the 1960s, UCSF’s clinical 
enterprise has expanded steadily, at a rate twice as fast as the growth of  its 
academic Campus (chapters 1, 7, and 9). As that growth waxed even more 
exuberant over the past 25 years, UCSF earned a glowing reputation for first-
rate clinical care across a broad spectrum of  diseases and technical advances, 
and delivered much-needed care to vulnerable populations in San Francisco 
and the third world. These achievements attracted bright students, many pa-
tients, innovative faculty, technology entrepreneurs, and philanthropists, as 
well as research funds from federal and private sources. Now, as UCSF Health 
merges with Bay Area hospitals and partners with primary care and other 
delivers of  health care, the clinical enterprise is projected to grow even faster: 
revenues of  the combined clinical-academic enterprise will soon surpass $6B 
per year—one third greater than revenues in FY2014, the index year chosen 
for this book. 
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The rationale for this accelerated clinical expansion: simple survival. In 
the rapidly consolidating US health care industry, the institution’s clinics and 
hospitals cannot “successfully vie for patients and contracts” without own-
ing or partnering with health-care delivery systems “whose cost structures 
are lower than [UCSF’s] academic medical center” (16). We have no reason 
to doubt this alarming survival rationale, but this book’s focus prompts us to 
pose a critical question: can further expansion of  the clinical enterprise pre-
serve the quality of  UCSF’s research mission? The proffered answer, in 2015, 
is yes: “[R]evenue from UCSF Health is, by far, the largest source of  flexible 
dollars that we use [for many purposes,] . . . and to support our researchers 
(with the cuts in NIH funding over the past decade, even successful research-
ers can no longer fully support themselves without help) . . . .” (16) Note, 
however, that this “yes” makes no claim that clinical revenue dollars will suffice 
to maintain research at UCSF. 
Indeed, blunt truths cast serious doubt on any positive answer to our 
question. First, most of  the increased clinical revenue from affiliating with 
additional hospitals and physicians does not and cannot provide “flexible dol-
lars” to support researchers—or any mission beyond maintaining the health 
care delivery systems required to maintain patient volume and contracts for 
UCSF’s academic medical center. More clinicians and patients generate needs 
for ever-greater capital investment in buildings, offices, and hospital facilities, 
plus pressing needs for housing more faculty, staff, and students. Second, the 
medical center’s revenues are already proving inadequate to subsidize research 
in either basic science or clinical departments at levels they clearly need. So far, 
no “business model” for research at UCSF has shown how clinical revenues 
can sustain it by paying the unrecovered indirect costs of  research for the next 
20 years. Even smoke and mirrors cannot produce such a business model, be-
cause clinical revenues are unlikely to grow fast enough in the foreseeable fu-
ture to pay all those costs. The upshot: academic research cannot be sustained 
without strong support from government and philanthropy. 
A third blunt truth is harder: although it may prove essential for UCSF’s 
future, clinical expansion inexorably diverts much-needed academic atten-
tion from teaching and research toward the myriad critical issues that arise in 
building more medical offices and clinical facilities and forging complex agree-
ments, contracts, mergers, and affiliations. Rapid responses to opportunities 
or threats require unrelenting energy and attention, so chancellors, deans, de-
partment chairs, division chiefs, and faculty necessarily focus less energy, skills, 
and attention on financially smaller, less alluring academic challenges, which 
often call for long-term remedies that cannot work without continuing deter-
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mination and efforts of  academic leaders, and their successors. 
In addition to separating clinicians, researchers, and teachers into en-
claves, UCSF’s growing size nudges its missions to define goals and assess 
effects in numbers (of  people, dollars, or assignable square feet), rather than 
on academic quality. A strong focus on quantity allows leaders to brag about 
UCSF’s gargantuan research engine and massive health system, but tempts 
them to recruit high-profile senior figures in the laboratory and the clinic and 
attenuates their once strong commitment to judging the quality of  research by 
investigators already present at UCSF. Examples: (i) emphasis on ICR/asf  as 
a primary criterion for proper utilization of  research space; (ii) allowing NIH’s 
reviewers of  RO1 grants to replace the local scientific community’s judgment 
for deciding whether a young clinician-scientist should join the faculty (chap-
ters 4, 8, and 9). 
UCSF’s leaders, not coincidentally, are the triumvirate that presides over 
UCSF Health (see Fig. 1-1b): Sam Hawgood, UCSF’s Chancellor and Chair 
of  the Health System; Mark Laret, the System’s President and CEO; and Tal-
madge King, Jr., Vice Chancellor for Medical Affairs and Dean of  the School 
of  Medicine. With respect to the research mission, however, these thought-
ful, able leaders appear so far not have confronted a daunting contradiction. 
On the one hand, clinical expansion will surely continue, owing to its own 
inexorable momentum, the strong belief  that expansion is necessary for the 
institution’s survival, and the fact that neither the Dean of  Medicine nor the 
Chancellor possesses the necessary power to control clinical hires—power 
that is exerted by the Medical Center and clinical department chairs (see chap-
ter 9). On the other hand, clinical growth not only poses its own dangers for 
research, but also—and more important—probably cannot supply enough 
support for research to make up for lost state and federal dollars. 
Faced with this contradiction, what should UCSF’s leaders do to make 
research a sustainable mission for their institution? Rather than offering a 
concrete proposal, we strongly urge that UCSF recognize this challenging 
contradiction and decide explicitly how, or even whether, to deal with it. In-
deed, our greatest fear is that UCSF’s leaders—especially those charged with 
stewardship of  the Campus mission—will inadvertently fail to confront the 
contradiction. As stewards of  the Campus, the Chancellor and the Dean of  
Medicine—along with the other UCSF Deans and most department chairs—
correctly see themselves as exerting enormous effort and distributing many 
valuable dollars to support research, which they sincerely consider a critically 
important academic mission. 
Nonetheless, it is fair to ask those leaders (and their predecessors and 
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successors) to take a comprehensive view, with a perspective longer than the 
next few years, of  prospects for research at UCSF. Such a view would compare 
what kind of  institutional support research will deserve, vs. the support it is 
likely to receive—30-50 years hence. As we have seen, state and federal gov-
ernment, volatile and fickle even in their occasional bursts of  generosity, offer 
ever-diminishing support for research; private industry pushes its own driving 
agenda; and philanthropy needs to be guided to think in terms of  decades and 
half-centuries rather than quick fixes. Deleterious results are already appar-
ent: researcher salaries have become dangerously “soft;” dollars are directed 
preferentially to silos and support senior faculty rather than broad collabora-
tive projects; major responsibility for judging quality of  young researchers has 
been transferred to external judges (e.g., at NIH); older investigators gradually 
accrue more and more power, autonomy, and research dollars; institutional 
support for recruiting, training, and fostering careers of  young scientists be-
comes less stable; and working scientists (in both basic science and clinical 
departments) frequently complain that the institution focuses most of  its at-
tention elsewhere. 
This book’s introduction described a past half-century during which no 
academic health center could aspire to a national leadership role without a 
primary commitment to research. Indeed, UCSF made itself  a national leader 
by its stewardship of  biomedical research as the essential life-blood of  the 
institution. Now, in sharp contrast, UCSF’s stewards may fail to assess accu-
rately the future prospects for its research mission. Such an assessment failure 
can produce unexpected and undesired long-term consequences. One such 
consequence might be to consign innovative research at UCSF, once valued as 
the institution’s life-blood, to protracted entropic decline. 
Alternatively, the institution’s leaders could decide to undertake a careful 
and objective assessment of  the prospects for funding a truly first-rate research 
enterprise over the coming 30-50 years. Such an assessment would not be an 
easy undertaking, but only in part because it would have to compete against 
expansion and its demands for attention of  UCSF’s leaders. Suppose, instead, 
that a genuinely hard-nosed assessment shows it is quite unlikely that UCSF’s 
clinical enterprise and philanthropy can combine to support first-rate research 
over the long term: truly hard decisions would then become unavoidable. It 
would be lovely, of  course, if  that assessment were to indicate that UCSF can 
find a way to sustain vigorous, innovative research over the long run. If  so, the 
successful model may require some combination of: deliberately contracting 
certain local research commitments in order to preserve others; copious and 
well-directed philanthropy; out-competing other academic centers for govern-
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ment support; judicious management of  collaborations with the health-care 
industry; and extraordinary luck (one of  UCSF’s real specialties!). In any case, 
we strongly urge that such an assessment be made, soon. 
These are tall orders indeed! Time will tell. 
UCSF’s future prospects
We began this book by highlighting UCSF’s conflicts between extravagant 
hopes and harsh realities. Focusing almost exclusively on the institution’s re-
search mission, this chapter has proposed five potentially useful responses 
to today’s realities: a General Endowment; a Basic Science Division; TRA 
endowment(s) to reduce soft-money salaries; measures to redress disadvan-
tages of  young vs. senior scientists; and FFEs to support silo-bridging re-
search. As we warned at the outset, our proposals do not strike deep into the 
core of  every danger UCSF faces. This is because many problems are external 
to UCSF and thus beyond its control, and core internal issues, like clinical ex-
pansion and long-term sustainability of  research, are too complex and multi-
faceted to be tackled successfully by any proposals we dare to make. 
While our proposals for UCSF may not precisely fit challenges familiar to 
readers whose academic homes are elsewhere, careful consideration will reveal 
similar dilemmas and suggest parallel proposals to deal with them. Whether 
or not UCSF and its denizens choose to ignore our proposals, the institution’s 
momentum and internal strengths will keep it moving forward, nonetheless. 
We think our proposals are worth considering because they harness UCSF’s 
capacity for imaginative and effective responses to troubles and crises, some 
of  which were harder to handle than those it faces today. The first such re-
sponse, 50 years ago, ousted a chancellor in order to establish research as a 
guiding mission (14). Others include effective handling of  San Francisco’s 
sudden AIDS epidemic in the 1980s (17); converting department-based PhD 
training into multi-disciplinary biomedical graduate programs (14); and the 
hospitalist strategy to improve in-patient care in large medical centers (18). 
Today no one can predict what will happen to the US medical care system, 
academic biomedicine, research funding, or UCSF and its research. Nonethe-
less, we hope UCSF’s intrinsic grit, accumulated cultural capital, institutional 
creativity, and capacity for sheer good luck will enable its research mission to 
meet many of  its challenges, internal and external. 
Late-breaking news
As this book was going to press, we learned of  several developments at UCSF that are directly relevant—although in no way motivated by—our 
then unpublished proposals for future change. Time is limited, so we describe 
these only briefly:
1. The Chancellor’s office is starting to seek dollars for a general 
endowment (see chapter 10), to be called the Chancellor’s Fund for the 
Future. Although this fund has not yet been widely promoted, it is being 
discussed with potential donors. 
2. UCSF recently instituted a Physician Scientist Scholar Program, which 
resembles and significantly extends our proposal in chapter 10. The 
idea originated in the Department of  Medicine, but was adopted by 
the School of  Medicine Dean’s office. It provides five years of  research 
support, for a total of  $1.25M, for one or two outstanding new clinician-
scholars each year, in any of  the School’s departments. Scholars are 
chosen by a Steering Committee of  faculty from multiple departments. 
Each scholar’s department takes responsibility for paying her or his 
salary.
3. From the outset, the School of  Medicine anticipated future changes in 
the Basic Science Funding, based on experience with each previous 
version of  the Model. Extensive revision of  the Model, effective in 
2016, has corrected or decreased many, but not all, of  the financial 
deficiencies we pointed out in chapter 8. 
4. UCSF is actively taking steps (publicly announced in January, 2016) to 
address the housing shortage problems that we mention, by expanding 
housing opportunities in the Mission Bay area for its students and junior 
faculty.  
As is always the case, many additional changes are “in the works” at UCSF, but 
have not yet ripened enough to merit discussion.  
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15. SC Johnston, S Desmond-Hellmann, S Hauser, E Vermillion, N Mia, Predictors 
of  negotiated NIH indirect rates at US institutions. PLoS ONE 10.1371/
journal.pone.0121273, pub 20 March 2015. Web 3 April 2015 at http://
journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0121273 .
16. This was a 2012 agreement between Wallace Chan, Direc-
tor of  Cost Accounting Administration, DHHS, and then 
UCSF Vice Chancellor of  Finance Eric Vermillion.
17. UCSF reviews this rate when it re-negotiates its federal rates and sets it based 
on market experience. The rate in FY 2014 was set in 2012 by then UCSF 
Vice Chancellor of  Finance Eric Vermillion, as noted in reference 16.
18. Nominal NIH budgets in those two years were $23.1B and $30.1B, respectively; 
in 2003 dollars (see 19, below), the 2014 figure would be $21.3B, which is 78.5% 
of  the nominal 2003 NIH budget—that is, less by 21.5%. NIH appropriations 
are listed in NIH History of  Congressional Appropriations, Fiscal Years 2000-
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2014. Web 10 April 2015 at http://officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/pdfs/FY16/
Approp%20%20History%20by%20IC%20through%20FY%202014.pdf  .
19. Biomedical Research and Development Price Index, 1950-pres-
ent. Web 10 April 2015 at http://officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/
pdfs/FY16/BRDPI_Values_for_2014_2020.pdf  .
20. As shown in Tables 3-2 and 3-3, in FY2014 unrecovered indi-
rect costs on federally- or non-federally funded research were, 
respectively, 16 cents per TDC dollar (= $82/507) or 29 cents per 
TDC dollar ($82/288). The difference (= 29-16) is 13 cents.
21. C Kerr, The Uses of  the University. Cambridge MA, Harvard Univ 
Press, 1963. It is certainly true that US universities supported sig-
nificant research in the first half  of  the 20th century, but in relative 
terms their research efforts grew much larger after World War II.
22. B Alberts, Overbuilding research capacity. Science 329:1257, 2010. Web 6 
April 2015, at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/329/5997/1257.
full?sid=a0a48272-a1ea-4f4a-b8df-8116af52394f  .
Chapter 4
1. Assignable square feet leaves out hallways and utility space that can-
not be used academic or clinical purposes. The definition of  asf  
devoted to research also specifically excludes space that is not used for 
research—i.e., space devoted primarily to clinical care, teaching, etc.
2. Associate Vice Chancellor—Budget and Resource Management. Sum-
mary of  UCSF Space Utilization, December 2015. Web 29 February 
2016, at http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/4-2_
AVC_BRM_Summary_of_UCSF_Space_December_2015.pdf  .
3. Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost, UCSF. Campus Administrative 
Policies: Space Governance and Principles. Policy No. 600-24. 2013. 
Web October 30, 2015, at http://policies.ucsf.edu/policy/600-24 .
4. Email to one of  the authors, October 31, 2015, from Daniel Low-
enstein, Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost, UCSF.
5. The following brief  history is based on the experience of  Eric Vermil-
lion, who joined UCSF’s planning and budget staff  in 1979 and 
rose to serve as Associate Vice Chancellor for Budget and Finance 
in 2003, and as Vice Chancellor for Finance (2010-13).
6. Associate Vice Chancellor—Budget and Resource Management, UCSF. 
Mission Bay Capital Funding Plan: Source of  Funds. Web 29 February 
2016, at http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/4-6_AVC_
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BRM_UCSF_MissionBay_Capital_Funding_Plan.pdf  . The data is from 
the latest update of  this plan, dated February 25, 2016. Tables 4-3 and 
4-4 include only data from parts of  the plan whose status was complete 
on that date, and thus omit all “pending” or “programming” items.
7. See chapter 2 and reference 13 of  that chapter.
8. State funds in 2009 paid for a $35M capital improvement for Telemedicine and 
PRIME-US Education Facilities (see Telemedicine project funding authoriza-
tion. Web 29 February 2016, at http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/
files/wysiwyg/4-8_UCSF_Telemedicine_Project_Funding_Authorization.
pdf  ). In 2015, UCSF received the first payment (of  a total that will come 
to $21.7M) from UC for seismic retrofit and renovation of  the Clinical 
Sciences Building on the Parnassus Campus (see AB 94 info CSB project 
2015.pdf  (Web 1 March 2016, at http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/
files/wysiwyg/4-8_AB_94_UCSF_CSB_project_funding_authorization.
pdf  ). Funds for both these projects were paid from State Bonds for UC.
9. Associate Vice Chancellor—Budget and Resource Management, UCSF. 
Overview of  UCSF Debt. December 8, 2015. Web 29 February 2016, 
at http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/4-9_AVC_
BRM_Overview_of_UCSF_Debt_extract_December2015.pdf  .
10. UCSF. Long Range Development Plan (LRDP). Web 8 November 
2015 at http://www.ucsf.edu/about/cgr/current-projects/lrdp .
11. B Alberts, Overbuilding research capacity. Science 329:1257, 
2010. Web 6 April 2015, at http://www.sciencemag.org/
content/329/5997/1257.full?sid=a0a48272-a1ea-4f4a-b8df-
8116af52394f  . We also cited Alberts’s editorial in chapter 3.
12. UCSF A-88 agreement with DHHS (Division of  Cost Allocation), 
Exhibit A, page 1, Organized Research on-campus cost components 
{July 2013-June 2104), dated May 23, 2102. Web 29 February 2016, 
at http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/4-12_
AVC_BRM_UCSF_A88_Agreement_Exhibit_A_page_1.pdf  .
13. During this period, one of  the authors, Eric Vermillion, was 
responsible for the financial analysis UCSF used in deciding 
whether to build such facilities. See reference 5, above.
14. California state legislator John Garamendi sponsored the bill, which 
is Section 15820.21 of  the California Government Code.
15. One might wonder why the University of  California would need to have a law 
passed to be able to use its own revenue. The reason is based on a long standing 
agreement between the University and the State that UC would use a portion of  
its ICR to subvent (or in a sense, pay back) the State educational appropriation, 
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based on a negotiated formula. Once an agreement becomes part of  the State 
Budget Act, it becomes law and therefore requires a new law to change it.
Chapter 5
1. Interim Senior Vice Chancellor, Finance and Administration, UCSF. 
UCSF Financial Plan. October 27, 2015. Web 29 February 2016, at 
http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/5-1_Interim_
SVC_FandA_UCSF_Financial_Plan_Fall_October2015.pdf  . 
2. Associate Vice Chancellor, Finance, UCSF. Mission Bay Capital Funding 
Plan: Source of  Funds. Web 29 February 2016, at http://brm.ucsf.
edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/5-2_AVC_BRM_UCSF_Mis-
sion_Bay_Capital_Funding_Plan.pdf  . See also Fig. 4-3, above. 
3. Joint committee meeting on grounds and buildings, UC Regents meeting, 
September 16, 2010. Amendment to the UCSF capital improvement budget 
for new UCSF medical center facility at Mission Bay. Web 13 January 2016, 
at http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/minutes/2010/joint9.pdf  .
4. UCSF Long Range Development Plan. November 2014. Web 29 Febru-
ary 2016, at https://www.ucsf.edu/cgr/cgr-projects/lrdp .
5. UCSF Annual Financial Schedules (1979). Web 29 Febru-
ary 2016, at http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/
wysiwyg/2-6_UCSF_Annual_Financial_Schedules_1979.pdf  .
6. Email to Eric Vermillion on January 14, 2016 from Debora Obley, 
Associate Vice President, Budget Analysis and Planning, University of  
California, Office of  the President (UCOP). Getting the data for FY 
1971 required a search through paper records in the UCOP library.
7. As recalled by Eric Vermillion, then a member of  the UCSF Chancellor’s 
Budget & Planning staff, and subsequently UCSF Vice Chancellor Finance. 
8. A subvention, a term of  art in governmental operations, occurs when one 
government entity “grants” funds to another in support of  a specific purpose. 
While the term does not always imply deception, this use of  ICR to subvent the 
SEA did manage to deceive some faculty and officials, although understanding 
how it did so requires close attention. Because the state of  California wanted 
UC to use some of  the (then) new ICR to offset its costs in supporting the 
University, a formulaic way to accomplish this was devised in the 1960s. Even 
today, UC continues to “subvent” the State General Funds appropriation with 
what it terms “UC General Funds,” which include ICR. For decades, such 
subvented funds were contained within the amount of  the State budget each 
campus received (i.e., what UCSF calls the SEA), allocated by the UC Presidents 
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Office. Unaware that some of  their own ICR was included in the total, most 
UC staff  and faculty thought that all the money in their allocated portion 
of  “State General Funds” (known as “19900 funds,” in Campus parlance) 
came from the state, but that was not the case. Only in the past five years or 
so, when the great recession put extreme stress on UC funding and the state 
cut almost a billion dollars from the UC budget, did UC uncouple its UC 
General Funds from the State General Funds, so that campuses could keep all 
their earned ICR revenues. While each campus is still required to contribute 
a dollar amount of  its own revenues as a share of  the state subvention, now 
campuses can choose what color of  money they use for the subvention.
9. As UCSF preferred, the formula allocated ~20% of  each year’s ICR to each 
campus, in proportion to the ICR it earned. But the remaining ~80% was 
split, of  which slightly more than half  went to the UC General Fund (to 
subvent state funds; see reference 10, above), while the rest was allocated 
to campuses according to criteria—for instance, numbers of  undergradu-
ate students per campus—quite unrelated to either research or ICR. 
10. For the 27.7% rate, see Associate Vice Chancellor–Budget & Resource 
Management. UCSF History of  Federal Negotiated F&A Rates–Organized 
Research. Web 29 February 2016, at http://brm.ucsf.edu/follow-money-
financing-research-ucsf-references . For current rates at a range of  research 
universities, see SC Johnston, S Desmond-Hellmann, S Hauser, E Vermillion, 
N Mia, Predictors of  negotiated NIH indirect rates at US institutions. PLoS 
ONE 10.1371/journal.pone.0121273, pub 20 March 2015. Web 3 April 2015 at 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0121273 .
11. Campus Core funds currently include ICR, the SEA, investment 
income, tuition and fees, and income from auxiliaries such as 
housing, parking and recreation, plus patent income and some 
endowment income, gifts and certain internal assessments. 
12. For the change in state funding between 1991 and 1995, see UCSF Annual 
Financial Reports for those years. With respect to the regulatory changes that 
affected what the university could charge as direct costs, note that these changes 
were not described in Chapter 3, which focused instead on indirect costs. 
13. One of  the authors (HRB) vividly remembers this occasion.
14. A major assumption in operational planning for the Mission Bay research 
campus was that state funds would provide an annual allocation of  ~$14M 
(that is, $14 per square foot times approximately a million asf), to help defray 
costs of  maintenance, utilities, and operations costs for eligible facilities. 
Longstanding agreements obligated the state to fund a share of  the operations, 
maintenance and utility costs of  UC buildings determined “eligible” for state 
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support, including teaching facilities, support facilities and research facilities. As 
economic problems persisted through the 1990s and the 2000s, however, the 
State (and the UC President’s office, which sets funding priorities for all UC) 
increasingly backed away from many funding commitments. So, in this case, 
and with the state’s agreement, only teaching-related facilities (needed for UC’s 
increased enrollment of  undergraduate students) would receive either capital 
funds or operations, maintenance and utility funds during these years. Funds 
for new research facilities have not been reinstated. A few exceptions in UCSF’s 
favor should be noted: (i) state funds were provided for a small portion of  the 
Genentech Hall building at Mission Bay, based on a long standing agreement to 
fund replacement space for an older building at Parnassus; (ii) state funds for 
maintenance and utilities were also provided for a portion of  the QB3 building 
(Byers Hall), because it was built at the State’s insistence under the earlier Cali-
fornia Institutes for Science and Innovation Initiative. Even for these buildings, 
the state provided only ~50% of  capital, maintenance, and utility funds—thus 
further underlining the state’s lack of  reliability as a financial partner.
15. The firm, Kaufmann-Hall, was nationally known for developing financial 
modeling tools for medical centers, but had not previously produced models 
that incorporated the financial eccentricities of  a university engaged in 
teaching and research, with accounting rules different from those required 
of  medical centers. The silo-based models were driven by federal regula-
tions requiring different sets of  books for hospitals and universities.
16. Vice Chancellor–Finance, UCSF. Report on Operational Excellence and Depart-
mental Budget Savings, August 1, 2013. Web 29 February 2016, at http://
brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/5-16_VC_Finance_UCSF_
Report_on_Operational_Excellence_and_Budget_Savings_August_2013.pdf  . 
17. The EBC’s membership has remained constant, but principal financial officers 
of  each Control Point have joined the group as an ex-officio associates, 
allowing both principal Control Point officers and their financial right hands 
to participate in EBC discussions. This change led later to formation of  a 
committee (now called the Budget and Investment Working Group), composed 
of Control Point financial officers, their seconds, and the Chancellor’s Budget 
and Resource Management staff. The latter group hashes out nitty-gritty 
details of  problems, proposals, technical solutions, and implementation 
mechanisms, along with more detailed discussion of  details of  financial reports. 
18. Interim Senior Vice Chancellor, Finance and Administration, UCSF 
Financial Plan Fall 2015, Oct 13, 2015. Web 29 February 2061, at http://
brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/5-18_Interim_SVC_
FandA_UCSF_Financial_Plan_Fall_October_2015.pdf  . The final Annual 
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Financial Report may not be available before this book goes to press.
19. For instance, a budget bill signed into law on 18 December 2015 gives the NIH 
a 6% increase in funds for 2016, relative to 2015. But this, the first substantial 
raise in more than a decade, does not quite recoup losses in constant NIH 
dollars since 2003, and the “deal struck in October by legislators and [President] 
Obama provides almost no room for further boosts in 2017.” S Reardon, C 
Cesar, H Lebford. US biomedicine nets budget win. Nature 528: 446 (2015).
Chapter 6
1. Associate Vice Chancellor—Budget and Resource Management, UCSF. 
2014 Annual Financial Report Overview, October 21, 2014. Web 29 
February 2016, at http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/
wysiwyg/1-1_Annual_Financial_Report_Overview_October_2014.pdf  . 
Instead of  citing the subsequently published official Financial Report for 
that year (which we have cited in multiple previous chapters—for instance, 
reference 3 in chapter 1), we cite the overview, which contains headcount 
information, which is correct but not included in the later version. 
2. The UC retirement system had been more than 100% funded for several decades, 
and for two decades the plan had received no employee or employer contribu-
tions. As a consequence of  the 2001-04 “dot.com” recession, followed by the 
2008 ‘great’ recession, the UC system was forced to begin requiring both types 
of  contributions again, because the retirement system’s projected funds fell 
into the 80% funded range, and UC policy requires that it be 100% funded.
3. S. Marshall et al., Academic Affairs, UCSF, An Insider’s Guide to 
advancement and promotion at UCSF. October 23, 2008. Web 23 
December 2014 at http://academicaffairs.ucsf.edu/ccfl/media/Events/
fdd2011/advancement_and_promotion_Oct_08_slides.pdf  . 
4. Associate Vice Chancellor—Budget and Resource Management, UCSF. Faculty 
Salary Fund Source Profile, April, 2015. Web 1 March 2016, at http://brm.ucsf.
edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/6-4_AVC_BRM_UCSF_Faculty_Sal-
ary_Fund_Source_Profile_FY2014_0.pdf  . This file contains the salary and 
faculty profile data for FY2014, derived from faculty salary ledgers, that 
is included in Tables 6-2, 6-3, and 6-4, as well as Figures 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3. 
It should be noted, however, that ~150 “faculty” (who were not explicitly 
recorded as belonging to one of  the five~ series described in the text) are 
not included in data reported in those tables. Defined as belonging to a 
specified faculty series, the faculty headcount was 2,395, and their total salaries 
amounted to $492M. Both figures are less than those reported in the UCSF 
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Annual Financial Report for that year (reference 1, above), which put the 
headcount at 2,545 and total faculty salary at $542M (Table 6-1 and reference 
1). The latter numbers are greater—by, respectively, 150 people (6.3%) and 
$40M (10.2%)—than we found by defining faculty by their assignment to a 
faculty series. Possible reasons for this discrepancy include: (i) faculty who did 
belong to a specific series may have been mistakenly unlabeled as such in the 
financial records surveyed for Tables 6-2 to 6-4; alternatively, (ii) some of  the 
difference may represent individuals who are in fact “academic non-faculty” 
(a large category, defined in the legend of  Table 6-1) but were incorrectly 
designated as faculty in reference 1. Fortunately, the discrepancies are not 
large enough to call into question any inferences we draw from the data. 
5. S.A. Bunton and R.A. Sloane, The redistribution of  tenure tracks for U.S. 
medical school faculty: clinical MED faculty. Association of  American 
Medical Colleges, Analysis in Brief  15(5) (2015). Web pdf  21 May 2015 
at https://www.aamc.org/download/432328/data/may2015redis-
tributionofrenureracksusmedicalschoolfacultypart1.pdf  .
6. S.A. Bunton, The relationship between tenure and guaranteed sal-
ary for U.S. medical school faculty. Association of  American 
Medical Colleges, Analysis in Brief, 9(6) (2010). 
7. Report of  UCSF In-residence Task Force, 19 February 1999. 
Web 2 December 2015, at http://academicaffairs.ucsf.edu/
academic-personnel/media/inresidencereport2005.pdf  .
8. In this chapter, “department types” fall into four categories: academic clinical 
departments; academic basic science departments; organized research units 
(ORUs); and “other.” Both types of  academic department are represented 
in UCSF’s four different schools. The largest category includes 26 “clinical” 
departments, each named for a clinical specialty (e.g., Otolaryngology, Family 
Health Care Nursing); this category includes three units in the School of  
Dentistry, 20 in the School of  Medicine, two in the School of  Nursing, and one 
in the School of  Pharmacy. The 12 “basic science” departments include one 
in the School of  Dentistry (Cell and Tissue Biology), seven in the School of  
Medicine (Anatomy; Anthropology, History, and Social Medicine; Biochemistry 
and Biophysics; Cellular and Molecular Pharmacology; Epidemiology and 
Biostatistics; Microbiology and Immunology; Physiology), two in the School 
of  Nursing (Physiological Nursing, Social and Behavioral Sciences); and 
two in the School of  Pharmacy (Bioengineering and Therapeutic Sciences, 
Pharmaceutical Chemistry). UCSF’s seven ORUs include the Proctor Founda-
tion, Cardiovascular Research Institute, the Diabetes Center, the Helen Diller 
Family Comprehensive Cancer Center, the Institute of  Neurodegenerative 
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Disease, the Institute for Health and Aging, and the Philip R. Lee Institute 
for Health Policies. The “other” category includes two units: Dean’s Office 
of  the School of  Medicine; Osher Center of  Integrative Medicine. 
9. Data for these increases pertain to the School of  Medi-
cine only, and are cited in chapter 7.
10. The source of  this data is the document cited in reference 4 to this chapter. 
11. Association of  American Medical Colleges, Sponsored program salary 
support to medical school faculty in 2009. January, 2011. Web 13 January 
2015  https://www.aamc.org/download/170836/data/aibvol11_no1.pdf  .
Chapter 7
1. HR Bourne. Paths to Innovation: Discovering recombinant DNA, oncogenes, and prions, 
in one medical school, over one decade. University of  California Medical Humani-
ties Consortium and University of  California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2011. 
2. Herbert Evans, a renowned physiologist, made this remark in the 
mid-1960s to LH Smith, Jr, then chairman of  UCSF’s Depart-
ment of  Medicine. Quoted in reference 1, above, p 2. 
3. The dean was William Reinhardt. The CVRI director was Julius 
H Comroe, Jr, who instigated the successful coup to unseat the 
Chancellor, as described in chapter 2 of  reference 1, above.
4. ORU faculty typically hold joint appointments in regular academic depart-
ments and may teach in those departments and even assume limited 
clinical responsibilities, when appropriate; nonetheless, the ORU usually 
takes primary responsibility for their promotions, their laboratories, 
and administration of  their research grants and contracts.
5. See C Kerr, A UC President’s View of  the Expanding Research Community. Interviewer: 
Nancy M Rockafellar, The UCSF Oral History Program, Kalmanoviz Library, 
UCSF, San Francisco. Interviews December 19,1994, El Cerrito, CA.
6. For the data, see NIH research grants, 1952-1985, a graph on p 65 of  reference 1.
7. Except for the CVRI, which Comroe organized a decade or so earlier, non-clinical 
research at UCSF was rather old-fashioned before Rutter came. See reference 1.
8. The discoveries are described in reference 1. Herbert Boyer, then in 
UCSF’s Department of  Microbiology, discovered how to cut, splice, 
and recombine genes and DNA fragments into the bacterial genome, 
in collaboration with Stanley Cohen, Stanford University. Boyer later 
co-founded Genentech, the biotechnology company, in collaboration with 
Robert Swanson. Michael Bishop and Harold Varmus, also in Microbiology, 
discovered src, the first oncogene. Stanley Prusiner, in Neurology, discovered 
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prions and their role in transmission of  Creuzfeldt-Jakob disease.
9. Information about UCSF’s contributions and discoveries (Table 7-1) and 
scientific awards and prizes received by UCSF faculty (Table 7-2) came 
from multiple sources, including: reference 1 in the present chapter; 
the authors’ conversations with UCSF researchers; a web survey by the 
authors, looking for outstanding accomplishments by UCSF personnel; 
and helpful suggestions from Kristen Bole, UCSF University Relations. 
10. Names of  these departments, their classification as clinical vs. non-clinical/
basic, and the schools to which they belong are listed in chapter 6, reference 7. 
Note that the 12 non-clinical departments, although broadly classified as “basic 
science departments,” include four whose research focuses on social science; 
of  these, two are in the School of  Medicine and two in the School of  Nursing. 
11. Associate Vice Chancellor for Budget, UCSF. UCSF Sponsored Project Expense 
and Overhead Recovery (2014). Web 29 February 2016, at http://brm.ucsf.
edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/7-11_AVC_BRM_UCSF_Spon-
sored_Project_Expense_and_Overhead_Recovery_2014.pdf  .
12. Associate Vice Chancellor – Budget & Resource Management; 
UCSF ICR Benchmarking Data Report for FY 2013-14. Web 29 
February, at http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysi-
wyg/7-13_AVC_BRM_UCSF_ICR_Benchmarking_Data_FY13-14.pdf  . 
13. This M-UP requires some kind of  ruler to compare the values of  
different kinds of  square feet: dry-lab vs. wet-lab vs. clinical-lab vs. 
whatever-lab. What kind of  value do we mean? Is the correct measure 
something like indirect costs recovered per square foot, a kind of  
“landlord’s rule”? Instead, should we base its value on how much space 
of  each particular flavor the present research population covets? On the 
relative value to science or humanity of  various kinds of  research?
14. Common Fund, 2014 Higher Education Price Index. Web 23 December 2014, 
at http://media.bizj.us/view/img/3864291/hepi-2014-full-report-pdf-9-16-14.
pdf  . Note also: (i) over the period in question, this price index shows virtually 
the same percentage change in prices as does the Biomedical Research and 
Development Price Index, which focuses entirely on research expenditures; 
(ii) comparisons in this chapter do not include dollars that came to UCSF as 
a result of  the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of  2009 (ARRA). 
15. Associate Vice Chancellor for Budget, UCSF. UCSF Sponsored Project Expense 
and Overhead Recovery (2004). Web 29 February 2016, at http://brm.ucsf.
edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/7-16_AVC_BRM_UCSF_Spon-
sored_Project_Expense_and_Overhead_recovery_2004.pdf  . 
16. Dollar data in this and the following paragraphs are from references 11 and 14.
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Chapter 8
1. S. Masters, Associate Dean for Curriculum, School of  Medicine, 
UCSF, in a telephone interview September 8, 2015.
2. K Hopkins. SARS, malaria, and the microarray. TheScientist, November 
21 2005. Web 15 July 2015 at http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.
view/articleNo/16860/title/SARS--Malaria--and-the-Microarray/ . 
3. See publications listed in David Julius, UCSF Profiles, 
at http://profiles.ucsf.edu/david.julius .
4. See publications listed in Nirao Shah, UCSF Profiles, 
at http://profiles.ucsf.edu/nirao.shah . 
5. N Zeliadt. Profile of  Kevan M Shokat, Proc Nat Acad Sci USA 108:15046-52 
(2012). Web 15 July 2015 at http://www.pnas.org/content/109/28/11057.full .
6. See publications listed in Ronald Vale, UCSF Pro-
files, at http://profiles.ucsf.edu/ron.vale .
7. Lasker Award Winner Peter Walter, Nature Medicine 20:1112-4, 2014. Web 15 July 
2015 http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/v20/n10/full/nm.3683.html.
8. J Fleischman. The ribosome profiler, Jonathan Weissman. 
ASCB Post, July 6 2015. Web 15 July 2015 at http://ascb.
org/the-ribosomal-profiler-jonathan-weissman/ .
9. Interview with J Weissman in his Mission Bay office, 17 April 2015.
10. Associate Vice Chancellor for Budget, UCSF. UCSF Sponsored Project Expense 
and Overhead Recovery (2014). Web 29 February 2016, at http://brm.
ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/2-4_AVC_BRM_UCSF_Spon-
sored_Project_Expense_and_Overhead_Recovery_2014.pdf  .
11. Personal communication from C. Desjarlais, assistant 
dean of  UCSF Graduate Division, June 2015. 
12. Associate Vice Chancellor – Budget & Resource Management. UCSF ICR 
Benchmarking Data Report for FY 2013-14. July 2 July 2015. Web 29 
February 2016, at http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysi-
wyg/7-13_AVC_BRM_UCSF_ICR_Benchmarking_Data_FY13-14.pdf  . 
13. HR Bourne. Paths to Innovation: Discovering recombinant DNA, oncogenes, and prions, 
in one medical school, over one decade. University of  California Medical Humani-
ties Consortium and University of  California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2011.
14. The HHMI pays salaries and benefits, plus substantial 
research funds, to the PIs themselves; UCSF receives rent 
for the space occupied by these faculty members. 
15. Associate Vice Chancellor—Budget, UCSF. 2014 Report of  HHM 
investigator space occupancy. Web 29 February 2016, at http://
brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/8-15_AVC_BRM_
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UCSF_HHMI_Investigator_occupancy_inventor_2014.pdf  . 
16. American Association of  Medical Colleges, Report on Medical School 
Faculty salaries, 2013-2014. The AAMC provides online instructions on 
how to obtain a copy of  this survey (Web 2 August 2015, at https://
www.aamc.org/download/369956/data/currentgfanowissue.pdf  ). The 
authors examined the survey in the Academic Affairs division of  the 
office of  UCSF’s Dean of  the School of  Medicine on July 14, 2015. 
17. Rent Jungle, Rent trend data in San Francisco, CA, May 2015. Web 29 July 2015, 
at https://www.rentjungle.com/average-rent-in-san-francisco-rent-trends .
18. NIH. Ruth L Kirschstein National Research Service Award (NRSA) 
stipends, tuition/fees, and other budgetary levels effective for 
fiscal year 2015. Web 26 July 2015, at http://grants.nih.gov/
grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-14-046.html .
19. Zillow Home Value Index. San Francisco home prices and values, May 31, 2015. 
Web 29 July 2015, at http://www.zillow.com/san-francisco-ca/home-values/ .
20. Interview with Daniel Lowenstein, UCSF Executive Vice 
Chancellor, in his office on July 22, 2015.
21. Interview with Joseph Derisi, in his office, on April 3, 2015.
22. W. Benow, Creating operational efficiencies with community engagement. 
Presentation to a Chief  Business Officers meeting at the Association of  
American Medical Colleges, September 27, 2013. UCSF Chancellor Sam 
Hawgood gave us a copy of  this presentation in early March, 2016.
23. C.L. Leathers, Director, Academic Personnel. ABOG tools of  the 
trade, Presentation May 21, 2009. Web 30 July 2015, at http://
academicaffairs.ucsf.edu/academic-personnel/compensation-benefits/
downloads/ABOGToolsoftheTrade052209CLL.pdf  .
24. University of  California Academic Personnel Manual. Web 20 
July 2015, at http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-pro-
grams/academic-personnel-policy/ .
25. Dean’s office, School of  Medicine, UCSF. Basic science Departments: 
Resource allocation model, a presentation to department mangers on August 
8, 2014. A. Paardekooper, Interim Vice Dean of  the School of  Medicine, 
UCSF, communicated this presentation to the authors on June 3, 2015.
26. For instance, reference 25 explicitly states that: the School of  Medicine’s 
Dean’s office will absorb annual changes to the SEA; the Dean’s office will 
partner with basic science departments in preparing recruiting packages 
for new faculty; contributions from the Dean’s office to the BSFM will 
include multiple resources, including the SEA and indirect costs from 
sponsored projects; if  a faculty slot is vacated, the associated BSFM funds 
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revert temporarily to the Dean’s office, to be shared by all departments 
until the slot is occupied; the Dean and the basic science department 
chairs, acting as an executive committee, will agree on filling these slots.
27. Specifically, the BSFM would pay ~$100,000 of  actual salary (= $130K/1.297). 
The $181,500 in addition would come to a total salary of  $281,500, and 
the grant would pay the corresponding benefits, for a total of  1.297 x 
$181,500. The number of  basic science faculty with gross salaries greater 
than $281,500 was determined by surveying 2014 salaries of  professor-
rank UCSF basic science faculty (see University of  California Employee 
Pay. Web 24 October 2015 at  https://ucannualwage.ucop.edu/wage/ . 
Of  the nine individuals whose salaries were greater than $281,500, five 
were in the School of  Medicine and four in the School of  Pharmacy.
28. The total faculty salaries assume that professors at each faculty rank earn the 
median UCSF salary listed in reference 16, and that their average benefits 
are 29.7% of  total salary. Thus the total salary includes two assistant profes-
sors at $118,000 per year x 1.297 (= $304,000), two associate professors 
at $145,000 x 1.297 (= $374,000), and four professors at $225,000 x 1.297 
(=2,322,000). Together, this amounts to $3,000,000 in salaries plus benefits.
29. The departments’ share of  faculty salaries, based on the presentation to 
department managers (reference 25), would include 48% of  the total 
$678,000 for assistant and associate professor salaries, or $324,000 (= 0.48 
x $678,000) and $956,000 for 8 associate professors (= 0.41 x 8 x $225,000 
x 1.297 for benefits), for a total—if  the initial estimates are correct—of  
$1,280,000. Presumably grants would pay the rest, or $1,720,000. 
30. Human Resources assesses payments from departments that are pro-rated in 
ways that depend on numbers of  department personnel and their positions 
and responsibilities. Similarly, Research Management Services, a central office 
responsible for pre-award administration of  grant applications, pro-rates 
its charges to the number and type of  applications it processes in a given 
year. Rather than try to calculate fictional amounts, we estimated both 
figures from conversations with managers of  basic science departments.
31. The charge per graduate student at the 2015 rate assessed by UCSF’s Integrated 
Funding Model for graduate programs, which distributes money to graduate 
programs from departments. We estimate 2.5 students for each of  12 PIs. 
32. To pay a host of  disparate charges, ranging from pencils, paper, and tele-
phones to staff  computers, and many other kinds of  charges. This number 
also is arbitrary, based on conversations with department managers.
33. Arbitrary estimations of  salary plus benefits. In real departments these salaries 
depend on rank and responsibilities of  individual staff. See also, Table 8.4.  
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34. This number is calculated from figures in the BSFM plan for 2015, cited in 
reference 25, above. For various faculty ranks, the amounts supplied by the 
BSFM would be: $150,000 for two assistant professors, at $75,000 each; 
$170,000 for two associate professors, at $85,000 each; $420,000 for four full 
professors, at $105,000 each; and $520,000 for four additional full professors, 
at $130,000 each. (The BSFM offers different amounts for two categories of  
professors, depending on their “step” at full professor rank; we arbitrarily 
assigned half  of  these fictional professors to be in the lower category, 
half  in the upper.) The BSFM’s total contribution for faculty salaries, then, 
would come to $1,260,000. Amounts for staff  (12 staff  at $50,000 each) and 
“base” administrative payments ($335,000) are as listed in reference 25. 
35. UCSF Graduate Division, Basic Sciences—Demographics. Web 17 September 
2015 at https://graduate.ucsf.edu/basic-sciences-demographics . 
36. UCSF figures reflect status of  former students, assessed in summer and fall 
2012 (UCSF Graduate Division. Basic Sciences—career outcomes. Web 
27 July 2015, at https://graduate.ucsf.edu/basic-sciences-career-outcomes 
). National averages are from National Institutes of  Health, Biomedical 
Research Workforce Working Group Report, June 14, 2012. Web 27 July 
2015 at http://acd.od.nih.gov/biomedical_research_wgreport.pdf  . 
37. The national average is from the Biomedical Research Workforce 
Working Group Report, as cited in reference 36, above.
38. The 10 graduate programs in basic sciences include Bioengineering, Biological 
and Medical Informatics, Biomedical Sciences, Biophysics, Chemistry and 
Chemical Biology, Developmental and Stem Cell Biology, Neuroscience, 
Oral and Craniofacial, Pharmaceutical Science and Pharmacogenomics, and 
Tetrad. (The Tetrad program combines subprograms in Biochemistry and 
Molecular Biology, Cell Biology, Developmental Biology, and Genetics.) The 
five social science graduate programs include Epidemiology and Translational, 
History of  Health Sciences, Medical Anthropology, Nursing, and Sociology.
39. The total number of  social science graduate students, including the PhD in 
Nursing program’s 94 students, was 165, according to: (i) UCSF Gradu-
ate Division, Social Sciences PhD Programs — Demographics. Web 17 
September 2015 at https://graduate.ucsf.edu/social-sciences-demographics 
; (ii) Graduate Division, Nursing PhD: Demographics. Web 18 September 
2015, at https://graduate.ucsf.edu/programs/nursing-phd-demographics .
40. Annual tuition and fees for in-state graduate students are tabulated for FY 
2015 by the UCSF Graduate Division (Web 3 August 2015, at http://
registrar.ucsf.edu/registration/fees/graddiv ). The graduate stipend 
($32,500 per year in FY2015) is fixed by agreement of  directors of  
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all 10 basic science graduate programs in January before interviews 
with the next years’ prospective students, according to David Morgan, 
director of  the Tetrad program, in an email, August 3, 2015. 
41. Average time-to-degree was calculated for 504 students who graduated 
between 2002 and 2006. UCSF Graduate Division. Web 26 July 2014, 
at http://graduate.ucsf.edu/basic-sciences-aggregate-ttd .
42. The UCSF Graduate Division stressed that these rough percentage estimates are 
by no means precise, owing to the large numbers of  graduate programs and 
separate grants and institutional funds involved. In other words, the estimates 
provide unbiased but at best highly approximate numbers. In this regard, it 
should be noted that at the national level estimates of  biomedical PhD training 
costs and relative contributions from the sources that pay them are notoriously 
inadequate. While NIH itself  pays much of  the cost, it has so far not quanti-
fied the number of  graduate students supported by its research grants, how 
many NIH dollars they receive from these grants, or the proportion of  these 
costs paid by institutions that train graduate students. Moreover, individual 
institutions rarely reveal how much they contribute to defray these costs. 
43. For discussions of  biomedical graduate education and use of  the PhD degree 
to provide labor for laboratories, see B Alberts, MW Kirschner, S Tilghman, 
H Varmus. Rescuing US biomedical research f  rom its systemic flaws. Proc 
Natl Acad Sci 111:5773-7, 2014, and HR Bourne, Is 6 years too long to get 
a Ph.D. in biomedical science? FASEB J 29:357-360, 2015. The latter paper 
also discusses the number of  years required for a biomedical PhD degree.
44. The estimated ~$24M spent on about 500 postdocs comes to ~$48,000 
per postdoc year. Each student year, as stipulated above, costs about 
$50,000, whether it comes out of  a PI’s grant or from another source, 
and thus to the PI is virtually the same as the cost of  a postdoc.
Chapter 9
1. Of  these fold-differences, the first three are derived from data in Table 7-4; the 
fold-difference in sponsored dollars (contracts and grants) is the quotient 
of  73% divided by 18% growth (for clinical vs. basic science departments, 
respectively, both in nominal dollars) from 2004 to 2014, in Fig. 7-1.
2. The examples were collected by polling 18 UCSF lead-
ers and researchers, including seven chairs or division chiefs, 
five wet-lab scientists, and six dry-lab scientists. 
3. See publications listed in Fahy’s and Woodruff ’s UCSF Pro-
files. Web 12 August 2015, at  http://profiles.ucsf.edu/john.
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fahy and http://profiles.ucsf.edu/prescott.woodruff  .
4. See publications listed in their UCSF Profiles. Web 12 August 2015, at http://
profiles.ucsf.edu/louis.ptacek and  http://profiles.ucsf.edu/ying-hui.fu .
5. See publications listed in his UCSF Profile. Web 12 August 
2015, at http://profiles.ucsf.edu/stephen.hauser .
6. See publications in his UCSF profile. Web 12 August 2015, 
at http://profiles.ucsf.edu/david.rowitch .
7. See publications in his UCSF profile. Web 12 August 2015, 
at http://profiles.ucsf.edu/richard.locksley .
8. See publications listed in their UCSF Profiles. Web 12 August 2015, at http://
profiles.ucsf.edu/robert.grant and http://profiles.ucsf.edu/diane.havlir .
9. JC Watts, et al. Transmission of  multiple system atrophy prions to 
transgenic mice. Proc Nat Acad Sci 110:19555-560, 2013. Web 
August 12 2015, at http://www.pnas.org/content/110/48/19555.
full.pdf?sid=f693740d-5f8e-416e-9380-715817f1fa8c .
10. Associate Vice Chancellor for Budget, UCSF. UCSF Sponsored Project Expense 
and Overhead Recovery (2014). Web 29 February 2016, at http://brm.
ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/2-4_AVC_BRM_UCSF_Spon-
sored_Project_Expense_and_Overhead_Recovery_2014.pdf  .
11. Administrative units are listed in chapter 6, reference 7.
12. For a list of  231 different kinds of  NIH grants, see National Institutes of  
Health. Grants & Funding: Activity codes search results. Web 18 August 
2015, at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/ac_search_results.htm.
13. Dr. Hellmann left UCSF in 2014 to become CEO of  the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, and was replaced as Chancellor by Sam 
Hawgood. She was not the “research aggregator” just mentioned.
14. UCSF. Research partnerships. Web 18 August 2015 at https://
www.ucsf.edu/about/research-partnerships .
15. University of  California Financial Schedules, FY2014. Schedule C: Current funds 
expenditures by department; http://www.ucop.edu/financial-accounting/finan-
cial-reports/campus-financial-schedules/13-14/san-francisco-consolidated.pdf .
16. The diagram is based on a personal communication to the 
authors on June 3, 2015 by A Paardekooper, then the Associ-
ate Dean of  the UCSF School of  Medicine. 
17. 2014 Annual Financial Report Overview, October 21, 2014. Web 29 
February 2016, at http://brm.ucsf.edu/sites/brm.ucsf.edu/files/
wysiwyg/1-1_Annual_Financial_Report_Overview_October_2014.pdf  .
18. As described in the main text, above, UCSF defines basic science depart-
ments in several ways. Here the definition includes the five School of  
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Medicine departments whose research focuses on wet-lab biology (i.e., 
Anatomy, Biochemistry and Biophysics, Cellular and Molecular Pharmacol-
ogy, Physiology, Microbiology and Immunology), plus Epidemiology and 
Anthropology, History and Social Medicine. Of  these seven, Biochemistry 
and Biophysics is unusual in that its budget is rarely in arrears. 
19. These clinicians’ contentions are intensified by the high regard and 
generosity some of  UCSF’s former leaders accorded to basic scientists, 
prosperity of  expanding clinical departments and their research, and 
fiscal constraints imposed by flat-lined NIH budgets and contracted 
state support for university faculty salaries and research.
20. Bruce Wintroub, interview December 1, 2014. At the time of  this 
interview, in addition to his job as chair of  the Department of  Der-
matology, Wintroub was acting Dean of  the School of  Medicine.
21. In the Department of  Medicine, examples include: cardiology; rheumatology; 
infectious disease; and pulmonary, critical care, and allergy and immunology.
22. This person preferred not to be named.
23. Robert Nussbaum, interview November 24, 2014. At the time of  this 
interview, Nussbaum was chief  of  the division of  Genomic Medicine in 
the Department of  Medicine. In August 2015 he became Chief  Medical 
Officer of  Invitae Corporation, a genetic information company.
24. Jeffrey Olgin, chief  of  the division of  cardiology in the 
Department of  Medicine. Interview, June 1, 2015.
25. Donna Ferriero, chair of  the Department of  Pediatrics, Interview March 3, 2015.
26. Talmadge King, Interview April 7, 2015. At the time of  this inter-
view, King was Chair of  the Department of  Medicine. In May 
2015, he was appointed as Dean of  the School of  Medicine.
27. American Association of  Medical Colleges, Report on Medical School 
Faculty salaries, 2013-2014. The AAMC provides online instructions on 
how to obtain a copy of  this survey (Web 2 August 2015, at https://
www.aamc.org/download/369956/data/currentgfanowissue.pdf  ).The 
authors examined the survey in the Academic Affairs division of  the 
office of  UCSF’s Dean of  the School of  Medicine on July 14, 2015.
28. Kevin Shannon, Professor of   Pediatrics, Division of  Hematol-
ogy/Oncology, Interview November 5, 2014.
29. UCSF Bridges Curriculum: Foundational Sciences. Web 24 August 
2015, at http://meded.ucsf.edu/bridges/foundational-sciences .
30. Several types of  disease have proved unusually amenable to genetic and 
molecular investigation: cancer, caused by mutations in oncogenes and tumor 
suppressor genes; infectious disease, where genomes of  viruses and bacteria 
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furnished abundant therapeutic targets; disorders of  the immune system 
(asthma, allergy, autoimmunity, and brain diseases like multiple sclerosis), in 
which developmental lineages of  specialized cells opened avenues for unmask-
ing pathogenesis and targets for treatment; neurology, where genetics and 
biochemistry are beginning to unravel epilepsy and neurodegenerative diseases. 
Research in other areas has made important advances: e.g., anti-cholesterol 
therapy for atherosclerosis, electrophysiologic technology for treating 
arrhythmias, micro-surgical technologies. Progress has been slower in a number 
of  common and devastating diseases that may result from multiple mutations 
in myriad genes, such as diabetes, osteo-arthritis, and psychiatric disorders. 
31. These roots began with a distinguished Epidemiology department, 
Steven Schroeder’s founding of  General Internal Medicine, a division 
of  the Department of  Medicine (1980), and Philip Lee’s founding of  
the UCSF Institute for Health Policy Studies (1981; it is now the Philip 
R. Lee Institute for Health Policy Studies). As chair of  the Department 
of  Medicine from 1995 to 2006, Lee Goldman, an expert focused on 
delivery of  health care, further expanded scholarship in this area.
32. Mike McCune. Telephone interview, March 9, 2015.
33. That is, approximately 65%, which was in addition to ~$6M in continu-
ing support of  clinical research centers (CRCs) for experimental study 
of  patients. UCSF’s CRCs had been supported for decades, and the 
2006 grant added dollars for the CTSI to that continuing support.
34. For details, see UCSF Accelerate: Access CTSI services to enable research. 
Web 24 August 2015, at http://accelerate.ucsf.edu/training .
35. National Institutes of  Health, Biomedical Research Workforce Work-
ing Group Report, June 14, 2012. Web 27 July 2015 at http://
acd.od.nih.gov/biomedical_research_wgreport.pdf  .
36. For UCSF’s 13 matriculants in 2015, see UCSF Medical Scientist Training 
Program. Web 26 August 2015, at http://journals.lww.com/academicmedicine/
pages/results.aspx?txtkeywords=Md-PhD+programs+meeting+their+goals .
37. LF Brass, et al. Are MD-PhD programs meeting their goals? 
An analysis of  career choices made by graduates of  24 MD-
PhD programs. Academic Medicine, 85:692-701, 2010. 
38. Chiefs of  three divisions in the Department of  Medicine emphasized that 
both total salary and the K-award portion vary, depending on the division 
and the NIH institute, respectively. The numbers given here are guesstimates 
at best. In an email on September 1, 2015, Maye Chrisman, then Associate 
Chair for Finance and Administration in the Department of  Medicine, wrote 
that the average K-awardee salary in her department (including 59 awardees 
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in every year of  the award) was $160,000 per year (minimum $75,000, 
maximum $240,000), of  which the average K-award itself  pays $75,000-90,000. 
Thus our guesstimates of  $80,000 from the K-award and $130,000 total 
are more or less in the right range for beginning awardees. A varying but 
substantial portion of  the $50,000 difference between these two numbers, 
which is paid by departments, is earned by each awardees’s clinical service.
39. Guerrero LR, Nakazono T, Davidson PL. NIH career development awards in 
Clinical and Translational Award Institutions; distinguishing characteristics of  
top performing sites. Clin Transl Sci 7:470-5, 2014. doi: 10.1111/cts.12187.
40. K Bibbins-Domingo and C. Razler. K-Awards in the Depart-
ment of  Medicine: 10 Year Analysis. Slide presentation (2014); 
communicated to the authors 5 February 2015.
41. Data derived from a personal communication, June 2, 2015, from 
Christine Ireland, plus several emails over the following week. Ms. 
Ireland is Deputy Director of  the Clinical & Translational 
Science Training program within the CTSI at UCSF.
42. Perhaps, for instance, D is just a lonely person, G prone to detecting meaningless 
clues, and E too easily upset by imagined attitudes of  colleagues. Worse, the 
interviewer’s (unspoken but perhaps detectable) bias in favor of  intensive 
scientific communication may have affected one or all of  these interviews.
43. J. Grandis, Interview May 14, 2015. Associate Vice Chancellor of  Clini-
cal and Translational Research, Grandis came to UCSF in 2014.
Chapter 10
1. Holy Bible (King James Version). Genesis 41.
2. Depending on context, UCSF refers to “basic science” as comprising several 
distinct but overlapping subsets of  faculty. The narrow definition of  basic 
science departments (used in the context of  proposal 2 in this chapter) 
combines eight departments whose (112 sponsored) faculty conduct 
primarily biological experiments. A broader definition combines those eight 
departments with four whose (85 sponsored) faculty conduct primarily social 
science research (e.g., in epidemiology and statistics, nursing, etc.). And 
sometimes this group of  197 faculty is included in an even broader group, 
which contains an additional 73 sponsored faculty in ORUs (see Table 8-2).
3. Such a committee might comprise chairs elected by each section 
and a rotating contingent of  graduate program directors, plus 
two or three at-large members elected by BSD faculty.
4. About 95% of  sponsored faculty in basic science departments of  the School of  
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Medicine are in the ladder-rank series and thus would presumably be covered 
by the BSRF and any successor plan devised for the proposed BSD. Two 
less numerous groups of  basic science faculty, however, would presumably 
not be covered by such a plan because (if  they are primarily researchers) 
they obtain virtually all their salary from external sources; these include: i. a 
dozen or more adjunct faculty; ii. a tiny sprinkling of  In Residence faculty. 
5. The average rate of  return on endowments is 5%. Divi-
sion of  $208M by 0.05 produces $4.16B. 
6. Basic science faculty deserve part of  this money because they already carry the 
burden of  paying 50-70% of  their salary from grants, and have no alternative 
source of  funding except the university (chapter 8). While clinician-researchers 
can earn 25-30% of  their salary from grants and still maintain a viable research 
program, they still must earn the remaining 70-75% from grants; if  they cannot, 
they will be required to devote more than 25-30% time to clinical activity, 
further reducing their research productivity and prospects for external funding. 
7. According to the Association of  American Colleges’ tabulation of  PhD faculty 
salaries in basic science departments at UCSF in FY2014, 23% of  School 
of  Medicine faculty were associate professors, who received a median salary 
of  $145,000. Let us assume the same median salary and percentage of  
associate professors for all 112 sponsored faculty in UCSF’s basic science 
departments (including those in the dentistry and pharmacy schools, as 
well as medicine) in the same year. In that case, $75,000 per year for 23% 
of  112 faculty (26 individuals) would come to $1.95M—requiring, at a 5% 
payout, an endowment of  $39M. That $1.95M payout could pay ~40% 
of  salaries (including benefits, calculated as 29.7% of  actual salary) for 
that same cohort of  basic science associate professors. See the American 
Association of  Medical Colleges, Report on Medical School Faculty salaries, 
2013-2014; for more detail on this report, see chapter 8, reference 16.
8. Email to all DOM faculty from Robert Wachter, Interim Chief  of  Medicine, 
December 18, 2015. (An author of  this book received Wachter’s email after 
the preceding main-text paragraph was written.) The DOM salary contribu-
tions will not be continued after promotion to the rank of  Professor in 
Residence; individual associate professors who receive some salary dollars 
from the State Educational Appropriation (SEA) will receive only whatever 
IRAPS dollars are necessary to bring the total to $50,000 per year. 
9. They may have assumed that UCSF’s education of  graduate students could 
not possibly be better than it is now. To the contrary, graduate programs 
could have been required to improve training as a condition for receiving 
payouts from the endowment. For instance, one of  the authors has argued 
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that graduate education can be improved by reducing the time required to 
obtain a biomedical PhD degree (HR Bourne, Is 6 years too long to get a 
Ph.D. in biomedical science? FASEB J 29:357-360, 2015), and has suggested 
to his colleagues that UCSF is the right institution to meet the challenge.
10. N Ruiz-Bravo. Conversation with NIH: The Health of  the Scientific 
Workforce. Presentation 4 December 2007. Web 29 November 2011. 
The Powerpoint version of  this presentation can be found by initiating a 
search on the Office of  Extramural Research’s Public Websites Archive, 
at http://archives.nih.gov/asites/grants/05-29-2015/archive/ .
11. S Rockey. More data on age and the workforce. NIH Office of  Extramural 
Research, Extramural Nexus, March 15, 2015. Web 5 October 2015, at 
http://nexus.od.nih.gov/all/2015/03/25/age-of-investigator/ .
12. A graduate program in the Watson School at Cold Spring Harbor makes 
PhDs faster. See Watson School. Cold Spring Harbor. Web November 12, 
2014, at http://www.cshl.edu/images/stories/wsbs/ docs/WSBSstats.
pdf  . For description of  an experiment to test whether other schools 
can match that example, see the paper cited in reference 9, above. 
13. For instance, shortening time-to-degree would reduce availability of  cheap 
graduate-student labor in PIs’ laboratories. The resulting labor shortage might 
be countered by replacing 2.5 graduate students with a well-trained PhD 
staff  scientist—a move that could probably produce the same amount of  
effective labor but would require PIs to change organization of  their labs, as 
others have recommended. See B Alberts, MW Kirschner, S Tilghman, and 
H Varmus, (2014) Rescuing US biomedical research from its systemic flaws. 
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 111, 5773–5777. DOI: 10.1073/pnas. 1404402111
14. HR Bourne. Paths to Innovation: Discovering recombinant DNA, 
oncogenes, and prions in one medical school, over one decade. UC Medi-
cal Humanities Consortium and UC Press, 2011.
15. One such group might include, for example, an expert at constructing and 
analyzing “big data” in one silo, plus clinicians seeking to understand puz-
zling common clinical disorders (e.g., autism, asthma, epilepsy) in other 
silos. The group may have just discovered robust markers, biological and 
environmental, in subsets of  patients suffering from such a disorder.
16. This paragraph’s quotations are from the succinct, direct argument for UCSF’s 
recent clinical expansion made by Robert Wachter, interim chair of  UCSF’s 
Department of  Medicine. See: R. Wachter, UCSF Health: What it is and why it’s 
important. UCSF Department of  Medicine, Chair’s Corner. December, 2015. 
Web 16 December 2015, at https://medicine.ucsf.edu/corner/ucsfhealth.html .
17. T. Cook. SFGH’s Ward 86: Pioneering HIV/AIDS care for 30 years. UCSF 
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News Center, June 2011. Web 1 October 2015, at https://www.ucsf.edu/
news/2011/06/9988/sfghs-ward-86-pioneering-hiv-aids-care-30-years .
18. RM Wachter and L Goldman, The emerging role of  “hospitalists” in 
the American health care system. New Engl J Med 335:514-7, 1996.
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